Stochastic utility maximising dynamic programming applied to medium-term reservoir management by Kerr, Andrew L.
Stochastic Utility Maximising Dynamic 
Programnling Applied to Medium-Term 
Reservoir Mal1agenlent 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Management Science 
in the University of Canterbury 
by 
Andrew L. Kerr 
University of Canterbury 
2003 
HI> 
9b~S 
'N5~ 
'kltl 
2003 
- (J J u;.! 2003 D 
To Su and Liam 
Acknowledgements 
I wish to thank: my supervisor, Grant Read, for his guidance, support, tolerance, and 
enthusiasm for this work. 
Staff of the Energy Modelling Research Group and the Department of Management 
have been extremely helpful with regard to resources and conference funding. Both 
Trans Power and the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand have provided funding for 
this thesis, sponsored several related projects, and been forthcoming with data. 
I have worked with many talented individuals (Tristram, Glenn, Gavin, Steve, 
Callum, Mike, Mark) over the duration, sharing offices, ideas, indoor cricket strategies, 
and many coffees. They have contributed to 'the process' being enjoyable and to a 
study environment which I consider myself very fortunate to have been a part of. 
Family and friends have contributed in various ways, though Hassan, Otto and 
Alan deserve special mention for their interest and enthusiasm. Su and Liam have 
given tireless support and encouragement in many difficult circumstances and this 
thesis is dedicated to them; they believed in me and always smiled. 

Abstract 
Medium-tenn reservoir management is a classic planning problem to which stochastic 
dynamic programming has been applied. An aspect of reservoir management 
modelling often neglected is 'risk', although it has been identified as being of prime 
importance. A utility function can imply an attitude to risk, and in this thesis, a 
modified stochastic dynamic programming model (SUMDP) is presented which can 
maximise expected utility, where utility is defined over the range of tenninal storage 
and 'wealth' outcomes and hence is dependent on all decisions made over the planning 
horizon. 
SUMDP IS applied to reservOIr management III regulated and deregulated 
representations of the New Zealand electricity system. Experimental results showed 
that increasing the relative risk aversion to low tenninal wealth values reduced the 
mean and variability of wealth and was achieved by conserving water and hence 
increasing storage. This effect was amplified by the contract level of the hydro finn in 
a deregulated case where the reservoir finn was a price setter with financial contracts 
and the remaining players were price takers. 
SUMDP can be applied to other problem classes, one of which is stochastic route 
choice in acyclic networks. SUMDP is discussed in this context and applied to some 
example problems. Rather than a single (static) route choice decision being optimal at 
each node of the network, SUMDP produces optimal non-static decisions which are 
dependent on the accumulated time taken to reach the node and take into account the 
utility associated with the time taken to travel the route. There are few approaches 
discussed in the literature which produce non-static solutions, consider uncertainty, and 
consider risk, so SUMDP also contributes to this literature. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Decision making is an activity that permeates our lives in numerous situations on a 
daily basis. The context and importance of these 'decision situations' (also referred to 
as decision problems) is wide and varied. Many of these situations involve the same 
type of decision process: choosing from a set of actions and considering the possible 
consequence(s) of this decision. While easy to describe, the effort and time required to 
select an action can range enormously. The technique(s) used to select from alternative 
actions can be as wide and varied as the problem at hand, ranging from unconscious 
reactions, to simple rule of thumb and/or 'gut feeling' approaches, to large and complex 
mathematical optimisation models. For complex systems and/or decision situations, 
mathematical models can be a useful, if not necessary, tool for decision making because 
they incorporate aspects of the system and problem which can not be factored in to the 
simpler approaches. 
So what is a mathematical optimisation model? Essentially, it is a mathematical 
representation, or abstraction, of a decision problem faced by a DM. Let Q denote the 
set of prescribed feasible decisions available to the DM. A given decision, q, is 
constrained to be a member of Q, so q E Q . Central to optimisation models is the 
notion of an objective function, which reflects the value to the DM of the consequences 
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of decision(s), and is used to discriminate between alternative decisions. Let this 
objective function be referred to as f(q). ill order to find the 'best', or optimal, value 
of q, the DM solves the following optimisation problem: maximise f(qp ... ,q,J subject 
to q E Q. This simplified model can be extended and modified in a number of ways, 
depending on the problem being considered. 
Stochastic sequential (or multi-period) decision problems are one type of problem 
which can be approached using mathematical optimisation. These problems 
incorporate uncertainty about internal and/or external parameters; they are sequential 
because they involve making (often similar) decisions repeatedly, and often over time. 
Examples of these problems can be found in the areas of inventory management, 
transportation, and finance. Determining the optimal value(s) of q is difficult for these 
problems because the consequences of alternative actions must usually be compared at 
different points in time, and uncertainty can affect what actions are feasible at different 
points in time, as well as the consequences themselves. An important characteristic of 
many of these problems is that uncertainty is resolved during the planning process, and 
the DM has the ability to make decisions which are conditional on the history of 
outcomes. A suitable solution technique for these problems will therefore produce a 
dynamic solution rather than a static solution, because the latter does not allow for any 
adjustment through the planning horizon. 
Reservoir management, uncertainty, and risk 
Reservoir management is an example of a stochastic sequential decision problem. ill 
essence, the problem involves determining reservoir releases over a specified time 
frame in order to maximise the 'value' to the DM of the consequences of releasing or 
storing water. ill the context of reservoir operation in an electricity system, which is the 
focus of this thesis, the 'consequence', or return, from a release is the cost or profit 
from the electricity generated from that release. It is an interesting and complex 
problem because water is a storable commodity, so there is a continuous process of 
deciding whether to release it now or to store it. and release it later. This trade-off is 
made on the basis of uncertainty about future physical and economic factors (e.g., 
inflows and prices), which is often referred to as risk. 
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The importance of considering uncertainty and/or 'risk' can be found throughout 
the reservoir management literature. Yeh (1985) stated that " ... the trade-off between 
return and the associated risk is of prime importance ... " (p. 1805). Reznicek and 
Cheng (1991) comment that " ... long-term reservoir operation has to trade offbenefits 
and risks associated with achieving the benefits ... " (p. 241). Larsen and Bunn (1999) 
state that " ... Governments are risk averse when it comes to the security of the 
electricity system ... " (p. 339). Philbrick and Kitanidis (1999) state that " .. . operators 
are typically risk averse" (p. 136). For electricity systems dependent on hydro 
electricity and/or where uncertainty is prominent, the implication is clear. This was 
recognised by Read et. al. (1992) in their commentary on the use of operations research 
models in the New Zealand energy sector. They stated that " ... a major deficiency in 
our modelling and planning was the inadequate attention paid to risk, and the 
flexibility of different solutions to cope with it" (p. 244). 
Systematic procedures for analysing risk are desirable in an organisational setting 
(Ward, 1997), though the relationship between DM concepts of risk and theoretical 
concepts is a subject of continued research and debate (March and Shapira, 1987). But 
what is risk? The concept of risk can take on a number of definitions depending on the 
situation at hand. Risk is usually referred to in conjunction with, and sometimes in 
place of, terms such as variation, utility, preferences, uncertainty, and hazards. The 
concept of risk adopted here is akin to that in decision analysis, which is a prescriptive 
framework for choosing among a set of pre-specified alternatives with uncertain 
outcomes. What is important is not risk, per se, but the DM's preferences towards the 
consequences of decisions. A utility function can be used as a mechanism for reflecting 
these preferences, and investigating trade-offs between preferences towards different 
consequences (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). Attitudes to risk, such as the DM being risk 
averse or risk seeking, can be derived from the form of a utility function. With a utility 
function defined over the set of consequences, the decision problem becomes one of 
maximising expected utility as opposed to maximising expected value. 
In reservoir management, risk is generally associated with uncertainty about future 
physical and economic factors, and their impact on system operation and costs. 
Reservoir management models that incorporate stochasticity into the optimisation are 
therefore often deemed to consider 'risk'. But in general, stochastic models have an 
4 Chapter 1: Introduction 
objective which maximises the expected value of the returns from release plus the value 
of storage held at the end of the horizon. (The latter term is required to reflect the value 
of storing water for use after the planning horizon). Maximising the expected value of 
these returns, though, does not explicitly consider 'risk' as implied by a utility function. 
Furthermore, if a utility function (defined over 'end of horizon' performance) is used to 
assess the performance in each period, the resulting policy will not necessarily 
correspond to that which maximises utility of the performance at the end of the 
planning horizon (Bard and Bennett, 1991). 
There exists extensive literature on utility functions and decision making. 
Research has addressed aspects such as the form and attributes of utility functions, the 
suitability of utility functions for prescriptive and descriptive decision making, and 
temporal issues. Research relevant to this work will be discussed in a later section. It 
is worth mentioning here, though, that decision analysis can be difficult to apply to 
strategic decision problems (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The nature of uncertainty and 
the set of available decisions can be difficult to prescribe (e.g., the location of an airport 
or factory, the price of a good, or a nation's tax structure). Moreover, there exist 
multiple consequences which are difficult, if not impossible, to subjectively or 
objectively estimate or trade off against each other. On the other hand, tactical (or 
operational) decision problems are often well defined, both in terms of the decisions 
available, and the consequences of those decisions. For this reason, a utility function 
defined over these consequences is a more viable proposition, as is a systematic 
analysis of the relationship between decisions and utility. 
Medium-term reservoir management is a relatively well defined tactical decision 
problem because the same type of decisions are made repeatedly. In simple terms, the 
decision in each period is how much to release, which has some immediate return (e.g., 
profit or cost) and, in conjunction with inflow uncertainty, influences the storage in the 
next period. If the problem were represented using a decision tree, the nodes would 
represent points in time and storage levels at which a decision can be made (assuming 
hydrological and economic events were not correlated). Chance nodes would denote 
uncertain inflows and alternative decisions at the node would correspond to alternative 
feasible release levels. The consequence at the end of branch (a sequence of releases, 
inflows, and storage levels) of the decision tree would be the accumulated returns and 
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storage level (referred to as attributes). In decision analysis, these two attributes 
" ... characterise the full cognitive impact of that position point in time and space" 
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976 p. 31). This is a reasonable assumption for medium-term 
reservoir management problems where the objective has been defined as maximising 
the expected value of accumulated returns and storage at the end of the planning 
horizon. Therefore, the possible combinations of these two attributes describe a 
domain over which a utility function could be defined. The objective becomes one of 
maximising the expected utility associated with end of horizon accumulated returns and 
storage. 
Maximising expected utility of accumulated returns and storage appears to be a 
potential way of representing the DM's attitude to risk, via a utility function. The 
reason for this is that the expected value of utility is a function of all the decisions and 
realisations of uncertainty which occur during the planning horizon. A major 
complication with an objective that maximises utility in a sequential decision problem, 
though, is that it is (generally) non-separable. Techniques for solving reservoir 
management problems with uncertainty (and other stochastic sequential decision 
problems) include simulation, stochastic programming, and stochastic dynamic 
programming (SDP). SDP can handle the dynamic decision structure of many time 
periods, temporal resolution of uncertainty, and non-linearities in the return and 
objective function. However, conventional SDP, along with other techniques, relies on 
the objective function being temporally separable. This can limit the type of situations 
able to be modelled, including one with a utility maximising objective as defined here. 
Decision analysis, while able to handle the objective of utility maximisation, requires 
enumeration of all branches of a decision tree. Each branch corresponds to a scenario 
that could occur. For sequential decision problems with multiple stages (periods), 
states (storage levels) and decisions (release), the number of branches of the decision 
quickly becomes impossible to analyse. 
It would be desirable, then, to devise a method of handling the non-separable 
objective while maintaining the computational advantages that result from the stage-
wise decomposition as well as the other modelling advantages that SDP offers (Yeh, 
1985). One way to address the separability issue is to increase the number of states, 
although this increases the computational requirements, and in the worst case, results in 
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the problem being solved using complete enumeration. However, Kaye and Read 
(1998) observed that a utility maximising objective defined over the accumulated 
returns only required the addition of a single state variable. The computational effort 
required is therefore increased, but not necessarily prohibitively. They describe the 
application of the technique to a centralised 'cost minimising' reservoir management 
problem. Ranatunga (1995) applied this approach to the problem of short-tenn 
scheduling for a thennal power station facing price uncertainty. More recently, 
Craddock et. al. (1999) applied it to a deregulated reservoir management problem 
which they solved using a Dual SDP technique developed from that described in this 
thesis. 
This thesis studies Kaye and Read's technique applied, in the first instance, to 
medium-tenn reservoir management. The approach - referred to as Stochastic Utility 
Maximising Dynamic Programming (SUMDP) - is illustrated using an aggregated 
representation of the New Zealand electricity system, a system which is highly 
dependent on hydro electricity. Indeed, the situation in New Zealand in 2001 has 
highlighted the impact of inflow uncertainty on reservoir operation. After a dry 
summer and inflows consistently below average, storage levels are such that consumers 
are being encouraged to reduce electricity consumption so as to avoid black outs, and 
electricity prices have reached historically high levels. In this situation, the 
implications of the attitudes of hydro companies, and the New Zealand Government, to 
inflow uncertainty and storage levels is receiving considerable scrutiny. 
After discussing reservoir management and introducing SUMDP, a regulated case 
IS considered, where the problem is to schedule reservoir release (generation) and 
thennal plant so as to meet a fixed detenninistic demand. The objective is to maximise 
the utility of the accumulated cost and ending storage. A deregulated case is then 
considered, where the reservoir, while contracted for a fixed quantity in each week, also 
trades with the spot market, where it operates as a price setter. Thennal plant are 
treated as price takers, and the objective is to maximise the combined utility of revenue 
from release and ending storage. In both cases, the models are used to investigate the 
differences in system perfonnance resulting from using utility functions which imply 
different preferences for accumulated return and storage. The results are compared to 
those derived using a conventional objective of maximising the expected cost or profit. 
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SUMDP applied to medium-term reservoir management receives the majority of 
the attention in this study. However, SUMDP can also be applied to another class of 
sequential decision problems known as stochastic route choice (SRC) problems. A 
general SRC problem involves finding a route (sequence of arcs) through a directed 
acyclic network which minimises the sum of the expected arc costs, which are 
uncertain. There are a relatively small number of studies which address the case where 
the DM's preference towards the total cost is reflected by a utility function. Few 
techniques produce a dynamic solution, and these do not consider utility functions. 
SUMDP, while relatively inefficient, can produce a solution which is dynamic and 
utility maximising. SUMDP applied to SRC problems is therefore briefly explored. 
Thesis outline 
To summarise, while risk has been identified as an important aspect of reservoir 
management, few stochastic models have explicitly incorporated risk. This thesis 
presents a variant of stochastic dynamic programming that explicitly considers risk 
(insofar as it is implied by a utility function) and applies it to medium-term reservoir 
management using the New Zealand electricity system. The approach is also studied 
for stochastic route choice problems where utility maximisation has received 
considerable attention but few techniques have been published that produce dynamic 
utility maximising solutions with uncertainty. 
The layout of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 1: 
Chapter 2: 
Chapter 3: 
Chapter 4: 
Introduction. 
Modelling approaches to reservoir management are reviewed, with an 
emphasis on risk and competitive market issues. 
Issues involved with combining utility with sequential decision problems 
are discussed. SUMDP is introduced and related approaches are 
reviewed. 
The application of SUMDP to classical 'regulated' medium-term 
reservoir management using a representation of the New Zealand 
electricity system is discussed. 
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Chapter 5: 
Chapter 6: 
Chapter 7: 
Chapter 8: 
Chapter 9: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Implementation Issues are discussed, including algorithmic 
modifications which reduce the computational requirements of the 
solution approach. 
Optimisation and simulation results are discussed for the regulated case. 
The impact on the release schedules and system performance from 
varying the curvature and positioning of the utility function is discussed. 
SUMDP is applied to deregulated medium-term reservoir management 
using a representation of the New Zealand electricity system. The 
benefit function is modified to incorporate a fixed contract quantity. 
Optimisation and simulation results are discussed for the deregulated 
case. The impact on the release schedules and system performance from 
varying the curvature of the utility function, as well as the contract level, 
are discussed. 
Some extensions to SUMDP for reservoir management are presented. 
These include the simultaneous management of thermal plant, and a 
Stackelberg gaming model, both of which effect the derivation of the 
return in each period. 
Chapter 10: SUMDP is applied to stochastic route choice problems. The relevant 
literature is reviewed, and SUMDP is illustrated using some simple 
example problems. 
Chapter 11: Conclusions. 
Chapter 2 
Reservoir Management 
2.1 Introduction 
Stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) is a useful technique for reservOIr 
management problems because the non-linear and stochastic aspects of the problem can 
be incorporated into the problem formulation (Yeh 1985, Reznicek and Cheng 1991). 
The planning horizon divides naturally into discrete time periods (the stages) with 
storage as the state variable which links the stages. For each stage and state, a release is 
determined which maximises the expected return (or minimises the cost) of the decision 
at each stage and the value of storage at the end of the horizon; future uncertainty is 
explicitly factored into the release decision. 
SDP . is introduced as an approach to reservoir management in Section 2.2. 
Reservoir management for the New Zealand system is discussed in Section 2.3. 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss how 'risk' and competitive electricity market issues have 
been incorporated into reservoir management models. 
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2.2 Modelling approach 
For many years, a common starting point for research in the area of reservoir 
optimisation has been the state-of-the-art review of reservoir management models by 
Yeh (1985). Models were grouped by the type of optimisation technique, with those 
groups being primal and dual variants of linear programming, non-linear programming, 
and dynamic programming. Approaches can also be classified by the number of 
reservoirs considered, the length of the planning horizon, the nature of the objective, 
return, transition functions, and the nature of inflows. Deterministic methods are rarely 
suitable because the characteristics of reservoir management problems do not satisfy 
the assumptions required to produce optimal release schedules (philbrick and Kitanidis, 
1999). Most techniques that explicitly consider uncertainty, rather than using heuristic 
means, are either a variant of stochastic linear programming (SLP) or stochastic 
dynamic programming (Philbrick and Kitanidis, 1999). Here, we are concerned with a 
SDP approach to reservoir management. 
Due to the nature of the discussion in the remainder of the chapter, it is worth 
introducing a classical (and typical) SDP approach, as in Yeh (1985) for example. For 
a T-stage problem, the release schedule (which is a function of the storage level in t) 
which maximises the sum of the returns in each period can be found by solving 
subject to 
(2.1) 
for t= T-l, ... , 1 and given fT+l(ST+l) defined over all ending storage levels. The state 
of the system in each period is the storage level Sf E Sf , the decision variable in each 
period is the release qf E Qt (Sf). The uncertain and discrete inflow in t is at which 
occurs with probability Pr(at ). The return, or benefit, from release qt is reflected by 
rt (ql). Satisfaction of monotonicity and separability conditions (Nemhauser, 1966) is 
sufficient for this decomposition. When the returns are additive (and in this case 
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independent), a stage-wise decomposition is possible because these conditions are 
satisfied. This approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
A drawback with SDP (and SLP) is that it has limited application to systems which 
require multiple state variables. This can occur under a variety of circumstances e.g., 
multiple reservoirs, correlated inflows, and when modelling other aspects of the 
problem. In a SDP context, approaches have been proposed for reducing the impact of 
increasing the state space by reformulating the problem (Read, 1989; Archibald et. aI., 
1997) and reducing the computational effort required to approximate the future value 
function (e.g., Johnson et. aI., 1993; Chen et. aI., 1999). 
2.3 Reservoir management in New Zealand 
Managing the provision of hydro electricity is a relatively important issue for many 
countries around the world e.g., Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, and 
Norway. The reliance on hydro generation varies, though, depending on factors such as 
the storage capacity of reservoirs, the availability of alternative generation sources, and 
network configurations. From a modelling perspective, the important characteristics of 
the New Zealand system are the reliance on hydro generation, the spatial dispersion of 
generation plant, and the stochastic nature of inflows (Scott, 1997). Hydro generation 
accounts for approximately 70% of annual national electricity demand. Because the 
aggregate storage capacity is only 6 weeks (approximately) of national demand, and 
thermal generation is relatively expensive and limited in capacity, detailed planning of 
reservoir operation is crucial. In addition to natural inflows being highly uncertain, 
New Zealand is geographically isolated from any other electricity system, so can not 
rely on external electricity sources if required. A large proportion of hydro electricity is 
provided from two reservoir systems; for medium and long-term planning these are 
often aggregated into a single reservoir. These reservoir systems are located in the 
South and North Islands, with a DC-link used for transferring power between the two 
islands. 
Several reservoir management m04els have been developed/implemented and/or 
tested using the New Zealand system. For example, Read's (1989) two reservoir Dual 
SDP model was the basis ofthe model used for reservoir management by the Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ). Yang and Read (1999) extended Read's model 
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by considering correlated inflows. Scott (1997) extended Read's model by considering 
operation of the aggregated reservoir in a deregulated electricity market, with weekly 
behaviour represented using a Coumot model. Recently, Craddock et. al. (1999) have 
extended Read's and Scott's model by augmenting the state space of their two-reservoir 
dual SDP model with an auxiliary 'wealth' variable, utilising the approach first 
developed in this thesis. 
2.4 Reservoir management models incorporating risk 
Risk has generally been incorporated into constraints rather than the objective (Yeh, 
1985) and the models are only partially stochastic (Philbrick and Kitanidis, 1999). 
Chance constrained models, also referred to as reliability constrained models, solve a 
model which has an additional set of constraints which have a probabilistic term. These 
constraints can be added to LP and DP models. Askew (1974a) described one of the 
first approaches to handling risk in the context of reservoir management. He described 
a 50 period (years) planning model for a single reservoir with stochastic inflows with 
independent distributions. Each period had an associated target release level, which 
corresponded to demand. The risk was defined in terms of a 'failure', where a failure 
corresponded to there being insufficient storage to meet demand. If a failure occurred, 
an economic penalty w was incurred, otherwise there was no penalty. This penalty was 
assumed constant, so the magnitude of the penalty did not reflect the magnitude of the 
shortage. The recursive relation was defined as 
(2.2) 
where at is the discount rate applied to the future value function. Policies were found 
for combinations of reservoir size, inflow distribution, benefit function, and discount 
rate. The impact of w on the policies, expected net benefit, and frequency of failures 
was compared. As w was increased, the expected benefit decreased, as did the 
frequency of failures. Details regarding the size of the failures were not supplied. 
However, the 'high w' policies usually involved lower release levels, so the magnitude 
of the shortages presumably decreased also. 
Using the same recursive relation described in Askew (1974a), Askew (1974b) 
describes a DP model capable of handling chance constraints. Chance constraints were 
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defined as a constraint on the probability of a variable attaining a value outside of some 
predefined bounds. As in Askew (1974a), the reliability constraint was not explicitly 
considered when detennining the optimal release policy. Instead, the values of the 
constraint variables were measured during the optimisation and the feasibility evaluated 
post optimisation. In Askew (1975), w was defined differently than in Askew's earlier 
work; rather than being an explicit cost as in the earlier work, w was added to the 
discount rate (d) which was applied to the value function. The value of w was 
described as a fonn of risk premium in that immediate benefits were valued more 
highly than future benefits, depending on the value of d+w. The purpose ofw remained 
the same in all three papers, being used solely as an incentive to produce a schedule 
which was then able to be evaluated with regard to any reliability constraint(s). 
Therefore, the resulting schedule may not be optimal to the original problem, and this 
point is noted by Askew (1974b). 
Because the penalty is included in the calculation of the weekly benefit, the overall 
objective remains that of maximising an expected value. Therefore, the objective 
remains separable and additive, and the manager is implicitly risk neutral towards the 
distribution of end-of-horizon benefits (inclusive of the penalty). The reliability 
constraint(s) must also be additive over time (Rossman, 1977). In the SUMDP model 
described later in this thesis, a low release level can result in a shortage cost. This 
shortage cost is similar to Askew's w penalty, though it is dependent on the magnitude 
of the shortage. SUMDP is different, though, because the DM's utility of total cost 
(inclusive of the shortage cost) is considered when detennining the optimal release in a 
given period. 
In their comment on Askew (1974b, 1975), Sniedovich and Davis (1975) briefly 
discuss how reliability constraints, which are a function of the values of system 
variables over the entire planning horizon, can be incorporated directly into the DP 
algorithm. They describe (briefly) how the state space can be augmented with the 
reliability variables, and these can then be constrained as described in Askew (1974b). 
For example, Askew describes the following reliability constraint: the average number 
of occasions during the life of the project on which it will be unable to supply its 
forecast release must not exceed a given maximum (y). Sniedovich and Davis suggest 
that this constraint can be handled by defining yt as the expected number of failures up 
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to the beginning of period t. The constrained optimum could then be found by 
maximising the expected value of benefits, while satisfying constraint yt::; r \It, 
where yT =0 (here T is the last period). The definition of l is similar to the definition 
of the accumulated wealth state variable (wt) considered in this thesis. However, 
Sniedovich and Davis do not consider the issue of the manager having preferences 
towards the outcome of that variable. 
Rossman (1977) also critiques Askew's approach and develops a reliability-
constrained DP approach from a Lagrangian perspective. He models the reliability 
constraint defined in Askew i.e., a constraint on the expected number of failures. The 
recursive relation is of a similar form to Askew's because it too includes a penalty for 
violating the reliability constraint (Yeh, 1985). He also defines a number of other 
reliability constraints, some of which are not possible to incorporate into Askew's 
CCDP approach because they are not separable. 
The chance-constrained models described above do not take into account the 
storage level at the end ofthe horizon, nor is it mentioned by any ofthe authors. This is 
a tolerable assumption if the problem is framed in terms of the entire life of a reservoir 
and a stationary policy is desired. If that were the case, though, it would be preferable 
to constrain storage in the last period to be zero or some other desired storage level e.g., 
for future recreation and/or environmental use. One way to reduce the incidence of 
these outcomes, and hence accommodate risk in some way, is to solve a model with 
chance (or reliability) constraints on the probability or frequency of an outcome 
occurring. A drawback is that the preferences are assumed to be linear for outcomes 
that are feasible with respect to the constraint. Chance-constrained models have also 
been developed for multiple reservoir and/or multiple objective problems (Reznicek 
and Cheng, 1991). 
A technique· related to chance-constrained programmmg IS reliability 
programming. Reliability programming uses risk loss functions to penalise the risk of 
choosing an infeasible solution (Reznicek and Cheng, 1991). Reznicek and Cheng 
(1991) present an overview of stochastic linear programming models which include the 
reliability programming constraints and objective terms. These all involve maximising 
the sum of the benefits less any penalties for constraint violations. The approach 
presented by Reznicek and Cheng is considered a multiobjective approach because two 
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loss functions are considered. However, the reliability constraints are still defined such 
that a separable objective(s) can be defined. 
A recent approach which does not use a utility function is the portfolio 
management model of Fleten et. al. (1999). The objective is to maximise the expected 
operating profit (spot and contract revenues/costs) plus end-of-horizon reservoir values: 
(2.3) 
At the end of each profit period 0), expected profit I j is penalised, should it fall below 
some predefined target level (i). Variables p, v denote correlated price and inflow 
uncertainty, Pen{Ij,ij) is the penalty function, with Pen{Ij>ij »0 for I j < ij' and 
V(ST) is the value of end-of-horizon storage. They argue that these (convex) penalty 
functions form implicit (concave) utility functions because the marginal value of 
increasing income is higher when below the target. This may satisfy the economic 
definition of a decreasing utility function, but does not imply anything about the DM's 
preferences for different outcomes. 
Essentially, these penalty functions are a variant of the single-period penalty 
functions of chance constrained programming. The difference is that the penalty is 
defined over the performance in multiple periods and requires an augmentation of the 
state space as in SUMDP. Performance and penalties are measured in like terms, 
though, so their approach is specific to the portfolio management context within which 
it was described. Justifying penalty functions for problems with non-financial 
objectives or non-comparable financial objectives would be difficult. More 
importantly, though, these methods do not deal with risk as it might be implied by a 
utility function. 
2.5 Market issues 
Traditionally, the electricity industry .has been managed by Government-owned or 
regulated entities. In the last decade, though, it has been restructured and deregulated 
to various degrees throughout the world. This deregulation has encompassed the 
supply, transmission, and delivery of electricity. In New Zealand, deregulation of 
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electricity supply sector has resulted in the creation of a number of smaller companies 
that operate in a commercial environment. A consequence of this is that instead of a 
single centralised firm minimising cost, there are now several firms maximising profit. 
The objectives and purposes of the planning models used by these firms must therefore 
be adapted, and reservoir management models are no exception. 
While the dynamics of reservoir systems are well understood (and modelled), the 
dynamics of electricity markets are a newly emerging modelling area. In addition to 
the complexities of physically generating and transmitting electricity, and uncertainty 
about environmental parameters, which affect all systems, additional complexities and 
issues such as the actions and interactions of multiple firms, risk, contracts, and the 
management of the physical and financial assets of firms over time must be considered. 
There are numerous publications which address various combinations of these factors. 
However, there are very few models that consider reservoir management in a 
competitive wholesale electricity market (Scott, 1997). 
One of the issues arising from deregulation of electricity and other utility sectors is 
the influence that firms have on the price in the market, and hence the potential market 
power of firms. The general area of market power and associated strategic behaviour 
has been a subject of recent modelling effort, though there are few applications with 
detailed hydro modelling. One model used for representing the strategic behaviour of 
firms is the Cournot-Nash model. Cournot competition assumes that firms compete on 
the basis of quantity, and each firm makes an offer based on an assumption of the 
output of all other firms. A Nash equilibrium is found when there is no incentive for 
any of the competing firms to alter their generation levels. For example, Borenstein, 
Bushnell and Knittel (1999) present a recent critique of market power models and 
illustrate results of a comparison between perfect competition and the Cournot 
equilibrium. An alternative to Cournot competition is Bertrand competition and 
involves competition on the basis of price (rather than quantity). In Bertrand 
competition, any firm can undercut all other competitors by offering generation at a 
lower price, though they may not be able to physically supply the resulting demand due 
to capacity constraints. This in turn causes instability in attaining an equilibrium 
(Borenstein et aI, 1999). For further discussion of issues involved with equilibrium 
models and electricity markets, see for example Smeers (1997). 
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There are relatively few published approaches for handling reservoir management 
in a competitive (or 'deregulated') environment where there are one or more firms with 
market power (Bushnell, 1998). Scott (1997) and Craddock et. al. (1999) describe 
medium-term reservoir management models where the firms game in a Coumot 
fashion. Optimal reservoir releases are determined using Dual Dynamic Programming 
with the state space in each period being the marginal value of storage for Scott's 
model, and the ratio of the marginal utility of wealth to storage in Craddock et al. 's 
model. The state space is discretised and each marginal value is used as the marginal 
cost of hydro generation when determining the Cournot equilibrium. Bushnell (1998) 
described a multi-period multi-firm model with Coumot competition, though didn't 
account for uncertainty. . Hydro firms were modelled by constraining their total 
generation during the planning horizon (1 month), yet storage and inflows were not 
explicitly modelled. More importantly, these firms were implicitly assumed to be risk 
neutral with respect to wealth because the objective was to maximise expected profit. 
2.6 Conclusions 
While there are many approaches to reservoir management, there are few published 
approaches which systematically account for attitudes to 'risk', or at least anything 
other than non-risk neutral attitudes. To the author's knowledge there are no published 
techniques for reservoir management when a utility function is used to represent a 
DM's attitude to outcomes at the end of the horizon (excepting Craddock et. al. (1999) 
which was developed in conjunction with this research). There are also few published 
approaches for handling reservoir management in a competitive or deregulated, 
environment where there are a few firms with market power (Scott, 1997; Bushnell, 
1998). In Chapter 3, SUMDP is introduced as a modified version of a conventional 
SDP approach to the reservoir management problem. Chapters 4-9 discuss the 
application of SUMDP to reservoir management in regulated and deregulated 
electricity markets. 

Chapter 3 
Utility and Stochastic Sequential 
Decision Problems 
3.1 Introduction 
SUNlDP integrates aspects of decision analysis (see for example Keeney and Raiffa 
(1976)) with dynamic programming (see for example Bellman and Dreyfus (1962)). A 
classical SDP approach to reservoir management is developed in Section 3.2. Issues 
involved with integrating utility with stochastic sequential decision problems are 
discussed in Section 3.3. SlJMDP is presented in Section 3.4 as an approach to 
handling utility in the context of stochastic sequential decision problems. Related 
approaches are reviewed in Section 3.5 and Section 3.5 presents conclusions. 
3.2 Stochastic dynamic programming 
A general stochastic sequential decision problem will now be introduced, such as might 
be applied in the context of classical reservoir management (e.g. Yeh, 1985). ADM 
controls a system over a finite planning horizon. The planning horizon is divided into 
t= 1 ... T discrete stages, or periods. At any stage, the system is in one of a finite number 
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of states, st, where st E st. At each stage and state, the DM can make a decision, qt, 
which is one of a prescribed finite number of possible actions qt E QI. Uncertainty in 
the period is represented by at. For reservoir management, st is the storage level at 
the beginning of t, qt is the release made in t, and al might be inflow and/or price 
uncertainty. 
The state of the system evolves through time, depending on the values Sl , ql, and 
at according to a transition function: 
(3.1) 
For reservoir management, a simple form of this transition is S1+1 = st - qt + al , where 
al is the uncertain inflow in the period. Additional factors incorporated into this 
transition function could include evaporation and spill. 
Associated with decision ql is an immediate consequence (or return or reward), 
rt (Sl ,qt ,at), which can also be uncertain. Typically, rl (.) is a monetary cost or profit 
which can be discounted if required. An additional factors which might be included is 
head effects. The actual definition of r t (.) is dependent on the situation being 
considered. Examples include the cost of meeting demand, profit from release, power 
output, and the difference from a target output level. The state, decision, and 
uncertainty variables are assumed here to be unidimensional, but can be 
multidimensional. 
The objective for this problem is to maximise the expected return accumulated 
over the stages of the planning horizon, plus the value of the state of the system at the 
end of the planning horizon. The problem can be stated mathematically as 
PI 
subject to 
(3.2) 
Chapter 3: Utility and Stochastic Sequential Decision Problems 21 
where II (Sl) is the expected return given optimal operation in all periods and 
situations. Function 11'+1 (ST+l ), measured in the same units as the return function, 
reflects the value to the DM of the state ofthe system at the end of the planning horizon 
(and at the beginning of period T+1). In effect, the problem involves not only trading 
off the returns between periods 1, . .. ,T, but also trading off those returns expected to be 
earned during the planning horizon against those earned after the planning horizon, 
which are reflected by 11'+1 (S1'+l ). (There are alternatives to using a non-zero 
/T+l (S1'+l ), such as constraining ST+l or penalising deviations from a target level). The 
optimal decision in each period is a function of the state of the system in each period, 
so the optimal policy has the form 1[ {ql (sI1 ... , q1' (S1' )}. Because the state of the 
system is uncertain for each period, there is no single state-independent policy which 
maximises /1 (SI); determining the optimal decisions in a given 1 requires that all 
possible futures be considered, explicitly or implicitly. 
One solution technique would be to completely enumerate all possible decision 
sequences. For small problems this can be tractable, but it is easy to see that the 
number of possible futures (or scenarios) grows exponentially with the number of 
stages and states, rendering complete enumeration a near impossible task. An 
alternative is to solve PI using stochastic dynamic programming (e.g., Bellman and 
Dreyfus, 1962), which restates the above problem as Tsub-problems of the form 
SDPI 
subject to SI+1 = T.f(Sf ,qf,af ) 
(3.3) 
which are solved recursively for t= T-l, "', 1 (a process known as backwards 
recursion). The function It ~f) is the expected cost obtained if the system is operated 
optimally for all sequences of random variables from 1 to T. Underlying this 
decomposition is Bellman's 'principle of optimality', which states that "an optimal 
policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial decision are, the 
remaining decisions musl constitute an optimal policy with regard 10 the state resulting 
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from the first decision." There are more general (and hence less restrictive) versions 
(e.g., Denardo, 1982; Carrawayet. al. 1989). 
For the solution to each of the T sub-problems to be optimal for the original 
problem, PI must satisfy separability and monotonicity conditions (Nemhauser, 1966). 
The separability condition requires that 
(3.4) 
for real valued functions gl and g2' The monotonicity condition requires that gl is a 
monotonically non-decreasing function of g2 for every decision in t=1 (e.g., for every 
ql in PI). Decomposition is then possible because 
For the proofs underlying these conditions, see for example Nemhauser (1966) or Kall 
and Wallace (1994). Note that these conditions apply to a case with stochastic returns 
when the uncertainty variable is independently distributed. 
The size of the problem is now linear in the number of stages. However, in order 
to approximate fl(l), the state and decision variables are often discretised into a finite 
grid of points or levels. This is sometimes referred to as discrete stochastic dynamic 
programming, though SDP is used herein. The value of p(st) is calculated for the 
discrete values of Sl by solving SDPI. This involves evaluating fl+l (SI+I) for feasible 
ql. Because fl+l (SI+I) is only known for the discrete values of st+l, fl+1 (SI+1 ) must be 
estimated for SI+I lying off the grid. Linear interpolation is the most often used 
technique (Johnson et aI, 1993). If there are n state variables each discretised at x grid 
points then fl+l (st+l) must be evaluated wxn times at each stage, where qt is 
discretised at w points. 
Alternative methods for approximating p+I(SI+I) have been proposed (see for 
example Johnson et al (1993) or Chen et al (1999)). Some of these have given rise to 
variants of traditional 'primal' stochastic dynamic programming (e.g., Read (1989)). 
Due to SDP's flexibility and the multi-state nature of problems, techniques that reduce 
Chapter 3: Utility and Stochastic Sequential Decision Problems 23 
the computational requirements of determining fl(st), whether by approximation or 
restructuring the problem, are ongoing research areas. 
3.3 Utility and stochastic sequential decision problems 
The importance of considering risk in reservoir management has been discussed in the 
previous chapters. It was pointed out earlier that risk is an important aspect of reservoir 
management, yet there are few published approaches for incorporating risk. In the 
previous section, a classical SDP approach to reservoir management (SDPI) was 
presented as an approach to solving PI. The objective of PI (and SDPI) is to 
maximise the expected benefits from release plus the value of storage held at the end of 
the horizon. As a result, the DM is implicitly risk neutral; decisions are only compared 
on the basis of the expected value of the consequences. A utility function can be used 
to represent DM preferences towards consequences, and depending on the shape of that 
utility function, will reflect the DM's risk attitudes. 
The general form of the utility function to be considered is 
(3.6) 
where U is a real valued utility function. Given the nature ofPl, there are two obvious 
forms that this utility function might have. The first case is where utility is defined as 
the sum of the utility associated with the returns in each period i.e., 
(3.7) 
The second case is where utility is defined over the sum of the returns i.e., 
(3.8) 
Recall that, in decision theory, a utility function is used to reflect preferences for 
uncertain outcomes. In terms of PI, these two definitions of U~I(.), ... ,rT(.)) can be 
incorporated into the objective as 
UI (3.9) 
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and 
V2 (3.10) 
though more general forms are certainly imaginable. For ease of exposition, it is 
assumed that the value of storage at the end of the horizon, V(ST+!), has been 
incorporated into the calculation of rT (. ) . This does not lessen the generality of the 
discussion though, because V(ST+!) depends only on the state of the system, 
uncertainty, and decisions in T. 
In decision theory, VI has been criticised because the axioms which support single 
stage decision problems do not extend so easily to multistage problems (Mossin, 1969; 
Spence and Zeckhauser, 1972; Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Kreps and Porteus, 1979). 
The criticism is due to the fact that lotteries with the same distribution of payoffs can 
have uncertainty resolving at different times, and this affects the DM's preferences, 
hence violating the independence axiom of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory 
(Mossin, 1969). Specifically, the DM's utility associated with uncertain consequences 
can rank alternatives differently depending on when uncertainty is resolved. Therefore, 
the decision in a given period, and hence the utility associated with it, may be 
dependent on the previous observed outcomes, and unknown potential outcomes 
(Kennedyet. a1., 1994). Machina (1989) argues that expected utility can be modelled 
using temporal utility functions. Rae (1971) shows how to handle a case where utility 
is determined over the net present value of the sum of the returns, but does not account 
for system dynamics. Gilboa (1989) argues that additively separable utility functions 
aren't appropriate for representing DM preferences for sequential decisions problems at 
al1. He proposes a formulation which considers the weighted average of utility and the 
variation in utility between consecutive periods. In terms of SDP, though, VI is 
additive and separable over time, and can therefore be maximised using SDP. The 
single period utility functions attempt to reflect a DM's preferences in each period, 
while the SDP decomposition handles the physical evolution ofthe system over time. 
Objective V2 is consistent with a decision theory approach to stochastic sequential 
decision making in that a utility function defined at a single point in time (at 1) is being 
maximised. If the reservoir management problem were expressed as a decision tree, as 
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in decision theory, then a value of utility would be associated with each tenninal branch 
of the tree and the optimal path through the tree could be detennined by folding back 
the tree. For small problems, solving a decision tree is tractable. For example, Kall 
and Wallace (1994) solve a decision tree using SDP for a 3-stage investment problem 
with a continuous wealth state variable and a single attribute utility function. The 
'physical' state variable was the bank account in which funds were held, with only two 
bank accounts considered and all money was required held in a single account; splitting 
the money between accounts would have considerably increased the size of the decision 
tree. The non-linear utility function, defined over tenninal wealth outcomes, is passed 
back to each stage in its functional fonn, given an assumption about the initial wealth. 
However, as the number of states and periods increases, the size of the decision tree can 
become impossibly large to analyse. 
In the previous section, SDP was discussed as a technique for decomposing a 
problem (PI) into T sub-problems (SDPI). As stated earlier, for the principle of 
optimality to hold the objective of PI must be separable and monotone. Recall that the 
objective of PI being considered is 
(3.1) 
subject to the constraints for PI. If U is linear (i.e., there is no risk aversion) then 
returns in each t are just scaled by U. Therefore U can be moved inside the summation 
and: 
(3.11) 
With U linear (and positive), the policy which maximises the expected utility of the 
total returns is equivalent to that which maximises the expected utility of the single 
stage returns. So although U is defined over the returns in all stages, it can be 
incorporated directly into the calculation of the single stage returns. The resulting 
objective is just a linear transfonnation of that defined for PI, and therefore remains 
separable and can be solved using SDPI. Because E[a~f)] *- a E[rf] for some constant 
a' at 
a =u>O, the policy that maximises the expected value of returns will also maximise the 
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utility of the expected returns, which is the desired result. SDPI could therefore be 
solved in its original fonn and the value of U associated with the optimal policy 
detennined aftetwards. Note, too, that if uncertainty is removed and U is non-
T 
decreasing, but not necessarily linear, it is sufficient to maximise Ir t (.) (Nemhauser, 
1=1 
1966). 
The scenario of interest here, though, is when U is non-linear, non-decreasing (in 
order to satisfy the monotonicity requirement of DP), and the outcomes are uncertain. 
As before, total utility is a function of all the returns over the planning horizon. With 
uncertain returns and U non-linear, it is not possible to move U inside the summation 
because 
(3.12) 
so U can not be used to scale the returns in each stage. The utility of all decisions must 
be considered simultaneously, so the objective is non-separable. Because U is non-
linear, E[U~f)];j:. U E~I ], it is also not possible to move U outside the expectation and 
al at 
simply maximise the expected value of the returns; the value of utility associated with 
the policy that maximises the expected value of the total returns will not necessarily be 
that which maximises the expected utility of the returns. 
In summary, Ul can be implemented easily in SDP but has received criticism 
because the timing of uncertainty and decision making induces preferences which 
violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory. On the other hand, U2 is 
consistent with decision theory but seemingly difficult to apply in a SDP context 
because the objective is not separable. In the next section, SUMDP is introduced as a 
modified version ofSDPl which overcomes the non-separability ofU2. 
3.4 SUMDP model 
Let U be a non-negative non-increasing utility function defined over the consequences 
of decisions made over the planning horizon. In tenns of a decision tree, the 
'consequence' at the end of the horizon is represented by the accumulated returns and 
the value of the state variable. At this stage, let the value of being at the final state be 
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reflected by the terminal value function fT+I(ST+I), which can be incorporated into 
rT(e) without loss of generalisation. (This assumption about valuing Sf+1 in units of 
rt (e) will be relaxed later). 
The problem to be solved is therefore 
P2 
subject to st+1 = r:t(st ,qt ,at) 
(3.13) 
As discussed earlier, this objective is non-separable if U is non-linear, so a formulation 
like SDPI is not a valid approach to solving P2. 
Kaye and Read (1998) show that SDPI can be reformulated so that the objective is 
separable. This is achieved by defining an auxiliary state variable, wt , which is the 
accumulated returns (or wealth) up to the beginning of period t: 
(3.14) 
The level of wealth at the beginning of t+ 1 is therefore 
(3.15) 
which is only dependent on the state of the system, the decision, and uncertainty, in t. 
The state transition equation for wealth has the general form 
and in this case, 
wt+1 = Tt(wt st qt t) w , , ,a 
T 
W T+1 = Irk(wk,sk,qk,a k) 
k=1 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
given initial condition WI = O. The feasible range of wt , denoted by W t , will depend 
on the bounds of rt (wt, st ,qt, at), though wt could be constrained to reflect, for 
example, requirements on the return in each period. 
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The (utility maximising) objective of P2 can now be restated as 
;J5{,,:,,[ u( t, r' (ul ,s' ,q', a' l)]} ~ r.a;, {.~)u(wr., llj (3.18) 
with the state transition equation for WI and WI = O. With the value of the storage at 
T+ 1 incorporated into rT (.), P2 can be restated as 
P2a 
subject to 
ql E Q' ~I , WI ), Sl E Sf, WI E Wi , WI = 0 (3.19) 
However, there are two consequences at the end of the planning horizon: 
accumulated returns and the storage level at T+ 1. Therefore, the general form of the 
utility function that needs to be considered is 
(3.20) 
An advantage of using U{WT+1 ,ST+l) is that WT+I and ST+l do not need to be expressed 
in the same units; U{WT+I ,ST+l ) just needs to reflect the DM's preferences with respect 
to combinations of W T+1 and ST+l. For some problems, though, comparing outcomes 
using like units is reasonable e.g., Pl and SDPl used U(wT+l ,ST+I) W T+1 + fT+l{ST+I). 
(An interesting result shown in is that, for a specific form of non-separable utility 
function, the optimal policy in each period is independent of the auxiliary variable). 
The terminal value function is therefore defined over the states of the system at the 
end of the planning horizon, so 
(3.21) 
Problem P2 can now be formulated as a SDP with state variables for the system state 
and the accumulated return. The problem to be solved for t=T-l, .. . ,tis 
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SDP2 
subject to: 
(3.22) 
Using backwards recursion, the expected 'utility to go' in any period is induced from 
the expected utility to go from the subsequent period; utility is not derived from 
combining utility functions over multiple time periods. 
The fundamental difference between SDPI and SDP2 is that in the latter the state 
space in each stage has been increased from Sl to Sl X WI , and fl (WI ,Sl ) is measured 
in units of utility rather than monetary units, which affects the way that fl(WI ,Sl) is 
calculated. This latter difference potentially increases the applications of SUMDP 
because U is not required to be defined over commensurable variables. Adding the 
auxiliary variable to the state space has removed the process, and requirement, of 
comparing decisions in t according to the value of E~I(wl,sl,ql,al)+ fI+1(.)]. 
Decisions are now compared by evaluating the expected value of fl+1 (.) for the values 
of the state variables in t+ 1, with the return embedded in the definition of the state 
variable. SUMDP, of itself, does not place any constraint on the type of utility function 
other than those required to satisfy the minimal requirements of dynamic programming 
as defined by Nemhauser (1966). 
For U2, the attitudes of the DM towards wl+1 and SI+1 evolve over the time periods 
as the recursive relation is evaluated, so explicit attitudes towards them are not 
considered. Whether this is applicable depends on the nature of the problem, 
particularly the length of the time periods and the planning horizon. In a managerial 
context, for example, performance might be assessed during the planning horizon, as 
well as at the end. If the periods over, which performance is assessed is from x to y, 
with y>x, then total utility could be expressed as 
(3.23) 
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If the DM is concerned with n consequences (attributes) which are the sum of 
additively separable 'returns' in each period, and U can be defined over these, then n 
auxiliary state variables can be added to the problem. This observation is not specific 
to reservoir management applications of SDP. In practice, this process will result in a 
problem with a state space increasing exponentially in n, as identified earlier. 
However, bounds on Wi, the form of rt(wt,sl,ql,al), and the form of Umay restrict 
the state space and decisions required to be considered at each stage. This study deals 
with the case where a single auxiliary variable is added. In chapters 5 and 6, techniques 
for reducing the state space required to be searched are presented for the specific 
problems therein (and where Wi is defined as the accumulated returns). 
3.5 Related techniques 
The concept of an 'accumulated value' state variable is not new to the dynamic 
programming literature, nor is the concept of utility maximisation. However, few 
techniques combine utility maximisation and stochastic sequential decision problems. 
This section discusses some relevant techniques and modelling approaches. 
The procedure of augmenting the state space to overcome non-separability has 
been discussed in general texts (e.g., Nemhauser, 1966; Kall and Wallace, 1994) and in 
publications on specific application areas (e.g., Yeh, 1985; Sniedovich, 1989). 
Nemhauser (1966) describes a (deterministic) terminal optimisation problem as one 
where the objective is to maximise a function of the final output state, which is a 
special case of a problem maximising the sum of the returns. 
subject to 'Vt (3.24) 
To represent the problem as a maximisation of the sum of the returns, let 
rt{st ,qt)= 0 'Vt < T and rT(sT ,qT) = U(I:t(st ,l)) = U(ST+I) for t = T , which gives the 
desired relationship 
t < T (3.25) 
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The original problem can therefore be restated as 
subject to tit (3.26) 
which is decomposable into T sub-problems ofthe form 
j'(st)= m~xQt(st ,qt) 
q 
subject to (3.27) 
where Qt(st,qt)=rt(st,qt) for t=T and Qt(st,qt)=rt~t,qt)+ ff+l(l~/(st,qt)) tlt<T. 
With uncertainty (independent in each period), the same approach results in sub-
problems of the form 
subject to (3.28) 
where Qt(st, qt ,at )=rt(i ,qt ,at) for t=Tand 
Qt(st ,qt ,at )=rt(st ,qt, at)+ jf+l(r.t(st ,qt, at)) tit < T . 
Clearly, SDPI has this form. SLlMDP, as stated in SDP2, IS just a terminal 
optimisation problem where the terminal states are W T+1 and ST+l which evolve 
according to the transition functions T~ (. ) and r.t (. ) • 
Ranatunga (1995) applied a version of SUMDP to the purchase and sale of forward 
contracts so a risk averse DM owning thermal plant with inter-temporal uncertainty 
could hedge against price uncertainty. The state variables were the number of units 
committed in t, the accumulated return, and the (Markov) state of prices. The terminal 
value function was defined as 
(3.29) 
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This is a single state terminal optimisation problem with the state being the 
accumulated wealth. Preferences toward the state of the system at the end of the 
planning horizon were not considered. This is a reasonable assumption for a short-term 
problem because the commitment level of the station can be constrained to be equal at 
the beginning and end of the day, and can only be in one of a few discrete states. For 
problems such as reservoir management, though, this assumption is less satisfactory 
because it is storage that is being managed, and hence the trade-off between storage and 
wealth needs to be explicit. 
Commenting on the yield management model of Krautkraemer et. al. (1992), 
Kennedyet. al. (1994) argue that an additive utility function of the form in VI does not 
explicitly account for variation between periods. They suggest that a DP approach 
using an objective such as that of Gilboa (1989) could be used to reflect this. Another 
state variable is proposed to record the expected utility from returns in the previous 
period. The decision in t therefore depends on the moisture level and the expected 
utility 'earned' in t-1. In the context of a ship routing problem, Psaraftis & Tsitsiklis 
(1993) noted that in order to extend their DP model to handle a time window with 
penalties for early and/or late arrival, the state space required the inclusion of the time 
dimension, though they did not elaborate. 
In a reservoir management setting, Sniedovich (1980) considered a constraint on 
the variance of the total number of failures. His study was motivated by the following 
conclusion in Rossman (1977): " ... the variance of the number of failures over the 
reservoir's life cannot be considered as either an objective function or a constraint 
because the resulting mathematical expression is not separable and thus dynamic 
programming could not be used ... " (p.254). The same argument could be (incorrectly) 
made with respect to a utility function defined over the returns accumulated over the 
reservoir's life. Hence, the approach taken by Sniedovich is relevant. If the failure in a 
particular period is denoted by the function xt (st ,qt ,at) then the total number of 
failures over the life of the reservoir is 
( 1 1 1 r r r) '~ t( t t t) X S ,q ,a , ... ,s ,q ,a =.L,.x s ,q ,a (3.30) 
t~l 
where x t (. )=1 if a 'failure' occurs in period t and 0 otherwise. The problem involves 
maximising the expected value of total benefits while ensuring that the variance of 
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xl(e) does not exceed a given value u. While the expected benefit is additively 
separable, the variance of the failures is not; it is a function of all the failures which 
occur over the planning horizon, as correctly observed by Rossman (1977). 
To model a constraint of this sort, Sniedovich introduces a variable yl which is the 
total number of failures up to period t: 
I-I 
/ = Lxm(sm,qm,am) l<t=:;T+l (3.31) 
m~1 
with yf = 0 (note the correspondence to the definition of WI in SUMDP). Because 
Xl (e) is 0 or 1 in any given t, a given / will take a value in the range {O, t-l} and the 
value of yl+l can be determined by 
yl+l = T(SI ,ql ,al ,yf) 
= / + Xl (Sl , ql , al ) 
1 < t =:; T (3.32) 
T 
with the total number of failures at the end of the horizon being yT+I = L rl (Sf, ql ,al ). 
I~I 
Utilising the definition of variance, a Lagrangian problem is defined with the reliability 
constraint incorporated into the objective. A two-state SDP is formulated with a 
terminal value function FT+I(Sf,yl) = -A (yT+I - u Y where u is the mean number of 
failures and A is the penalty term on the failure constraint which was moved into the 
objective. The Lagrangian problem is redefined again as a function only of A' with u 
treated as a decision variable. Solutions are the expected benefit E[B] (given an initial 
storage) and the value of the variance (v) on the RHS of the constraint associated with 
the optimal solution derived using A,. Each solution for a fixed A, is found by 
repeatedly solving the two-state SDP over the range of u. As A increases, E[B] and v 
decrease, or in other words, a higher value ofv increases E[B], which is what would be 
expected. Rather than deal with preferences explicitly, as in SUMDP, this approach 
produces a mean/variance trade-off curVe. 
As stated earlier, the additional state variable in SUMDP is used to make objective 
U2 separable, though there are alternatives. Carraway et. al. (1990) describe a DP 
approach to multicriteria deterministic sequential decision problems. Each decision 
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(arc) has two outcomes, and the objective is to maximise a utility function U(x,y), 
which is defined as a function of these outcomes at the end of the horizon (the last node 
ofthe network). They show that if u(x,y) is used to evaluate decisions (arcs) from each 
node, a sub-optimal path will be produced. This is the same argument motivating 
SUMDP. Whereas SUMDP utilises Bellman's principle of optimality, Carraway et. al. 
(1990) utilise a weak principle of optimality: Han optimal path must be composed of 
sub paths that can be part of an optimal path" (p. 98). This is an alternative to using 
"an optimal path must be composed of optimal sub paths" which underlies DP in 
general and SUMDP in particular. 
With the weak principle of optimality, subpaths are not necessarily optimal with 
respect to the actual objective function u(x,y), where x and yare the criteria being 
considered in selecting a path. Instead, a "refining local preference relation" is used to 
determine preferences at each node. Preferences are induced from u(x,y) and utilise the 
bounds on the criteria at each node. Henig (1990) also utilises bounds on returns, 
showing that extreme partial solutions are optimal and can be determined analytically. 
However, his approach requires a rather restrictive set of assumptions (e.g., uncertainty 
resolved after all decisions made) which exclude problems such as reservoir 
management and stochastic route choice problems. 
Despite the theoretical weakness of using U1, p,'"';\ {"' ,~A t, u'~' (0) l]} , 
Krautkraemer et. al. (1992) describe an SDP application with an objective of Ul in the 
context of an agricultural planning problem. Each period corresponds to a year, and 
utility functions are defined over the returns in each year. The state variable is the 
moisture content of the land, the decision variable is whether to crop or fallow, the 
return is monetary, and there is uncertainty in the weather conditions. They argue that 
the biases resulting from explicitly assuming risk neutrality are considered to be more 
than those arising from violating the independence axiom. They concluded that the 
influence of risk on optimal DP solutions required more research because, at least for 
I:).gricultural problems, DM's can be risk averse ,owards outcomes within and between 
years. 
Levitt and Ben-Israel (2001), developing on the work of Ben-Tal and Ben-Israel 
(1991), consider an additive utility function like Uf. Whereas Krautkraemer et. al. 
Chapter 3: Utility and Stochastic Sequential Decision Problems 35 
(1992) use additive utility functions, Levitt and Ben-Israel consider the certainty 
equivalent of the returns. The utility function from which the certainty equivalent is 
derived is therefore measured in the same units as the returns e.g., a quadratic function 
with a risk parameter as is often used in financial planning. At each stage, the return is 
added to the certainty equivalent of the' cost to go'. 
With an objective such as U2, J'5{.,,:.,[ u(t,r'(o)]]}, utility is defined as a 
non-separable function of the returns over the entire planning horizon. SUNIDP 
handles this by redefining the problem as a terminal optimisation problem. The returns 
in each period, apart from the last period, are set to zero, and the expected utility 
function is induced from period to period via the state transition functions. Therefore, 
the returns in t do not impact on the 'cost to go' in t+ 1 as in a conventional DP 
formulation where the non-zero returns are added to the cost-to-go from the next stage. 
3.6 Summary 
SUNlDP combines the utility and stochastic dynamic programmmg to essentially 
provide a method for evaluating a decision tree that is more efficient than complete 
enumeration due to the stage-wise decomposition. Aspects from both are required to 
approach finite horizon stochastic sequential decision problems where the dynamics of 
a system must be considered and where the DM has non-linear preferences for the 
consequences of decisions. One of the requirements ofDP is that the objective must be 
separable. The typical objective of maximising expected value is separable, but, 
according to utility theory, also implies that the DM is risk neutral, and this may not 
always be the case. Indeed, the reservoir management literature is littered with 
descriptions of 'risk averse' operators and firms. 
Utility functions can be used to reflect a DM's preferences towards multiple 
uncertain consequences at a single point in time, and the form of these utility functions 
reflects the DM's attitude to risk. Extending utility functions to stochastic sequential 
decision problems is usually achieved "by aggregating single period utility functions. 
This can result in a non-optimal policy as well as being problematic from a practical 
perspective because utility functions must be defined for every period. It has been 
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argued that this is in fact a desirable property because the DM has the flexibility to 
define different preferences for different periods. 
SUMDP extends SDP to handle the non-separable objective implied by defining a 
utility function over the consequences at the end of the planning horizon. This is 
achieved by defining an auxiliary variable as the 'accumulated returns', and assuming 
that the DM's preferences are defined over the sum of the returns. As a result, 
preferences are defined over the 'accumulated returns' at the end of the planning 
horizon; utility is defined at a single point in time (at the end of the planning horizon). 
SUMDP therefore does not require that all periods, and decisions within those periods, 
be considered simultaneously. In fact, SUMDP can be extended to a range of problems 
where the accumulated return is a function of a subset of decisions in preceding stages, 
as long as a stage is not returned to. This occurs naturally in stochastic sequential 
problems with a temporal dimension, but also means that SUMDP can be applied to 
problems which can be represented as a (stochastic) directed acyclic network. 
The practical and theoretical applications of such a technique are broad due to the 
relative simplicity of the conditions required to extend a SDP formulation to handle the 
'utility maximising' formulation. A drawback, though, is that the auxiliary variable 
increases the number of states evaluated at each stage. Methods for reducing the 
impact of this are dependent on the characteristics of the problem. 
The problem considered in this thesis is that of medium-term reservOIr 
management. It is a well researched problem, with SDP being a suitable modelling 
technique due to its relative flexibility and ability to model the dynamics of reservoir 
operation and inflow uncertainty. However, SDP methods are usually defined with an 
objective of maximising expected value; if risk is considered, it is normally 
incorporated into the constraints of the problem (Yeh, 1985). SUMDP develops on 
existing reservoir management models which incorporate risk because the objective is 
to maximise the utility of accumulated returns and storage at the end of the planning 
horizon. Furthermore, electricity market deregulation has affected the environment in 
which many reservoir systems are managed. The return from a release is now a 
revenue rather than a cost and can be derived in a variety of ways depending on the 
assumptions made about the nature of competition. There are very few reservoir 
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management models which address the issues involved in 'deregulated' reservOIr 
management, and none that incorporate risk attitudes using a utility function. 
The layout of the remainder of this thesis is as follows. 
• Chapters 4 and 5 present theoretical and implementation issues for SUMDP 
applied to a reservoir management in a regulated (or centralised) system. 
presents experimental results. 
• Chapters 7 and 8 present theoretical/implementation issues and experimental 
results for reservoir management in a deregulated (or decentralised) 
environment. 
• discusses some extensions to SUMDP when modelling reservoir management 
in a deregulated environment. 
• departs from the reservoir management theme and discusses SUMDP in the 
context of stochastic route choice problems, which are a form of sequential 
stochastic decision problem for which utility maximisation is relevant but has 
received relatively little attention. 
• presents conclusions. 

Chapter 4 
SUMDP and Reservoir Management in a 
Regulated Electricity Market 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, SUMDP was introduced as an approach to stochastic 
sequential decision problems where the objective is to maximise utility. This technique 
can be applied to reservoir management, which involves planning future releases given 
uncertainty about future inflows into the reservoir. For classical reservoir management 
in electricity generation systems, the objective of stochastic models is typically to 
minimise the expected cost of satisfying demand from non-hydro generation. This is 
consistent with the objective used the 'regulated' or Government-owned electricity 
system as existed in New Zealand prior to deregulation. However, this objective 
implicitly assumes that the reservoir is operated in a risk neutral manner, and this 
assumption may not always be appropriate. The nature and impacts of the stochasticity 
inherent in this problem, added to the fact that it is relatively well defined, make it a 
suitable candidate for analysing the impact of utility functions on system performance. 
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This chapter discusses how SUMDP can be applied to a classical medium-tenn 
reservoir management problem, as faced when managing hydro reservoirs and thennal 
plant in the New Zealand electricity system prior to deregulation. The layout of this 
chapter is as follows: 
• The SUMDP fonnulation for the problem is presented in Section 4.2. 
• A two-state transition function is discussed in Section 4.3. 
• Utility functions are discussed in Section 4.4. 
• Conclusions are presented in Section 4.5. 
Throughout this chapter, concepts are illustrated using a representation of the New 
Zealand system data used to derive the experimental results in , as well as using 
illustrative data. 
4.2 SUMDP and 'regulated' reservoir management 
The situation considered here is that faced by a DM managing a reservoir and a number 
of other electricity supply sources such as run-of-river hydro stations and thennal 
sources. Demand must be met in each period and there are bounds on release and on 
storage. The inflows experienced in each week are uncertain. The objective is to 
dispatch the system to maximise the expected value of storage and benefits (negative 
costs) at the end of the horizon. This situation is representative of that faced by a 
Government or similar entity that manages the supply of electricity to consumers. The 
same circumstances could be faced by a finn (or agent), operating in a regulated or 
deregulated market but being required to satisfy a demand target. Instead of meeting 
national demand, the agent would meet a demand target specified by the principal. 
In reservoir planning problems, it is necessary to value tenninal storage (using a 
water value function) to ensure that adequate storage is carried through to the next 
planning horizon. Reservoir management models (e.g., Yang, 1995; Scott, 1997) use a 
water value function, V(ST+l), which is defined over the ending storage levels and 
increases at a non-increasing rate as ST+l increases. In. a classical primal DP model, 
V(ST+l) is used as the tenninal value function (in dual DP (Read, 1989) the marginal 
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water value function, or av(sT+! )jasT+! , is used). In terms of a conventional DP 
formulation, the 'cost to go' in the final period is defined as fT+!(ST+l)=V(ST+!). 
V(ST+!) can be provided from a higher level model which has a longer time frame (say 
20 years), or from solving a model to equilibrium. (A conventional SDP approach 
(SDPI) to the reservoir management problem PI was introduced in). 
In SUNIDP, the terminal value function reflects the desirability of achieving 
different levels of storage and accumulated wealth at the end-of-horizon, so 
(4.1) 
An alternative is to substitute V (ST+! ) for ST+! in the definition of U(wT+! ,ST+!), which 
implies both terms of the utility function are in monetary units. This reduces generality 
but may aid DMs in defining a utility function. Neither alternative makes any 
difference to the computational effort of the technique. 
SUMDP was introduced in. The SDP model of interest here, referred to as RM-R 
(Reservoir Management - Regulated) is essentially the same as that described in , and 
can be described as follows 
RM-R \It 
subject to: \It 
\It 
\It 
\It 
(4.2) 
where 
T is the finite set of periods (t) in the planning horizon. 
the accumulated cost at the beginning of t. 
42 
q, 
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the reservoir storage level at the beginning of t (measured in units 
of electricity e.g. MWh or GWh). 
is the expected end-of-horizon utility for a given wealth and storage 
combination in period t. 
the stochastic inflow into the reservoir during t. It is assumed that a 
distribution of inflows can be described (in this case based on 
historical data), and that these inflows are not correlated over time. 
See Yang (1995) for treatment of the correlated case. 
the release during t which is the decision variable in each stage and 
state. The optimal release in a given period, ql{Wf ,Sf), is a 
function of w' and S' i.e., cr{wt ,Sf)= argmax E[rI+l(Wt+l ,SIH )]. 
'!.'5,q' 5,£/ 
is a function describing the cost from release, and is a specific form 
of the more general rt(wt,sl,ql,a l). The benefit function is 
different in each period because it incorporates parameters such as 
demand and the cost of meeting demand; it does not depend on the 
level of the state or inflow variables. 
§..I ,Sl are the lower and upper bounds on storage in t. 
l, q' are the lower and upper bounds on release in t. 
The SDP is solved here using discrete dynamic programming, though it could be solved 
by other SDP variants such as Dual DP (Read & George, 1995) or Constructive DP 
(Travers and Kaye, 1997), as exemplified by the work of Craddock et. al. (1999). As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the aspects of SUMDP which differ from a 
conventional DP approach are the incorporation of the benefit function in to the 
transition of wt to Wf+l, and the utility function U{WT+1 ,ST+l). These two aspects of the 
problem are discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. (Issues relating to the 
solution technique and other implementation issues are discussed in further detail in ). 
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4.3 The benefit function 
The type of regulated electricity system considered here is one where a single entity, or 
DM, manages a number of generating plant so as to meet demand in each period. The 
case considered here is where the DM manages a single reservoir and a number of 
'non-reservoir' plant e.g., coal-fired, oil-fired and geothermal plant. The return from 
release in each period is the cost of satisfying an estimate of demand. In order to 
estimate this cost, demand and supply must be modelled, as discussed below. 
4.3.1 Demand and supply 
Weekly demand can be represented by a load duration curve (LDC), which reflects a 
cumulative probability distribution for load, or equivalently, the proportion of the week 
for which each possible load level will last. For example, extremely high demand will 
only occur for a few hours each week, and there will be some minimum load that must 
be satisfied for every hour of the week. The LDC is essentially a continuous curve, but 
for the purposes of the optimisation, must be approximated in some way. A common 
way is to divide the LDC into discrete time segments, termed sub-periods, during which 
the demand is approximated using a single demand curve. 
Load 
SPI SP2 SP3: 
I Time 
Figure 4.1: Approximating LDC with multiple 'fixed' demand curves 
Figure 4.1 illustrates a weekly LDC and a 3-subperiod approximation where the 
demand in each sub-period is approximated by a fixed (or constant) quantity. When 
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demand is approximated by a fixed demand level, it is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, 
so the quantity demanded does not change as the price changes. More generally, there 
will be some price, albeit extremely high, at which any party will be willing and able to 
decrease its quantity demanded. 
Demand is usually modelled by a function describing the relationship between 
price and quantity. Examples include constant, linear, quadratic or constant elasticity 
demand curves. Demand for a constant quantity of electricity can be represented 
mathematically (and in inverse form) as 
g(p) d (4.3) 
where d is a constant. A linear demand curve can be represented by the function 
(4.4) 
where Po >0 and PI <0 (t superscripts have been excluded). Here, p(g) reflects the 
price, per unit, that consumers are prepared to pay for some quantity g. For the 
constant elasticity case, ifthe price elasticity of demand is defined as 
8= 
8p g 
(4.5) 
then the inverse market demand curve can be described as 
1 
p(g)= p'[:,Y (4.6) 
where Po and go are reference points for price and generation through which the 
demand curve passes. The linear demand curve can also be defined in this way i.e., as a 
line with a negative slope that passes through a reference point. 
The remainder of this analysis for this regulated case assumes fixed demand (as 
does the deregulated case discussed in later chapters). Using linear and constant 
elasticity demand curves would potentially aid in making the model more realistic. 
These can be implemented with relative ease and do not jeopardise the SDP algorithm 
because the form of the resulting benefit function remains, convex in the release level 
(see for the linear demand case). 
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Demand is met in each period by a combination of generation from reservoir 
release and thermal plant. The non-hydro plant are referred to as 'thermal plant', and 
have the (assumed) characteristic that they will generate any quantity specified by the 
DM and that inter-temporal linkages do not need to be explicitly modelled. The bounds 
on generation for each plant in each period are assumed known, so 
Vi (4.7) 
where g: is the generation of thermal station i in period t, and g:, g: are the 
-I 
lower/upper generation bounds. Total system generation in a period is therefore 
comprised of the electricity provided from reservoir release and the contributions from 
I other power stations: 
I 
g~ =qt + Lg: (4.8) 
i=l 
Because the interaction between supply and demand was not a primary focus (as in 
Scott (1997) for example), demand in each period was assumed to be constant. In fact, 
for a given linear demand curve, a fixed demand curve can be defined such that the 
prices resulting from release closely approximates those obtained using a linear 
demand. Furthermore, Scott (1997) argued that the choice between a linear and 
constant elasticity demand curve was essentially arbitrary, so long as the equilibrium 
wasn't too far away from the reference points. With fixed demand, then, the load met 
by the other stations, given release qt, is therefore d t qt, and the cost of generating 
this amount can be calculated by considering the generation costs of the thermal plant. 
Release in a given period must be feasible with respect to storage bounds. Storage 
bounds can be handled in a variety of ways, depending on when inflows are assumed to 
arrive in the reservoir. It is assumed, rather conservatively, that release qt is actually 
made, not only before at is known, but before any inflow occurs at all. Thus a feasible 
release also satisfies 
(4.9) 
(Equivalently, the minimum release bound can be represented by ct being a non-
decreasing function of the storage level and qt ::;; zt (st)). Using this approach avoids 
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having to handle the situation where the release exceeds the inflow, resulting in a 
negative storage because 81+1 < §.1+1. At the other extreme, 8 1+1 is bounded at Sl+l, so 
the quantity (i - qf + at) - Sf is treated as being spilled and at no cost. The benefit to 
consumers would remain constant since the extra release is essentially spilled, and it is 
likely that excessive spill will be undesirable. Though only likely to occur when 
storage is high, release decisions which imply excessive spill could be penalised in 
order to reflect non-electricity related costs such as the environmental costs of flooding. 
If these costs were convex, which seems a realistic assumption, the cost curve would 
start to rise again as spill increases. 
In terms of thermal generation, each thermal plant has a known marginal fuel cost, 
ci ' and the stations are dispatched in order of marginal cost, from lowest to highest. 
These capacities and marginal costs can be used to construct a stepped supply curve 
which represents, for each feasible generation level, the lowest (unit) cost of supplying 
another unit of generation. To illustrate some of the concepts in this chapter a 
hypothetical system with a single reservoir and 3 stations will be referred to. The 
capacities and marginal costs of the stations and the reservoir release bounds are shown 
in Table 4.1 and the stepped supply curve is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
i 1 -I ~i gj ci 
Station 1 0 6 $20 
Station 2 0 6 $40 
Station 3 0 3 $50 
ql 7t 
Reservoir 0 10 
Table 4.1: Illustrative system data 
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Figure 4.2: Supply curve 
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The MWh costs are of a similar scale to those of stations in the New Zealand electricity 
system. When a single demand curve is used, outputs from this analysis are multiplied 
by 168 to represent the same dispatch occurring for the entire week (168 hours). Note 
that in order to ensure an intersection between the supply and demand curves exists, 
additional steps can be added to the supply curve. These would have substantially 
higher marginal costs than the existing thermal plant and reflect the cost of non-supply, 
or shortage. In the experimental results discussed in Chapter 6, for example, the supply 
curve is augmented with a single 'shortage' step (or dummy thermal station) with a 
marginal cost of $500IMWh. This shortage cost has also been used in other reservoir 
management models for the New Zealand system (e.g. Yang, 1995), and IS 
approximately twenty times larger than the average marginal cost of generation. 
4.3.2 Deriving the benefit from release 
Recall that demand for electricity in the period is approximated with a constant demand 
leveL This demand is met by a combination of reservoir release, qf, and thermal 
generation and the cost of meeting the demand not met by reservoir release can be 
expressed as 
I 
ct(qf ,dt ,gt ,ct )= L g:c: (4.10) 
i=l 
where gt is the vector of thermal generation levels and e is the vector of thermal 
marginal costs. The largest cost is incurred when qt = 0, and, ignoring storage bounds, 
the lowest cost is incurred when qt = 'iit . Note that release is discretised at K points, 
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with a particular discrete release being indicated with the subscript k. This subscript is 
only included when necessary. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the stepped supply curve, as well as how the demand (fixed) 
of 12MW is met when q~ = 3. Station 1 is fully dispatched and station 2 is partially 
dispatched, so g{ = g[ and gt ~ g~ ~ g~. Station 3 is not dispatched because C3 > C2 
-2 
and g~ < g~. If the electricity required from station 2 changes, as a result of increasing 
release, say, and g~ remains within its bounds, station 2 will remain the cheapest 
supplier of electricity. Station 2 is referred to as the marginal station because it is 
supplying the 'last' unit of generation, and at the marginal production cost c2 • 
c. 
, .4~ 
I 
I I Supply 
C3 ...................................................................................................................... ,.....---' curve 
C
2 
.. , ....... " ..... , ................. , .... " ..... ,', .............. ', .... ' 
c) ............... , ....... r-------! 
g~ 
o 3 9 12 
Figure 4.3: Supply/demand equilibrium (fixed demand) 
An increase in qt of IMW shifts the supply curve to the right, reducing the generation 
of the marginal station and reducing the total cost by the marginal cost of that station. 
Thus, an additionallMW of hydro generation will reduce g,~ by IMW for the marginal 
station. 
An alternative, and equivalent, way to consider this process is to create a residual 
demand curve (or demand curve for release), which is the demand curve faced by the 
reservoir given the potential output from the thermal stations. It is derived by 
subtracting the thermal supply curve from the demand curve. When demand is fixed at 
quantity d t , the RDC is the mirror image (vertical axis) of the supply curve truncated 
at d t , which is shifted so that d t becomes the y-axis through the origin. Figure 4.4 
shows the RDC using the supply and demand curves in Figure 4.3. 
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C. 
I ~~ / dt 
C2 ' 
c1 ---t--!-, ------. : ! : : 
q~ g~ 
o 3 6 12 
Figure 4.4: Residual demand curve (fixed demand) 
The cost of meeting demand is the area under the RDC curve between ql and d t , or 
d' 
cr(ql,dl,gt,c')= JRDCt(ql}Jql (4.11) 
q' 
Figure 4.5 illustrates cr(.) for the range of feasible qt using illustrative gt and c' 
values and with d t = 12MW. As ql increases, the amount of thermal generation 
decreases, and so does the cost. A change in the slope of the curve corresponds to 
moving to an adjacent step in the RDC with an equal or lower marginal cost, so cr (.) 
IS convex. 
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Figure 4.5: Cost of meeting demand (fixed demand) 
Ignoring storage bounds, if (t ~ d l then it will be feasible to satisfy demand from 
hydro generation alone, and the total cost will be cr (.) = O. In this model, {t :::;; d t , 
though the case where qt > d l is not unrealistic. 
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This approach can be generalised. For example, a similar convex cost function is 
derived by Pereira, Campodonico, and Kelman (1998), who describe a probabilistic 
model which calculates the expected cost of satisfYing demand for the range of 
reservoir release levels. The model takes account of forced thermal plant outages and 
does not require any approximations of the LDC. Calculating the cost when hydro 
replaces the merit order position of the different thermal stations produces the cost 
function. The cost curve they describe is convex and piecewise linear, which is the 
same general form as the cost curves described in the following sections. A similar 
approach was used in PRISM, which was a Dual DP based model (Read and George, 
1990) used for planning of electricity supply in New Zealand. 
In the context of satisfying a national demand where the consumers, via the 
Government, say, own the generation stations, BI (ql) should represent the (national) 
benefit to electricity users from consuming d t , NB(d t ), less the cost of producing d t : 
(4.12) 
However, if demand is assumed to be inelastic, then NB(d t ) is constant and can be 
ignored. Thus: 
(4.13) 
Figure 4.6 illustrates Bt (qt) for d t = 12MW , which is C' (.) flipped horizontally and 
shifted down the y-axis by the cost associated with qt =0. In the absence of spill 
penalties, Bt (qt) is non-decreasing and increases at a non-increasing rate over the 
range of feasible release levels. See for illustrations of the form of Bt (qf) when 
demand is modelled using a linear curve. 
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Figure 4.6: Bt (ql) for cost minimiser (fixed demand) 
As discussed earlier, weekly demand can be approximated by demand curves 
which represent demand in each sub-period. The optimal release in each sub-period 
will be that which maximises BI (ql ), given some value of qt, say q~. It is assumed 
that wt and Sl do not affect Bt(qt), so Bt(qt) need only be calculated once in each 
period. Let q~s be the release in sub-period s given total release in the period is q~ and 
where S is the set of sub-periods. For weekly release level q~, the optimal values of q! 
maXImIse or, equivalently, mImmIse sInce 
Bt(qO=-C'(q~,dt,gl,ct). Thermal generation in each sub-period, g~is' is also 
optimised since marginal costs (c~) are assumed constant for each thermal station in 
each sub-period. Constant demand in each sub-period is denoted by d: and is weighted 
by r:, where Ir: = 1 and r: indicates the proportion of the weekly load that d: is 
SES 
approximating. 
The optimal release allocation (ORA) problem can be stated as: 
ORA 
subject to 
52 Chapter 4: SUMDP and Reservoir Management in a Regulated Electricity Market 
(4.14) 
The objective is to detennine sub-period releases q~s' and thennal generation g~iS' so as 
to maximise the negative (convex) costs of thermal generation in each sub-period. The 
first constraint ensures that the sum of the releases in each sub-period equals the total 
release to be allocated. Next, (weighted) demand in each sub-period is satisfied by the 
hydro and thennal generation. Lastly, hydro release and thennal generation are 
constrained to be less than the upper generation bound, which is weighted by r! for 
thennal plant. 
In the optimal solution to ORA for a given q~, release will be allocated to the sub-
period with the largest marginal cost of thennal generation. As q~ is increased, and 
ORA re-solved, the additional release will be allocated to offset thennal general with 
the same, or lower, marginal cost. The benefit function Bt (ql) will therefore be a non-
decreasing function of qt, with a non-increasing slope. 
Theorem 4.1. Bt (qt ) is non-decreasing at a non-increasing rate (qt increasing). 
Proof The optimal release allocation over the sub-periods available will offset thennal 
generation in order of highest to lowest marginal cost. With marginal costs non-
negative, increasing qt will cause a non-negative change in thennal generation, which 
will incur a non-negative cost. The associated change in B' (qt) will therefore be non-
negative and Bt (ql) will therefore be non-decreasing. An increase in qt of one unit 
will reduce the total cost by the marginal cost of the most expensive operating thennal 
stations. With thennal costs convex, this marginal cost will decrease as ql increases, 
so Bt (ql) will increase at a non-increasing rate. 
In fact, the benefit from a particular release can be calculated directly by summing 
the weighted sub-period RDCs to create an aggregate RDC, RDCt (ql ), by 
RDC~(ql)= Ir:RDC;(qt) (4.15) 
seS 
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where RDC: (qt) is the RDC in a particular sub-period. The benefit from release 
d' 
function can then be calculated as Bt (ql ) = - j RDC~ (qt pqt . BI (qt) could be 
q' 
measured in other ways, depending on the way demand is represented and the obj ective 
oftheDM. 
4.3.3 State transition 
Given the form of Bt (qt ), it is worth considering in more detail the transitions of the 
wealth and storage variables from period to period. Recall that the state transition 
equations are Wt+1 = Wi + Bt (ql) and St+1 = i - ql + al for wealth and storage, 
respectively. For a particular (Wi, Sl) pair, the 'state transition possibility curve' 
(STPC) traces the values of W I+1 and St+1 over the range of feasible release levels. 
The weekly benefit, Bt (qt ), is defined here as the cost of generation supplied from 
other generation sources to ensure that demand is met, as introduced in the previous 
subsection. As was shown, BI (ql) is calculated as the cost of (optimally dispatched) 
thermal generation required to meet demand. As qt increases, the amount of thermal 
generation decreases, and so does the cost. A low release incurs a large cost (low 
benefit) and a high release incurs a low cost (high benefit). A change in the slope of the 
Bt(qt) corresponds to moving to an adjacent step in the stepped supply curve. 
Assuming these stations are dispatched in order of their marginal cost, Bt (ql) is a non-
decreasing function (in release, and hence in storage) that increases at a non-increasing 
rate (Theorem 4.1). Each additional unit of reservoir release displaces the most 
expensive unit of thermal generation. 
If qt > d l the benefit remains constant since the extra release is effectively spilled. 
It is likely that excessive spill will be undesirable, in which case it could be penalised 
and the cost curve could rise (benefit fall) as the level of spill increases. In that case, 
precautionary spill may be desirable. 'In this model, qt can not exceed d t because 
(t ~ d t so it is not possible for spill to be optimal unless inflows imply excess storage, 
in which case spill can occur. This is represented in the storage balance equation by 
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defining S1+1 :::;; st - ql + at. A slack variable is used to ensure that S1+1 :::;; S1+1, and it 
will be non-zero if Sl - ql + a l > st+1 . 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the STPC starting from the point (w~,s~), on the space 
W1+1 X St+1 for a given demand d t , and over the range of feasible release levels, 
ql :::;; ql :::;;?t. The starting point is (w~,s~), point 'A', which is mapped directly on to 
point 'B' in W 1+1 x S1+1. Note that w~ will not map on to W~+1 if different grid 
discretisations are used. The inflow is (conservatively) assumed to be zero; so that s~ 
maps to S~+1 if qt =0, as is assumed here. The uncertain inflows are handled 
independently of the release decision, and hence the STPC. (ill Chapter 5, it is shown 
how the end-of-period expected utility surface is adjusted for inflow uncertainty prior 
to the STPC analysis). 
Figure 4.7: State transition possibility curve 
The first point on the state transition possibility curve is point 'B', which 
corresponds to release fJ...t , which in this case equals OMWh. It is assumed here that the 
search starts at l rather than (t or some other point. While it is not necessary to 
search through the release grid in any particular order, the form of the benefit function 
is such that the computational effort can be reduced if the search is started from either 
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l or "it. At 'B', qt =0, so demand is met by all other supply sources, decreasing wt+! 
to its minimum possible value because the highest possible cost is incurred (recall that 
the weekly benefit is the negative of the supply cost, so from a starting wealth wt at 
'A', the maximum cost is incurred by releasing qt =0). As qt increases, st+! decreases 
because more water is released, and wf+! increases because the additional release 
reduces the quantity of 'other' generation, and hence the total fuel cost. Note that as qt 
increases, wf+! increases at a non-increasing rate because the marginal cost of the 
generation displaced by the reservoir release is decreasing due to the assumption of 
merit order dispatch. As long as a thermal station is dispatched with some non-zero 
marginal cost, wf+! <wt • 
The relationship between storage, release, and generation is assumed to be linear, 
so the state transition possibility curve (STPC), which is a function of wealth and 
storage, is independent of the value of Sf (and wt). Head affects, which reflect the 
impact of the storage level on electricity generation would invalidate this assumption 
since increased storage generally increases the rate at which throughput can be 
converted to electricity. In more detailed river chain modelling, concave efficiency 
curves are also used to reflect the ability of turbines to convert water throughput into 
generation. Because the 'reservoir' in this model is actually the aggregation of two 
river chain systems, explicit modelling of head effects and efficiency curves would be 
difficult, though still possible. Another extension involves tributary inflows, which can 
not be stored and hence are 'lost' if not used. If the tributary flow in period t is denoted 
by tr t , then trt would have the effect of altering wealth but not storage for qt ~ tr t , 
shifting the STPC to the right by Bt Vrt) for qt ~ trt. Again, this is relatively easy to 
implement but for the cases discussed here trt =0 (as in Scott (1997)). 
4.4 Utility functions 
A utility function can be used to evaluate decisions with uncertain consequences where 
the 'best' decision is that which maximises expected utility. Conditions under which 
expected utility is a suitable measure for comparing uncertain consequences were 
proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). These axioms have been 
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criticised and shown not to hold empirically as a descriptive model of behaviour (e.g, 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), but still remain a useful starting point for decision 
making under uncertainty (Bell, 1995). 
Consider again the RM-R model, where the decisions made throughout the 
planning had an associated return and also affected the state of the system at the end of 
the planning horizon. At the end of the horizon, the consequences of the sequence of 
decisions (and uncertainty) are the accumulated returns and the state of the system. 
These attributes are used to measure the achievement of the (two) implicit objectives of 
the problem. In order to link decision analysis with SDP, it is assumed that the 
objectives of the DM relate to the expected returns and the system state (for the case of 
reservoir management discussed here, the system state is the reservoir storage level). 
Given that these attributes have been defined, the focus is on how preferences for the 
outcomes of those attributes affect decisions made throughout the planning horizon. 
The terminal value function in RM-R is fT+l{WT+1 ,ST+l)= U(WT+1,ST+l). This utility 
function is defined over the two 'attributes', W T+1 and ST+l, where an attribute 
measures the performance of an objective. For the reservoir management problem, a 
non-decreasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function would combine the 
consequences (WT+1 and ST+l) into a scalar such that 
(4.16) 
and 
(4.17) 
where the >- means "preferred to" and ~ means "indifferent to" (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1976). 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) describe forms of multi-attribute utility functions and 
how they can be can be assessed given a variety of assumptions about the interaction 
between the DM's preferences for the attributes. The assessment of utility functions is 
not a prime concern here. What is of interest, though, is the nature of the DM's 
preferences implied by the utility functions. If plausible forms can be identified, then 
SUMDP can be used to assess the implications of such utility functions on system 
performance. Alternatively, SUMDP can be solved for a variety of plausible utility 
functions and the DM can select a preferred policy based on its performance. Where 
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multiple DM's are involved, this approach could be used to facilitate discussion and 
quantification of risk because the impact of different utility functions on, say, the 
distributions of end-of horizon storage and accumulated returns, can be assessed. 
One approach for modelling preferences for multiple attributes, and the one used 
here, is to define an additive utility function (see for example, Keeney, 1970; Richard, 
1975). For the reservoir management problem described earlier, this would have the 
form 
(4.18) 
Scalars k", and ks can be used to weight the utility functions. A function with this 
form implies that W T+1 and ST+l are mutually utility independent, which means that the 
utility associated with each consequence is independent of the value of the other 
consequence. 
In a practical setting, a DM's utility function (perhaps derived using the methods in 
Keeney and Raiffa (1976)) may well have a different form. The additive utility 
function provides a useful starting point, though. Furthermore, from a modelling and 
experimental perspective, it is easy to adjust the independent preferences for storage 
and wealth because only the particular utility function needs to be altered. 
4.4.1 Risk attitudes 
Before considering the risk attitudes implied by a multi-attribute utility function, as 
discussed above, first consider the case for a single attribute. Risk attitudes can be 
illustrated for the case of a DM deciding between two alternatives with the 
consequences measured using a single attribute (say returns). The DM's utility is 
assumed to be non-decreasing in returns, so more is better. One alternative, w, has a 
certain return and the other, w has uncertain returns and is 'risky'. Utility 
maximisation means that the If w is preferred to W, and x = E[ w], then 
u(E[wD> E[U(w)] (4.19) 
and the DM is said to be risk averse if this holds over all possible W, and implies that 
the DM's utility function is concave. On the other hand, if x is preferred to X, the DM 
is said to be risk prone, and the utility function is convex. The DM is said to be risk 
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neutral if the DM is indifferent between the certain and risky alternatives, such that 
u(E[wD== E[U(w)]. These relationships hold given an initial level of wealth (or asset 
position) WO' so the DM is risk seeking, for example, if U(E[wo + wD < E[U(wo + w)]. 
In terms of the functional form of U, au I d 2w:::; 0 means U is concave and hence the 
DM is risk averse. U is convex and the DM risk seeking if au I d 2w 2:: 0 . 
Richard (1975) extends the results from single attribute utility functions to multi-
attribute (or multivariate) utility functions. The DM's utility is evaluated over two 
uncertain outcomes, say w and s. Briefly, consider the DM's preferences for the 
following alternatives, each with equally probable outcomes: ((Wo,80),(WI,sJ) and 
B=((wo,sJ,(Wl'So)), where WI >wo and SI >so. TheDMis 
• multi-attribute risk averse if B >- A for all wO' WI' so' and SI; 
• multi-attribute risk neutral if and only if A - B for all wo' wl ' so' and 8 1 ; and 
• multi-attribute risk seeking if A >- B . 
When examining the effect of different utility functions on system performance, 
having a measure of the degree of risk aversion implied by a utility function is useful, 
but not necessary. Unfortunately, there are no simple measures of risk aversion for 
multiple attributes, though it is possible to indicate whether a utility function implies 
greater risk aversion than another i.e., an ordinal measure rather than a cardinal one 
(Richard, 1975). Essentially, the multi-attribute risk premiums can be compared for 
two different utility functions, and that with the larger premium is more risk averse. 
See for further detail. 
4.4.2 A special case: wT+! and ST+! exchangeable 
It is possible to define U(wT+! ,ST+!) such that auxiliary variable W T+1 is not required, 
even though the consequence (wT+! ,ST+!) is uncertain. This is possible if utility is 
effectively defined as a function ofthe sum of wT+! and ST+! , or more generally if: 
(4.20) 
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The value of the terminal state of the system has been transformed into the units of 
wT+! using V(ST+!). With this definition, the DM's utility is dependent on the 
aggregate 'value' associated with the consequence (wT+! ,ST+!), so the values of the 
system state and wealth are implicitly exchangeable i.e., 
au (wT+! ,ST+!) _ au (wT+! ,ST+!) 
awT+! - aV(ST+!) (4.21) 
If u is linear this definition of u(wT+! ,ST+!), then the problem is equivalent to PI 
because the value function is simply a linear transformation of that in PI and the level 
of accumulated wealth no longer affects the marginal benefit from the release decision 
i.e., the release decision is independent of wT , and only depends on ST and the trade 
off between the immediate return in t and the expected future value. This can be 
illustrated by considering the decision made in period T. If the contours of 
U(wT+! ,ST+!) were plotted on WT+! X ST+!, they would have the form illustrated in 
Figure 4.8. 
contours of 
U(wT+!, ST+! ) = wT+! + V(ST+! ) 
wT+! 
Figure 4.8: U(wT+! ,ST+!)= u(wT+! + V(ST+!)) with u linear 
Along each contour, U(wT+! ,ST+!) is constant. The contours are curved because 
V'(ST+!) is non-increasing (as in PI). They are equally spaced because increasing wT+! 
results in a linear increase in U(WT+I,sT+!). Importantly, the contours are identical in 
shape as wT+! varies, so the marginal value of storage in T+ 1 only depends on the value 
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of ST+!. Therefore, the release decision that is optimal for a particular value of ST will 
be optimal for all W T+1 and involves equating the marginal utility of release in T with 
the marginal utility of storage in T+ 1. This logic applies for decisions in all t E T . 
What is interesting is that the same result occurs if u is non-decreasing and non-
linear and the uncertainty in t (in this case due to uncertainty about inflow at) only 
affects the system state in the subsequent period, stH. The reason is that the contours 
(or indifference curves) of U(WT+1 ,ST+l) remain as linear transformations of each other. 
While non-linear u will result in contours that are not evenly spaced in the W T+1 
dimension (as in Figure 4.8), the form of the contours does remain the same. The slope 
of a contour at a particular value of ST+l is the same for any value of W T+1 , so 
(4.22) 
and the marginal rate of substitution between W T+1 and ST+l depends only on ST+l and 
not on W T+1 (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). The optimal decision in T will therefore only 
be a function of ST+l • 
The mathematical derivation of this result is as follows. Assume that u is 
continuous and differentiable. A contour of u describes the relationship between w and 
s for a fixed value of U(.), say k (the T+ 1 subscripts have been dropped from w and s). 
At a given point (W['+l ,S[+I), the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) reflects the 
change in one variable required to compensate for a change in the other to maintain the 
same value of U(WT+1 ,ST+l); it is the slope of the contour. 
U(WT+1 )=k is described as 
aU(W1,SI) _ au(wp s1) av(s) 
as - av(s) as 
The MRS at (WT+1 ST+l) for I 'I 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
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It was shown in Equation 4.21 that U(WT+1 + V~T+1)) implies au = ou(). Substituting 
Ow oV s 
Equation 4.21 in to the definition of au gives 
as 
au(wpsJ _ au(wpsJ ov(s) 
as Ow as 
Substituting this into the original contour definition gives 
(4.25) 
(4.26) 
The MRS for (W;+1 ,S;+I) is therefore independent of the value of W;+I, and this will 
apply to all WT+1 E WT+1. Illustrative contours of U{WT+1 ,ST+1) are plotted in Figure 
4.9, they would be horizontal translations of each other and parallel in the wealth 
dimension. 
contours of u(wT+! ,ST+! ) with u' non -increasing 
ST+I 
contours of U(WT+1 ,ST+l ) with u' non - decreasing 
Figure 4.9: U{WT+1 ,ST+1)= U{WT+1 + V{ST+1)) with u non-decreasing 
4.5 Conclusions 
The conventional approach taken in reservoir management models involves minimising 
the expected cost of operation. While 'risk' has been identified as an important aspect 
of reservoir management, there are actually very few models which explicitly consider 
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risk. In this chapter, SUMDP has been presented and discussed as an approach to 
reservoir management in a 'regulated' planning environment, which corresponds to the 
classical 'cost minimiser' scenario frequently considered in the literature. As in 
classical DP models, the return (or benefit) from release in each period is simply the 
cost of generation that is required to meet demand. As in classical decision theory, a 
utility function is defined over the appropriate consequences of decisions, which in this 
case are the storage level and accumulated returns at the end of the planning horizon. 
Combining these two concepts can be problematic, though, because utility 
maximisation generally invalidates a traditional DP approach due to the non-
separability of the objective. SlJMDP overcomes this by augmenting the state space of 
a conventional DP model with an accumulated 'wealth' variable. As a result, the scope 
of utility functions able to be considered for reservoir management problems is not 
restricted to linear utility curves. 
In Chapter 5, implementation issues associated with solving the regulated reservoir 
management (RM-R) model using discrete stochastic dynamic programming are 
discussed. Chapter 6 contains a discussion of optimisation and simulation results for 
RM-R applied to a reservoir management problem using a representation of the New 
Zealand electricity system. 
Chapter 5 
Implementation Issues 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4, a SurvIDP approach to reservoir management in a regulated environment 
was discussed (the RM-R model). In this chapter, issues relating to solving the 
recursive relation in each period are discussed. The solution approach is discussed and 
illustrated in Section 5.2 and discretisation issues are discussed in Section 5.3. As a 
consequence of the form of the benefit and utility function, the solution algorithm can 
be modified to reduc.e the computation time, as discussed in Section 5.4. 
5.2 Solution approach 
TheRM-R model can be solved using discrete dynamic programming. This involves 
discretising the continuous variables and the cost-to-go function evaluated at 
combinations of the discrete values (Denardo, 1982). The value function is therefore 
approximated at these discrete combinations, and the accuracy of the approximation is 
contingent on the resolution of the discretisation. 
A basic solution algorithm for solving RM-R is shown in Figure 5.1. 
63 
64 
Determine fT+l{WT ST) 
m' II 
For t = T ... 1 (period) 
For m = 1. .. M (wealth w~) 
For n = 1. .. N (storage s~) 
f t{wt st)=-oo m' n 
For k = 1 ... K given q~ < s~ (release q~) 
For 1 = 1. .. L (inflow aJ) 
wt+1 = w~ + Bf{q~) 
St+l = s~ - q~ + a; 
gt (Wt+l ,stH )= fl+l (w1+1 ,Sl+l ) 
end for 1 
/,-1 = ~ t-t+l(W f+1 SI+I) m,1/,k L..JP{g{ , 
{ 
If l,~,",k > f'(w:n's~) 
ft(w~,s~)= l~,",k 
~f (I f) t q Wm'S'1 = qk 
end if 
end for k 
end for n 
end for m 
end for t 
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Figure 5.1: Basic SDP solution algorithm 
Given the terminal value function i.e., the utility function defined over W T+1 wealth 
and storage, the terminal cost-to-go function can be determined for the range of storage 
and wealth values. The first period considered by the algorithm is period T, and the 
decisions made in Twill determine the (probability distribution of) values of wealth and 
storage at the end of Tlbeginning of T+ lover which the terminal value function is 
defined. Due to the discretisation of the variables, there are a number of loops in the 
algorithm. Once a discrete level of wealth (index m) and storage (index n) have been 
selected, the expected cost to go is determined for each feasible discrete release level 
(index k). 
Inflows are the stochastic element of this reservoir planning problem. In each 
week, the inflow ( at) into the reservoir is unknown. However, the distribution of these 
inflows is assumed to be known in advance, and is also assumed to be independent of 
the level of inflow in any other period. The inflow distribution in each week is sampled 
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at, or represented by, L values, each with some finite probability of occurring. Let a; 
denote the value of sample I and p; Pr[a t = a: ]. Recall that inflows are assumed to 
occur after the release decision has been made and the state transition for storage is 
5.3 Discretisation issues 
The discretisations of storage and release are likely to remam constant over the 
planning horizon due to the bounds on those variables being constant. However, for the 
wealth variable as it is defined here, Bt (qt) is accumulated over the planning horizon 
and the range of possible Wi values is very large compared to BI (ql ). If the number of 
grid points is kept constant, then the change in utility corresponding to relative changes 
in w' will be covered by a small number of grid points, and the approximation may be 
coarser than desired. 
In terms of defining the grid points in this model, the discretisation scheme for 
wealth does not involve discretising evenly over the entire range of possible wealth 
values in each period, i.e., from WI to W t in t. The reason for this is that it is unlikely 
that release will be consistently low (or high) throughout the entire planning horizon. 
Note that fT+l{WT+\ST+l) is defined over the range of W T+1 (and ST+l). It is not 
necessary to discretise the W T+1 variable if fT+l{WT+1 ,ST+l) is defined in functional 
form since the value of fT+l{WT+1 ,ST+l) for any value of W T+1 and ST+l can be 
computed directly. Thus, the following discussion of discretisation of WI relates to 
periods 1 ... T, with T being the last period in which discretisation occurs. Were 
discretisation to be required in T + 1, then the approach discussed below remains the 
same with the reference to T changed to T + 1. 
To improve the 'focus' of the state space discretisation, bounds on the Wi variables 
were set manually. The upper and lower bounds in T are denoted by the variables W;{ 
and W~, respectively. These bounds define a smaller 'focus region' within which the 
discretisation is evenly spaced (W;{ ~ wT ~ W;{ ), as illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
Calculations for W T ~ wT ~ W~ and W;: ~ wT ~ WT could still be performed, but 
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interpolations in this extended range were made over a much coarser grid (in fact the 
regions were only discretised at the two end points that defined them). 
0 
-I 
W 
-I 
W H --" 
I Wrt 
~ 
Wi 
Wealth 
t 
-I: 
W' 
W~~: 
Coarse grid 
: 
Focus region 
Coarse grid 
o = discretisation point 
Figure 5.2: Discretisatioo ofweaJtb variable 
T Time 
-T 
W 
-T 
W H 
T W/i 
Bounds were also set on the grid points in the first period. For each week, W IH was 
cal ulated by interpolating along the line defined by W~ and W:. Similarly, W~ was 
cal culated by interpolating between Wr~ and Wr.;' For a given week, then, the wealth 
grid between W~ and W~r was divided into /vf-3 equally spaced grid points, where M is 
the number of discrete values used to approximate Wi. A 'constant grid' discretisation, 
wh -reby the distance between any two grid points is always the same in any period, 
could be used in conjunction with, or as an alternative to, the approach described here. 
However, the concept of the 'focus region' remains valid, so it would be logical to 
apply this discretisation only Lo wealth values in the 'focus region'. 
Given th t: discretisation of the wealth/storage space in a given period, the value of 
fl (w' ,s' j is evaluated for the feasible range of releases and the maximum value (and 
associated release) stored. The conventional approach (as in Figure 5.1) for this 
process is to calculate a candidate f' (w' ,s') as the weighted sum of the f'+1 (W'+I ,S'+I) 
values corresponding to each of the possible ending states which result from the 
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possible inflows (see for example Nemhauser (1966) or Denardo (1982)). The 
probability of the ending state corresponds to the probability of the inflow used to 
derive it (p;). If l~,n,k denotes the expected utility associated with wealth w~, storage 
s~ , and release q~, all in t, then 
(5.1) 
Let gt(WI+I,SI+I)= fl+I(W:
n 
+BI(q;~S:r -q~ +a:) and be determined by interpolating 
between the values of gt(w t+1 ,SI+I) at the grid points representing combinations of 
WI+I WI+I Sl+l and 1+1 where wl+1 < W I+1 < wl+1 and 1+1 < 1+1 < SI+1 (see Hadley x' x+1 , Y , S y+1 , x - - x+1 S Y - S - y+l 
(1964)). A variety of approximation schemes exist. The approximation scheme used 
here is detailed in. For a fixed discretisation of release, gt(wl+1 ,SI+I) is calculated a 
maximum of L times for each q; for a given ( W~, , s~). The algorithm in Figure 5.1 will 
therefore require that gf (wl+I , St+I) be calculated M x N x K x L times in each period. 
The computational requirements can be reduced, though, as will be shown in later 
sections. 
5.4 Computational improvements 
The computational effort required to determine fl(Wt,st) and qt(W~"S~) in each 
period can be reduced by utilising the form of, and interaction between, the benefit 
function and the expected end~of-period utility function. This dampens the effect of 
increasing the dimensionality of the problem by including the wealth state variable. 
These refinements are discussed in the following sub-sections, and modifications are 
proposed to the SDP algorithm presented earlier in Figure 5.1. 
As discussed earlier, IS defined as 
U(WT+I ST+I)==k U (w1'+I)+k U (81'+1) Results discussed later will assume that 
, ww ws· 
uw(wT+!) and Us (8 T+1) are both non-decreasing at a non-increasing rate. This in turn 
implies that U(WT+I ,81'+1) and hence fT+I(W1'+1 ,81'+1) are non-decreasing at a non-
increasing rate. 
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Assumption 1: fT+1 (WT+1 ,ST+1) is non-decreasing at a non-increasing rate. 
Although the values of fT+1 (WT+1 ,ST+1) are only known at discrete points III the 
wealth/storage space, it is convenient to assume that fT+1(WT+1 ,ST+1) is continuous and 
twice differentiable, so that 
(5.2) 
Similarly for storage, 
(5.3) 
Using discrete dynamic programming means that f (WI ,S,) is not continuous, but is 
approximated at the wealth/storage grid points in t. Therefore, it is assumed that the 
first and second forward differences, which are the discrete analogues of the first and 
second derivatives, are positive and negative respectively (Denardo (1982». 
5.4.1 Inflow uncertainty adjustment 
The approach to handling inflows presented III the basic SDP solution algorithm 
(Figure 5.1) is inefficient because fl+1(w:+B'(q~~s~-q~+a;) may be calculated 
several times during the search of the state space. Because aJ is independent of the 
values of wealth and release, the end-of-horizon expected utility function can be 
adjusted for inflows independently of the release decision, meaning that the adjustment 
for inflow uncertainty need only be performed once and reducing the computational 
requirements accordingly. This concept is not unique and has been used in other 
reservoir management applications (see for example Scott (1997) or Scott and Read 
(1996». 
The following discussion is presented for a generic period t, since ft+1 (WI+1 ,St+1) is 
only assumed to be a non-decreasing function of Wt+1 and St+1 , which is less restrictive 
than the definition of f'+1 (Wt+1 ,St+1) in Assumption 1. 
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Let gt(W1+1 ,st+!) be the 'inflow adjusted' value surface, where 
t( t+1 S1+I)= ,"",ptfl+I(Wt+1 1+1 +at) g wm 'n L..J I m ,sn I Vm,n (5.4) 
1 
Here, gt (W1+1 ,SI+I) is just a convex combination of points in ft+1 (W1+1 ,SI+I), so the 
properties of f1+1 (W1+1 ,S1+I) will be evident in gt (WI+I ,S1+I). 
Theorem 5.1. The function gt (W1+1 ,S1+I) will be non-decreasing at a non-increasing 
rate after performing the inflow uncertainty adjustment as in Eqn 5.4. 
Proof The inflow distribution is identical for all values of storage and wealth. The 
inflow adjustment for any pair of discrete (W1+I ,S1+1) therefore corresponds to creating a 
convex combination of fl+1 (W1+1 ,S1+I) values, where 8"1+1;:::: st+l. If fl+1 (WI+I ,S1+I) is 
non-decreasing (non-increasing), a convex combination of f1+1 (W1+1 ,SI+I) will yield 
another non-decreasing (non-increasing) function. D 
The expected utility associated with different (wt +1 ,S1+1) can then be determined by 
reading/interpolating the value of gl(W1+I ,S1+1) associated with (W1+1 ,S1+I); only a single 
interpolation is required for each discrete release level. Thus, l~.n.k can be redefined as 
(5.5) 
As this is a function representing the expected utility prior to the inflow at the end of t, 
and the release at the start of t, the subscript on the 'g' is t. Because the benefit from 
release is not accounted for, gl (WI+I ,SI+I) is still defined over the values of wealth 
which occur at the beginning of the next period. The SDP algorithm with this inflow 
uncertainty adjustment is shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Detennine fT+l (w~, s~) 
For m = 1 ... M (wealth w::1) 
For n = 1. .. N (storage S:'+I) 
For I = 1. .. L (inflow a;) 
g; = J'+I(Wf+l ,min(sl ,s:, + a;)) 
end for I 
gl(WI+1 ,SI+I)= LP;g; 
I 
end for n 
end for m 
For t = T ... l (period) 
For m = 1. .. M (wealth w:) 
For n = 1. .. N (storage s:,) 
jl(W:,SJ= -00 
For k = 1 ... K given q~ < s:, (release q~) 
W,+1 = w: + BI(q~) 
Sf+l = Sl _q' 1/ k 
.(', = g'(Wf+l SI+I) J m,n,k , 
If l,:',1/,k > jl (w:",s:,) 
fl(W:",SJ= l,~,1/,k 
AI( I ,) , q wm,sn = qk 
end if 
end for k 
end for n 
end for m 
end for t 
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Figure 5.3: Solution algorithm with separate inflow uncertainty adjustment 
Without the inflow adjustment, a maximum of M x N x K x L interpolations are 
required (this is the worst case). The 'inflow adjustment' procedure requires 
M x N x L interpolations, while the 'release decision' requires M x N x K 
interpolations. ill the absence of any other modifications, then, the total number of 
interpolations required to derive j' (Wi, Sl) and is M x N x (K + L) . Therefore, 
calculating g'(WI+1 ,S'+I) decreases the number of interpolations required by a factor of 
(K + LYn ~ ~ per period (ignoring other overheads). More efficient methods may 
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yield even larger savings (see Scott (1997a) for example). For the experiments detailed 
in this thesis, inflows were assumed to be Normally distributed and sampled at 5 points 
(L=5) with probabilities 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.2, and 0.15. 
The savings from adjusting using !t(wt ,st) for inflows are particularly valuable 
because they are independent of the form of the utility functions and the benefit curve. 
For example, consider the case of demand uncertainty, where the demand in each 
period is approximated with discrete outcomes and probabilities. A single release will 
then correspond to several values of Bt (qt), so the expectation must be taken over the 
corresponding values of wf+! (ignoring storage). Another release level could imply the 
same w t+! from a different w t , but, without very restrictive assumptions, the associated 
values of Bt (qt ) can not be guaranteed to be the same. 
On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine uncertain variables which would 
allow a 'wealth adjustment' to be made. For example, in a regulated market the 
contract price could be modelled as a stochastic variable. With a fixed contract level, 
the contract revenue would be uncertain and independent of the level of storage and 
release. In the context of the stochastic route choice problem 0, it is not unreasonable 
to imagine a project management, or capacity expansion problem, where some sort of 
cash injection is expected at the completion of some set of tasks, but that the value of 
that injection is uncertain. Whether or not a separate adjustment for uncertain wealth 
improves the tractability of the algorithm depends on the nature ofthe uncertainty. 
5.4.2 Release ratchet 
The following discussion shows how the search for the optimal release in T for a 
particular wealth/storage pair does not require gT (WT+1 ,ST+l) be evaluated for all 
release levels. The 'release ratchet' approach described here is so named because 
instead of starting the search for the optimum release level from the minimum feasible 
release for every instance of the discrete state space, a 'ratchet' release level can be 
defined as the starting point for the search. This 'ratchet' release level is updated as the 
state space is evaluated and only moves in one direction, so the set of release levels to 
be evaluated continually decreases. Read (1986) used the same concept in his 
algorithm for deriving optimal oil stockpile capacity. 
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From Theorem 5.1, gT(WT+1 ,ST+I), which is fT+I(WT+1 ,ST+I) adjusted for the 
stochastic inflows in T, will have the same properties as fT+I (WT+1 ,ST+I ) i.e., 
(5.6) 
Similarly for storage, 
(5.1) 
For convemence, these functions are treated as continuous here, though will be 
discretised in the model. 
The slope of a contour of gT(WT+1 ,ST+I), which has some constant value of 
expected end-of-horizon utility, is defined as 
(5.7) 
An example of the form of the contours of gT(WT+I,sT+l) is shown in Figure 5.4. 
With gT (WT+1 ,ST+I) non-decreasing, the value of expected utility associated with each 
contour increases from left to right, from low wealth/storage to high wealth/storage. 
The impact of gT(WT+1 ,ST+I) having a non-increasing slope is that contours are spaced 
further apart in the wealth/storage space, with the increased distance between contours 
indicating lower marginal utility. 
Consider one of the contours in Figure 5.4. Starting from a high wealth/low 
storage position, if wealth is decreased, utility decreases, so storage must be increased 
to maintain the same level of utility (i.e., moving up the contour). Because the 
marginal utility of storage decreases, the increase in storage required to maintain the 
level of utility increases as wealth is reduced, which results in each contour having a 
steeper slope as wealth decreases and storage increases. Conversely, starting from a 
high storage/low wealth position on a contour and decreasing storage requires that 
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wealth be increased to maintain the same value of utility, and at an increasing rate. 
Hence each contour becomes flatter as storage decreases and wealth increases. 
High utility 
1....-____ .......;; _ _____________ ... WT+I 
Figure 5.4: Contours of the utility function 
The value of gT(WT+1 ,ST+I) associated with any combination of wealth and storage 
will not be less for the pair with the higher storage level when two pairs have equal 
values of wealth, and vice versa with storage fixed. That is, for (w:,s;,), (W:,S;'+I)' 
with T > T SI{+I - Sn 
and 
and T( T T» T( T T) g Wm'Sn+1 _g W""SI/ ' 
r( T T) ( T( TTl T( T T)) g Wm+I'SI{+1 ~ max g Wm'Sn+lpg WIl/+pS" . 
Cons ider now the contours of gT(WT+! ,S(+I) in Figure 5.4 with w T and ST on the x and 
y axes, respectively. Marginal utility decreases as storage and wealth increase. Any 
contour passing through a vertical line (fixed wealth) must have a greater slope at 
( r T) ( T r) T T . Wm ' 5 11 +1 than at W""SI{ ,for any SI/+I ~ SI/ I.e, 
(5.8) 
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The reason for this is that the change in storage that maintains constant utility must be 
larger for the contour intersecting (w~,s~+J than the contour intersecting (w~,s~). The 
same applies for a fixed storage. Any contour passing through a horizontal line (fixed 
storage) must have a lesser slope, with respect to the origin, at (w~+l' s~) than at 
(w~ ,s~), for any W~+l ~ w~, 
(5.9) 
The discussion that follows refers to gl (Wt+l ,l+l) and assumes that it has the same 
properties as gT(WT+1 ,ST+]) described here. Later, in Theorem 5.5, it is proved that the 
form of II (wt+! ,SI+I) is preserved over t, and hence so is the form of gl (W I+1 ,St+l ), as 
assumed here. For different functional forms and problems, modifications such as 
those detailed in the following sections may not be possible, so the dimensionality of 
the problem may mean that it can only be solved in a reasonable time using coarse 
discretisations of the state variables. 
Now consider the process of determining the optimal release for discrete (w:,s:') 
in period t. As discussed earlier, the basic procedure of determining the optimal release 
for some (w:" ,s:' ), is to evaluate gt (wt+t, S'+1 ) for each discrete q~, where 
WI+1 == w~n + BI (q~) and l+1 == s:, - q~ . In terms of the contours of gt (Wt+l , St+1 ), this 
procedure corresponds to finding the intersection of the STPC and the highest contour 
of gt (wt+t, st+!). Figure 5.5 illustrates this intersection for the STPC associated with 
(w:,s:'). Also illustrated on the STPC are the release levels corresponding to the 
breakpoints in Bt(q~), where q] < qx < qy < qz < qK are a subset of the K discrete 
release levels. In this case, the STPC intersects contour c3 and the optimal release is 
qy. Thus, It(w:,s:')= gt(w: + Bt(qJ,s:' -qJ and qt(w:,s:') qy. (For ease of 
discussion and illustration, intersections between the STPCs and contour lines will be 
assumed to occur at a comer point of the STPC, although, clearly, the intersection can 
occur at any point on the STPC). 
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STPC~,,, 
Figure 5.5: Selecting optimal release 
Now consider the same procedure applied to the STPC from the same level of wealth 
but the next, and higher, discrete storage level i,e., point (w~, 5~+1 ), The wealth state 
transition is independent of the level of storage!, so the STPC for (W~, 5:,+[) has exactly 
the same form as used at the point (W:",5;,) and any release feasible for (W~,5J is 
feasible for (W~" 5:,+1). For storage levels less than the upper bound on release, the 
STPC for a higher storage level will include releaseslbenefits which are infeasible for 
lower storage levels, but this does not alter the analysis though. In terms of the 
placement of the STPC for (w:
n
, 5~+1) on the contour diagram, it has the same horizontal 
pos ition and is shifted upwards in the storage dimension by 5:,+1 - 5~ , as illustrated in 
Figure 5.6. This shows that the STPC for (w:n , 5:,+J intersects contour c2 and the 
optimal release IS qz. Thus, F (w~" 5~+1 ) = g' (w~, + B' (q z)' 5:,+1 - q z ) and 
~,( 1 , ) W 5 = q 1tI ' n+! q z' 
! If hcad effects were taken into account, this would not be the case. 
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c
l 
STPC;" " 
Figure 5.6: Release ratchet in storage dimension in T 
Observe that ~I( I I » ~I( I I) q w""sn+1 - q w""s" . Holding wealth constant, the slopes of the 
contours increase as storage increases, but the fonn of the STPC remains the same. In 
tenns of searching for ql(W:"S:+I)' then, it is clear that if ql(W:"SJ is known, a lower 
bound can be defined for q' (w~, S:,+I) at ql (w~, S;,). The search for qr (W;II' S:,+I) can 
then be restricted to ql (W:" , s:,):S ql (w:" S:,+I ):S cr, rather than searching over the entire 
range of q~ values i.e., qt :sqr(w:n,s:,+J:sql. Once qr(w:",S~+I) has been found, the 
same principle applies to the search for ql (w:lI , s:,+J, and so on. In the example, given 
that ql (w:n , s:,) = q v' the upper/lower bound pair are (qy, q K ), so it is unnecessary to 
detennine J,:l.n.k for k<y. 
rrb 52 Ij'fl+l( 1+1 1+1). ':fi A . 1 d ~,( I I)' . 1(; 
. eorem . . W ,S IS satls les ssumptlOn an q wm,sn IS optima Jor 
non-decreasing for increasing Sl and Wi fixed. 
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Proof From Theorem 5.1, gt(W1+1 ,S1+1) is non-decreasing in both wt+1 and SI+1. The 
STPC is constant for a change in wealth, so BI(ql(W:,S~)) will produce the same value 
of W1+1 from (w~" s~) and (w~" s~+J. Since S~+1 > s~, STPC~n+1 must lie tangent to a 
'higher' (or the same) contour (cm,n) than that which intersected STPC~n at ql (w:, s~). 
Consider now a candidate release of q:,n+l at (w:,s~+J where q:,n+1 <ql(W~"S~). For 
q:,n+1 to be optimal, the slope of contour Cm,n+1 (the contour tangent to STPC~n+1) must 
be less than the slope of cm,n at the same value of wealth. I.e., if a vertical line is drawn 
through the point w:n + BI (q~"n+1)' then q:,n+1 optimal implies that the slope of the 
contour intersecting that vertical line at S:1+1 - q: n+1 must be greater than the slope of 
Cm,n at s:, - q:'"n+1' This contradicts Equation 5.8, which identifies the slope of any 
contour higher than cm,n as having a greater slope for a fixed value of wealth. It is 
therefore not possible for any point on STPC~n+1 to be tangent to a contour line of 
gl (W1+1 , SI+I) at any point corresponding to a release less than ql (w:, s:,). The tangent 
. h STPC I > ~ 1 (I I ) ~ 1 (I 1 ) ~ 1 (I 1 ) pomt must occur on teat some qm,n+1 - q wm,sn ,so q wm,sn+1 ~ q wm,sn . 
Th . l' lid h ~I( I 1 » ~I( I I) e reasomng app les to any two storage eve s, an ence q W m , S n+1 - q W m , S n 
V(s:' : n,n + 1 EN). D 
With gl (W1+1 , SI+I) having the same properties with respect to wealth as it does with 
storage, the behaviour of the contours with wealth fixed and storage varying will be 
mirrored for the case where wealth can vary but storage is fixed. Consider now the 
case when shifting the STPC in the wealth dimension and holding storage constant i.e., 
a 'release ratchet' in the wealth dimension. In the same way that the slope of the 
contours increases relative to a vertical line (fixed wealth) and storage increasing 
(Figure 5.6), the slopes of the contours decreases relative to a horizontal line (fixed 
storage) and increasing wealth. Figure 5.7 shows the STPC for (w:+p s:, ), where 
W:+1 ~ w:. The optimal release for (w:+1, s~) occurs at q x' which is less than the 
optimal release of qy at (w:,s:,). 
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Figure 5.7: Release ratchet in storage and wealth dimensions in T 
For some fixed level of storage, the marginal utility derived from accruing more wealth 
decreases as w ealth increases, it will therefore be optimal to release less at a higher 
level of wealth than at a lower level of wealth because the associated increase in storage 
wi ll result in a higher value of expected utility. This is the same effect which occurs 
when wealth i fixed and storage is varied as discussed earlier. In that case though, it 
wa optimal to release more at the higher storage level because the increase in expected 
util ity from higher wealth would outweigh the decrease in expected utility from lower 
storage. 
Theorem 5.3. If f'+1 (W'+I , S'+I) satisfies Assumption I, then if it (w~, s:,) is optimal for 
( I ,) th "/( I ')< ~/( I ,) {; 1 > 1 and in general, q~/(W',S') will be win's" en q wm+l,sn -q wm,sn Jar wm+1 _sll/ 
non-increasing for increasing w' and s' fixed. 
Proof From Theorem 5.1, g' (WI+1, S'+I) is non-decreasing in both W'+I and S,+I The 
STPC is constant for a change in storage, so B' (ql (w~, s;,)) will produce the same value 
of ,1+1 from (w~,s~) and (W~'+I,SJ. Since W~+I > w:/l' STPC:n+1n must lie tangent to a 
higher, or the same, contour than (;m." , which intersected STPC:/l,/l at q'(w:",s:J 
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Consider now a candidate release, q~l+l,n' at (W~+l' s~) where q~+I,n > (1' (w~, s~). For 
q~+I,n to be optimal, the slope of contour GII/,n+l (the contour tangent to STPC~l+l.n) must 
be greater than the slope of GII/,n at the same value of storage. I.e., if a horizontal line is 
drawn through the point s~ - q~'+I,n ' then q~+I,n optimal implies that the slope of the 
contour on this line at W~I+I + BI (q~+I,n) must be greater than the slope of GII/,n at 
w:n + BI (q:'l+l,,,)' This contradicts Equation 5.9, which identifies the slope of any 
contour higher than GII/,n as having a lesser slope for a fixed value of storage. It is 
therefore not possible for any point on STPC~+I,n to be tangent to a contour line of 
gl (Wt+l ,SI+I) at any point corresponding to a release greater than ql (w~" s:, ). The 
tangent point must occur on the STPC at some so 
ql (w~+i' s:, );:::: ql (w~, , s:, ). The reasoning applies to any two wealth levels, and hence 
D 
From these results it follows that the release ratchet can be applied simultaneously 
in the wealth and storage dimensions, and hence to define upper and lower bounds on 
Theorem 5.4. If fl+l(wl+\sl+l) satisfies Assumption 1 and given that q((w~+i's:,) is 
optimal for (w~+l's:') and ql(W~,s:,+J is optimal for (w~,s:,+J the bounds on 
In general, ql (WI, Sl) will 
be non-decreasing for ST increasing and wT decreasing. 
Proof This follows directly from Theorem 5.2, which proves that 
and from Theorem 5.3, which proves that 
~I( I I »~I( I II Astothepropertiesofq~l(wl,sl),Theorem5.2provedthat q wII/+1,sn+1 -q w",+I,Sn} 
ql(WI ,Sl) is non-decreasing for WI fixed and Sl increasing. Theorem 5.3 proved that 
ql (WI, i) is non-increasing for i fixed and WI increasing, so ql (WI, i) is non-
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decreasing for st fixed and wt decreasing. Thus qt(wt ,st) is non-decreasing for i 
increasing and Wi decreasing. o 
All that remains to be shown is that qt(wt ,Sl) will preserve the properties of 
p (wt , st ) between the periods. If the STPC originates from a higher storage (wealth) 
level the STPC will intersect a higher contour of gt(wt+1 ,st+l); an equal or higher 
expected utility must be able to be achieved if more storage (wealth) is available and 
the level of wealth (storage) is the same. In fact, the form of the optimal release 
function will preserve the properties of fl (w~, s:,) required for the solution to the SDP 
to be optimal. 
Theorem 5.5. If fl+1 (W I+1 ,st+1) is defined according to Assumption 1 and qt (wt , st) is 
non-decreasing for st increasing and wt decreasing, ft (wt , st) is non-decreasing at a 
non-increasing rate and thus preserves the properties of gt(wt+1 ,st+1). 
Proof See Hadley (1964, Ch. 10). o 
The ability to 'lock in' a release level as the state space is searched (via the 'release 
ratchet' approach) means that the search for the optimal release for some (w~,s:') can 
be started from the 'ratcheted' release level rather than from qt. For a given storage 
and wealth, this release level is defined as the maximum of the optimal release at the 
lower storage level (same wealth) and the release level at the higher wealth level (same 
storage). The release ratchet has been incorporated into the solution algorithm shown 
in Figure 5.8. 
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Detennine fT+I(W~,S~) 
Create gl (WI+I ,SI+I) (see Figure 5.3) 
rr" = 0 Vn 
For t = T ... 1 (period) 
For m = M ... 1 (wealth w:) 
For n = 1 ... N (storage s~) 
p(w:,s~)= -00 
k = max{rrn ' rrn_1 ) 
For k = k ... K given q~ < s~ (release q~) 
WI+I = w: + BI(q~) 
i+1 = s~ -q~ 
/,1 = gl (wl+l , SI+I) m,n,k 
If l~,n,k > fl(W:,S~) 
ft (w:, s~) = l,:',n,k 
~I (I I) 1 q wm,sn = qk 
rr" =k 
end if 
end for k 
end for n 
end for m 
end for t 
Figure 5.8: Solution algorithm with release ratchets 
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The variable rr" n E N stores the value of k corresponding to the optimal release 
for storage level s~. Because rr" is progressively updated, when a new iteration of the 
loop begins, the value of rr" will correspond to the optimal release for storage s~ and 
wealth W:_1 , while as the update progresses, rrn_1 corresponds to the optimal release 
for storage S~_I and wealth level w:, hence the ratchet release index for the storage and 
wealth pair is defined as k = max{rr" , rrn_I ). Note also that the wealth variable is 
searched in order of 'best' to 'worst', so m = M ... 1 rather than m = 1 ... M as in the 
previous algorithms. This allows the max operator to be used on the optimal release 
indices to define a lower bound on the current optimal release, with the upper bound 
remaining at qt. The reason for this is that the 'search tennination' scheme discussed 
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in the next section handles that aspect of the search, so any reductions in the range of 
q~ required to be searched would not have been utilised. 
If the algorithm were searching in the storage dimension while holding wealth 
fixed, and the 'release ratchet' was only applied in the storage dimension, then the 
search for qf(W~I,S~+l) would start from qf(W~I'S~) rather than 'if, so l:',n,k would be 
calculated about M x N x K times per period, rather than M x N x K times, indicating 
2 
approximately a 50% reduction in the number of interpolations required to determine 
qf (Wf ,Sf) and f' (Wf , Sf ), assuming that the distribution of optimal releases is evenly 
distributed over Sf. If the 'wealth ratchet' were applied separately, a similar saving 
would be expected. When the release ratchet is applied in both the storage and wealth 
dimensions, then there will presumably be some small additional saving from starting 
the search for qf(W:+pS~+J at the maximum of the optimal releases for the adjacent 
storage and release grid points, though it is not obvious a priori what the magnitude of 
this saving will be. 
Table 5.1 shows the solution times of a moderately sized problem with M=200, 
N=200, K=500, and T=52. The problems were run on a Pentium233 (these times could 
no doubt be improved were the code to be streamlined for execution speed). 
No ratchet Ratchet in W Ratchet in S Ratchet in W &S 
Time (mins) 77.02 32.16 32.30 30.16 
Improvement 58% 58% 61% 
Table 5.1: Effect of 'release ratchet' on execution time 
Using the ratchet reduced the solution time by about 60% from the 'no ratchet' solution 
time. Note too that the times quoted here all include the improved handling of the 
inflow adjustment. Were this excluded, the times would be approximately 5 times 
longer. 
5.4.3 Search termination 
The computational effort required to determine qf(Wf ,Sf) can be reduced even further 
by utilising the form of Bf(qf), which is non-decreasing at a non-increasing rate (first 
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derivative). Therefore, it is possible to terminate the search for IY(Wt ,st) because it 
equates to finding the unique intersection of Bt(qt) (concave) and the highest contour 
The resulting values of l~ II k are therefore concave in 
, , 
release q~ and, because qt (w:" , s:') is found by evaluating l~,",k for discrete q~, the 
search can be terminated once l~ II k starts to decrease. Note that, from Theorem 5.4, 
, , 
the starting point of the search. 
Theorem 5.6. If ft+!(wt+! ,sf+!) is satisfies Assumption 1, and qt(w:,s:') is optimal for 
terminated once l~,"+!,k+! ::;; l~.II+!,k . 
Proof From Theorem 5.1, gt (w1+! ,sf+!) is non-decreasing in both wf+! and st+! , so the 
contours of gt (wt+! , st+!) are therefore convex to the origin. The STPC is concave with 
respect to the origin, so the value of gt (wt+! , Sl+!) corresponding to each point on the 
STPC is therefore concave with a single optimal solution. This equates to 
maximisation of a concave function as discussed in Hadley (1964 Ch. 10-11), for 
example. If the search for qr (w:'~! ,s:,+!) is in one direction over the range of q~, and 
this range includes ql (w:';-\ s:,+!), the search can be stopped once the value of 
gl(WI+! ,Sl+!) associated with q~ is less than value of gt(wt+! ,Sl+!) associated with q~_!. 
D 
Figure 5.9 shows how the algorithm is changed to accommodate 'early 
termination'. The existing code is on the left with the new code on the right. There are 
several ways the 'search termination' could be implemented. Using the release ratchet 
modification, the k loop starts from the maximum of the optimal release at the lower 
storage level, or at the same storage lev:el but higher wealth. This is a lower bound on 
the optimal release level as proved earlier. The modification simply involves setting 
the release index loop to K+1 once l~,",k <!t(w:",s:'), which has the effect of ending 
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the k loop when k is next evaluated against the upper bound in the for loop (see Figure 
5.8). 
rr =k n 
end if 
If l:',II,k > ft(w:,s~) 
ft (w:, s~ ) = l:',n,k 
else 
"t( t t) I q wm,slI =qk 
rr =k n 
k=K+l 
end else 
Figure 5.9: Search termination modifications 
The effect of the search tennination is difficult to quantify, as it depends on the 
fonn of Bt (q~) and its interaction with gt (wt+t, St+1 ). Table 5.2 shows the execution 
times that resulted with and without the search tennination (ET) modification and using 
the same model as used for the release ratchet tests. 
No Ratchet in W Ratchet in S Ratchet in 
ratchet W&S 
Without ST 77.02 32.16 32.30 30.16 
With ST 45.43 0.88 0.95 0.63 
Improvement from using 41% 98% 98% 99% 
ST 
Overall improvement 99% 99% 99% 
Table 5.2: Effect of 'early termination' rule on execution time 
When the 'search tennination' and 'release ratchet' modifications are implemented in 
tandem, the reduction in CPU time required for the optimisation is approximately 99% 
ofthat required without the modifications. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has dealt with implementation issues relating to SUMDP, in particular, for 
the case of 'regulated' reservoir management. Because SUMDP augments the state 
space with the accumulated wealth variable, the computational requirements are 
demanding since the potential number of discrete points evaluated is the square of the 
number of discrete points in each dimension. It has been shown that the fonn of the 
benefit function and utility function may mean that the basic solution algorithm, which 
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can quickly become computationally intractable, can be modified to take advantage of 
their properties and yield improvements in computation time of up to 99% from the 
requirements of the unmodified algorithm. For reservoir management in a regulated 
environment, it is not an unreasonable assumption that the benefit and utility functions 
would have the form required to perform these modifications i.e., that cost decreases as 
release increases, and that a non-decreasing utility function with non-increasing first 
derivatives reflects a DM's trade-off between increasing storage and decreasing 
accumulated cost. In the next chapter, results are discussed for such a reservoir 
management problem where a DM is trading-off (via a utility function) storage and 
accumulated 'non-hydro' cost in order to meet demand. 

Chapter 6 
Experimental Results for Regulated 
Reservoir Management 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, optimisation and simulation results from a medium-term (one year) 
reservoir scheduling problem are explored using a representation of the New Zealand 
electricity system. The scenario considered here is described as a regulated electricity 
system, as described in the previous chapter, and a situation which existed in New 
Zealand up to 1992. The benefit function in each period takes the form described in the 
previous chapter, so the benefit, or return, from release reflects the cost of satisfying the 
residual demand from available generation sources; the residual demand is that which 
remains after hydro release has been subtracted. Concave and non-decreasing bi-
variate utility functions with different curvatures are defined over the range of end-of-
horizon accumulated costs and storage levels. The optimisation and simulation results 
are then compared to each other and to a base case where the terminal value function is 
defined as the value of storage, which is the form of value function used in most 
standard SDP approaches to this problem. The layout of this chapter is as follows: 
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• The (risk neutral) base case and utility functions are discussed in Section 6.1. 
• End-of-horizon perfonnance is discussed in Section 6.2. 
• Weeklyperfonnance is discussed in Section 6.3. 
6.2 System data and the base case 
The model is tested using a representation of the New Zealand electricity system. Most 
of the data used to derive these results is taken from Scott (1997). The supply curve is 
derived from thennal marginal costs and generation capacities, and run-of-river 
(uncontrollable) hydro. The capacities and marginal costs of these stations are detailed 
in Table 6.1. 
Station Capacity (MWh) Marginal Cost ($/MWb) 
Manapouri 570 5 
Clutha 6391244 5 
Huntly 900 20 
New Plymouth 518 25 
Stratford 178 35 
Marsden A 103 60 
Otahuhu 81 110 
Whirinaki 194 150 
Table 6.1: Supply curve data 
Manapouri and Clutha are hydro stations which are treated as run-of river, so their 
marginal cost is nominaL Clutha's weekly capacity is determined by interpolating 
between a summer capacity of 639MWh and a winter capacity of 244MWh. Because 
demand can not be met entirely from thennal plant, a 'shortage' (or VoLL/value oflost 
load) station is also included, which has a constant marginal cost of $500/MWh and an 
unlimited capacity. An example of the residual demand curve (RDC) and benefit 
function is shown in Figure 6.1, where the demand and supply data corresponds to 
period 2, with d t =3230MWh. As described in the previous chapter, the RDC in a 
given period was created by subtracting the supply curve from the fixed demand curve. 
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Figure 6.1: RDC and benefit curve 
For ease of comparison with the results in , a single demand curve was used to 
appr ximate the weekly load duration curve, The weekly demand corresponded to the 
middle (third) sub-period demand in Scott (1997), who approximated the weekly load 
duration curve with 5 equally weighted sub-periods. A fixed demand curve is used here 
whereas Scott used constant elasticity demand curves. Demand in each period was 
calculated by interpolating between summer (week 1) and winter (week 26) demand 
levels, which were 3204MWh and 3864MWh, respectively, somewhat lower than those 
used by Scott. However, the distributions ofEOH-W and EOH-S using the single fixed 
dem nd curve were very similar to those obtained by Scott using a five sub-period 
approximation with (fixed demand in each sub-period). The reason for this is that, not 
surprisingly, the aggregated RDCs (created by summing the weighted sub-period 
RDCs) were similar to the RDCs created using the demand of the middle sub-period. 
Because the aggregated RDCs generally lay to the left of the single demand RDCs, 
low r costs were incurred for the same release, and the EOH -W distributions shifted to 
the right. 
Figure 6,2 shows the inflow data in the form of a mean and standard deviation for 
each week (in GWh). 
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Figure 6.2: Inflow data 
For simplicity, it is assumed that a unit of inflow corresponds to a unit of storage i.e., 
that the inflow/storage efficiency ratio = 1. Inflows are assumed to be Normally 
distributed with a known mean and variance, and approximated by a discrete 
distribution with 5 points with probabilities of 0.15,0.2,0.3,0.2, and 0.15, respectively. 
Maximum storage was 2900 GWh and minimum storage was 0 GWh. Maximum 
generation/release was 2455MWh and minimum generation/release was OMWh. It was 
also assumed that a unit of release con·esponds to a unit of electricity supplied to the 
market i.e., that the release/generation efficiency ratio = 1. 
The optimisation and simulation code was written in C and compiled/executed on a 
266MHZI128MB Pc. The grid discretisations were 500 for storage (corresponding to 
5.8GWh storage steps), 1000 for wealth, and 2456 for release (corresponding to IMWh 
release steps). The following bounds were used on wealth for all optimisations: W ~ = -
$Im, Wf ; =-$50m, W~=-$150m, W:=-$250m (refer to Chapter 5 for the definition 
and discussion of these parameters). The grid spacing in the storage dimension was 
constant throughout the optimisation. Approximately 4 minutes was required for the 
optimisation, while the simulation time (20 simulations) was negligible. Initial storage 
for each simulation was 1450GWh. The random number generator used is that 
described in Law and Kelton (1991); Scott used Matlab's random number generator. A 
simple test of I-dimensional unifonnity was perfonned for a variety of sample sizes. 
The test statistics were less than the 5% chi-square values for all sample sizes. 
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The base case for these experiments lS where the player is risk neutral (RN) with 
resp ct to wealth. This corresponds to the perfectly competitive (PC) solution in Scott 
(1997). The end-of-horizon (non-increasing) marginal water value curve was taken 
from his model and the corresponding (non-decreasing) water value curve used as the 
end-of-horizon value function for the SDP. The graphs used to depict results for a 
single variable have five lines, where the points on these lines correspond to the 5th , 
25 th, 50th , 75 th, and 95 th percentlle values taken from the simulation results (20 
simu lations). Figure 6.3 shows the optimal weekly release curves, which are, for this 
RN case, a function of the storage level alone and determined in the optimisation. 
From the simulation results, the weekly release, weekly storage, and mean weekly 
generation levels or other fmus, are shown in Figure 6.5, Figure 6.4, and Figure 6.6, 
respecti ve I y. 
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Figure 6.3: RN optimal release surface 
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Chaprer 6: Experimental Results for Regulated Reservoir Management 93 
1000 ---
900 
BOO 
700 
:2 500 
~ 
~ 
c: 
,<;1 500 
.. 
~ 
c: 
'" 400 (!) 
300 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1- Manapoun - Clu!tla - Huntly - New Plymouth - Stratford -+- ~iarSden A ~ Otahuhu - WhJflnakl : 
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II simulations start from the same initial storage level of 1450GWh, and the 
values of storage (and wealth) are those at the end of the period, after the release 
decision has been made and an inflow observed. This is the reason that there is 
variability in the storage level in the first week of the simulation (Figure 6.5), but no 
vari ability in the associated release decision (Figure 6.4). Release generally follows the 
demand trajectory. A flat segment on the optimal release curve produces a plateau or 
'terrace' on the optimal release surface, corresponding to a single release level being 
optimal for a range of storage levels. These release levels correspond to comer points 
on the benefit curve, and hence to alJ thermal stations up to a certain marginal cost 
generating at their minimum or maximum with the remainder at their minimum. It is 
worth noting that the drop in optimal release levels for high storage during weeks 20-30 
is due to the interaction of inflows (decreasing) and demand (increasing). For that set 
of periods, it is economic to withhold release and incur higher thermal costs so as to 
avoid even higher thermal costs in later periods. 
Referring to the optimal release surface, q2 = 618 for 279 S S2 S 1575, and 
q2= 1135 for 1674 S S2 S 2557, with these generation levels being the minimum and 
max imum releases that will ensure New Plymouth is the marginal station with marginal 
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cost $2SIMWh. Also, two release are optimal a wide of 
so it is not that this is borne out by the simulation For 
example, the hydro 
levels period 2 are 618MWh 
to the 10th and 90th percentile 
13SMWh, respectively (Figure 6.4). 
Figure illustrate ranges a I increase/decrease In 
optimal/ sim u lated 
2SMWhlweek and 
is caused by demand 
to ensure a station IS 
40MWhlweek (second) 
picture is similar and 
the year. In reality, 
approximation will 
Overall, the simulation 
produced by Scott (1 
case, Scott and his simulation 
here. 
years so that variations carry to year and, consequently, 
storage that water 
6.3 Risk averse cases 
We now consider cases with utility curves over the ofRN 
by 
so that 
to 
release 
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simulated outcomes. 
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CDF RN EOH-W values 
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in marginal utility of the 
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The (utility) was arbitrarily defined over o to 1,000,000. utility 
curves were ranges of and 
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but scaled accordingly. Curve 0 has the least curvature (it is linear) while curve 4 has 
the most curvature. 
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The end-of-horizon value surface, fT+1 (WT+1, ST+I), is defined over the entire range of 
EOR-W and EOR-S, yet the utility functions in Figure 6.9 are only defined over a 
smaller range of EOR-W and EOR-S. Values of Uw corresponding to EOH-W outside 
this range were calculated as follows: 
• If EOH-W < -$230m, U w (WT+1) is calculated using a marginal utility double that of 
the first segment. 
• If EOH-W > -$176m, Uw(WT + I ) is calculated using a marginal utility half that of 
the last segment. 
Thus, the concavity of Uw (WT+I), was preserved over the entire range of EOH-W, and 
with Us (ST+I) also concave, fT+1 (WT+1 ,ST+I) is concave. (Recall that the definition of 
the end-of-horizon value surface is fT+! (WT+I, ST+I) = U W (WT+1 )+ US (ST+1 )). 
Experiments were performed for all combinations of Uw (WT+1) and Us (ST+!) 
described above. The results obtained using the curves illustrated in Figure 6.10 
receive the most attention as they reflect a 'moderate' and 'extreme' relative risk 
aversion towards wealth. 
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W2S2 W4S2 
Figure 6.10: Bi-variate utility curves 
The notation used to refer to the utility functions is WxSy where x and yare the 
util ity curves defined in Figure 6.9 for wealth and storage, respectively. Thus W4S2 
means that utility curve 4 is used for wealth and utility curve 2 is used for storage. The 
EOH value surface is then calculated by summing the utility associated with each 
discr te combination of wealth and storage. 
6.4 End-of-horizon performance 
In thi s section, the impact of the bi-variate utility functions on EOH-W and EOH-S is 
discussed. The purpose of this discussion is two-fold; firstly to examine the effect of 
diffe rent strengths of relative risk aversion, and secondly, to examine the relationships 
between the EOH results, regardless of which utility function was used to derive them. 
Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of EOH-W and EOH-S are shown in Figure 
6.1 1 and Figure 6.12, respectively. Summary statistics for EOH-Wand EOH-S are 
shown in Table 6.2. Each figure contains three curves, con"esponding to the RN, 
W2S2, and W 4S2 cases. These effects are evident in the CDF plots, where the W 4S2 
EOH-W CDF lies to the left of the corresponding W2S2 CDF. Because W4S2 has a 
stronger relative wealth risk aversion (relative to storage) than W2S2, W4S2 EOH-W 
would be expected to be less variable (and hence more vertical) than that derived using 
W2S2, and this would have the associated effect of a reduced the mean in order to 
achieve the lower variance. Compared ~o the RN case, W 4S2 and W2S2 both have a 
stronger relative wealth risk aversion, so RN EOH should be more variable. These 
expectations are reversed with respect to storage. W2S2 has a stronger relative storage 
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risk aversion than W 4S2, so W2S2 EOH -S wou ld be expected to be less variab Ie than 
the W4S2 values. 
Stronger relative wealth risk aversion has the effect of making the EOH-W CDFs 
less variable and closer to vertical, and in turn, reducing the variability, and range, of 
EOH-Woutcomes. The differences in the relative preferences for wealth and storage 
outcomes implied by the utility functions are reflected by the positioning and shape the 
CDFs. 
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Figure 6.11: EOR wealth CDFs 
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Table 6.2: Summary simulation statistics for EOH-W and EOH-S 
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- - W2S2 
'W4S2 , 
Although the differences in the storage CDFs are somewhat smaller than those for 
weal th, the differences do reflect the impact of the differences in relative preferences 
for OH storage and wealth. Compared to W4S2, the W2S2 storage CDF is slightly 
more upright, indicating that lower storage levels are less desirable, and hence it is 
worthwhile having lower (worse) levels ofEOH wealth in order to increase them. 
When wealth has a higher relative risk aversion than storage, as for W 4S2, a lower 
mean BOH wealth is acceptable if the vmiability in the BOH wealth outcomes is 
reduced. In order for this to be achieved, the vmiation in inflows is absorbed by 
storage, though the effect on mean BOH storage is variable, because a less variable 
EOH wealth implies less release on average, and hence higher storage, on average. 
The functional form of the utility functions describes the preferences about EOH 
storage and wealth outcomes, as well as the relative preferences of each over the other. 
These preferences are reflected by changes in the mean and variance_ The variance and 
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quartile statistics reflect the observations made about the EOH wealth and storage 
CDFs. Compared to the Rl\T case, the W 4S2 and W2S2 EOH wealth quartiles tend 
towards the mean, which is less than the RN mean in both cases (see Figure 6.14). For 
W4S2, the low standard deviation of EOH wealth is paired with a higher standard 
deviation of EOH storage, though mean storage levels are higher than RN for both 
W 4S2 and W2S2 . 
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Figure 6.13: RN and W2S2 EOH wealth CDFs 
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To illustrate the impact of different preferences for EOH wealth and storage on the 
dist ributions of EOH wealth and storage, optimisation/simulations were performed for 
all combinations of Uw and Us (ie, (WO,Wl,W2,W3,W4)x(SO,SI,S2,S3,S4)). 
Combinations of means and standard deviations of EOH-W and EOH-S are plotted in 
Figure 6.15, Figure 6.16, and Figure 6.17. Note that in some figures the negative of 
EOH-W has been plotted on the x- axis, with these values being refelTed to as EOH-C 
(C=cost) i.e, EOH-C = -(EOH-W). Thus, 'better' EOH-C outcomes lie to the left of the 
figures rather than to the right, which is the case for EOH-W outcomes. 
A positive and linear relationship (colTelation coefficient = 0.996) appears to exist 
between mean EOH-C and mean EOH-S (Figure 6.15); an increase (worsening) in 
EOH-C is accompanied by an increase in mean EOH-S at a rate of approximately 
0.044GWh/$1000, or 44GWh/$m. There are only two instances where a higher EOH-C 
has a lower mean EOH-S, and they occur at EOH-C values of approximately $195m 
and S200m. In both cases, the difference between the inconsistent mean EOH-S and 
the adjacent values is relatively small (;:::;20GWh). Also, the inconsistent results are 
achieved using utility functions with the same or similar utility functions applied to for 
EOH-Wand EOH-S. At EOH-C=$195m, the inconsistent point corresponds to W3S4, 
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and the prevIOUS point corresponds to W1S2, while at EOH-C=$200m, the two 
functions are W 4S4 and W3S3. 
While a general relationship between EOH-C and EOH-S might be expected there 
is no a priori reason to expect a unique monotone ordering given that the two factors 
are being varied independently. It is interesting to note that the RN result is consistent 
with the relationship between EOH-C and EOH-S. The relationship between the mean 
and standard deviation of EOH-C is less clear, though is essentially negative 
(correlation coefficient=-O.93). 1n general, then, selecting a utility function (from those 
used here) that reduces the variability of EOH-C will be likely to increase mean EOH-C 
and increase mean EOH-S. 
Extreme values of the mean and standard deviation of EOH-W and EOH-S are 
obtained using utility functions for EOH-W and EOH-S. The lowest mean EOH-C is 
obtained using WOSO, which, not surprisingly, also results in the lowest mean EOH-S 
and a relatively large standard deviation of EOH-C. It is one of five cases with an 
EOH-C standard deviation greater than $16m; all five cases use WO (see also Figure 
6.16). At the other extreme, W4S0 results in the highest mean EOH-S, the lowest 
standard deviation of EOH-C, but also the highest mean EOH-C. 
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Figure 6,16 plots the same data as used In Figure 6,1 5 but ordered by utility 
funct ion. The mean and standard deviation of EOR-S and standard deviation of EOR-
Car then plotted for combinations of Us and U w , with the leftmost observation being 
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the RN case, for reference. These results are collated into 5 groups with each group 
having a fixed Us, and the full range of Uw . Within each group it is therefore possible 
to examine the impact of increasing the curvature of Uw , or relative wealth risk 
aversion. This allows a clearer examination of the changes in the means and standard 
deviations of EOH-C and EOH-S for changes in Uw and Us. Consistent trends are 
evident for each value of Us. Increasing the relative wealth risk aversion: 
• increases mean EOH-C (see top x-axis labels); 
• reduces the standard deviation of EOH-C; 
• increases mean EOH-S; 
• increases the standard deviation ofEOH-S. 
As the curvature in Us increases, the groups of mean and standard deviation in EOH-S 
shift downward. In both instances, the curves become closer to linear as Us increases. 
At the same time, the groups of EOH -C means and standard deviations shift upward, 
reflecting, again, the compensatory behaviour of the means and standard deviations of 
EOH-C and EOH-S. 
Figure 6.17 depicts an approximately linear negative relationship between the 
standard deviations of EOH-W and EOH-S (slope = -0.036GWhI$). The standard 
deviations are consistent with what might be expected from the relative risk aversion 
implied by the utility functions. W 4S0 has the strongest relative wealth risk aversion 
and weakest relative storage risk aversion. As a result, the standard deviation of EOH-
W is the lowest of all values ($2,529) and the standard deviation of EOH-S (771) is 
almost at its highest. So, reducing the variability of EOH-W, has the effect of 
increasing mean EOH-S, and also increases the standard deviation ofEOH-S. 
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6.S Weekly operation 
This section discusses the effects of the utility functions on the weekly operation of the 
reservoir, and the implied generation levels of the other stations in the system. The 
curvature in the end-of-period (EOP) cost-to-go function reflects the relative benefits of 
achieving different EOP-Wand EOP-S outcomes. In Section 6.2, the optimal weekly 
RN release functions were illustrated (Figure 6.3), being only a function of storage. As 
discussed earlier, SUMDP uses a 2-dimensional state space to handle the bi-vari ate 
non- linear utility functions. For each period (stage) the release decision will therefore 
be a function of accumulated wealth and storage at the beginning of the period, referred 
to as BOP-Wand BOP-S, respectively. t is therefore not possible to depict the weekly 
optimal release functions in a single figure because it is four-dimensional (time, wealth, 
storage, release). 
Three dimensional surfaces were created by fixing either time or wealth. When 
time is fixed, the figures show the release function for a given period, and over the 
rang of wealth and storage levels which can eventuate in that period. Figures were 
created for release in the 12th , 261h , and 42nd periods. When accumulated wealth is 
fixed. annual trajectories can be shown which reflect the range of releases in each week 
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for the range of storage levels. Because wealth accumulates, it is not useful to define 
the same fixed level of wealth Ln each period. Accumulated wealth was therefore fixed 
at values corresponding to BOP-W at the 2soth, sooth, and 7S0 lh posLtions on the grid 
used to discretise BOP-W, thus fixing a measure of relative wealth appropriate for that 
time of year. The same discretLsations were used in each period for all optimisations, 
so it was possible to calculate the differences between different 'time-fixed' (and 
different 'wealth-fixed') release functions in order to examine the impact of, and 
differences between, the utility functions on these surfaces. 
Optimal release surfaces for W2S2 and W4S2 are plotted III the following six 
figures (W2S2 and W4S2 and t=12, 26, and 42). Beside each release surface is a figure 
illustrating the difference from the optimal RN release function. 
Figure 6.18: W2S2 optimal release surface and difference from RN release (t=42) 
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Figure 6.19: W2S2 optimal release surface and difference from RN release (t=26) 
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Figure 6.20: W2S2 optimal release surface and difference from RN release (t=12) 
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Figure 6.22: W4S2 optimal release surface and difference from RN release (t=26) 
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Figure 6.23: W4S2 optimal release surface and difference from RN release (t=12) 
With the EOP value function non-linear in both EOP-W and EOP-S, the optimal 
release function will not necessarily be constant over any range of BOP-S and BOP-W. 
For fixed BOP-W, release increases as BOP-S increases (Theorem 5.2). For fixed 
BOP-S, release decreases as BOP-W increases (Theorem 5.3). Thus, the release 
function is non-decreasing as BOP-W decreases and BOP-S increases (Theorem 5.4). 
The W2S2 and W4S2 release surfaces have 'flats' in the storage and wealth 
dimensions, which correspond to a single release being optimal for a range of BOP-W 
and BOP-W levels. As with the RN release function (Figure 6.3), these flats 
correspond to the intersection of a vertex of the STPC and a contour of the EOH value 
function. When a single release is optimal over a range of BOP-S and BOP-W, the 
slope of the EOH value function implies that an increase in release (and increase in 
wealth and decrease in storage) decreases expected EOH utility. Conversely, a 'sloped' 
section of the release surface corresponds to an edge of the STPC (a horizontal segment 
of the residual demand curve) intersecting a contour of the EOP value function. For 
t=42, the highest 'flat' corresponds to Huntly baseloaded, the next flat IS New 
Plymouth baseloaded, and so on. For t=26, the highest flat corresponds to New 
Plymouth baseloaded, the next highest flat is Stratford baseloaded, and so on. For t=12, 
the highest flat corresponds to New Plymouth baseloaded, the next highest flat 
corresponds to Stratford baseloaded, and so on and so forth. (Where these flats overlap 
(for the two cases compared) the solutions are obviously identical, causing the erratic 
nature of the plot of differences). 
When BOP-S is near its lower and upper bounds, release is the same regardless of 
the level of BOP-W. This implies that the marginal utility of storing another unit of 
water is essentially independent of the level of wealth. This is because the contours of 
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the EOP value function are at their steepest when storage is low and flattest when 
storage is high. Therefore, the additional utility derived from increasing EOP-W is 
greater (less) than the decrease in utility from releasing another unit of water when 
storage is high (low). For BOP-S between the storage bounds, and across the range of 
BOP-W, the release functions exhibit variation, with the magnitude of change 
decreasing as the distance from the terminal period increases. This is a sensible and 
expected result, as well as a common characteristic of SDP solutions; decisions closer 
to the end of the horizon will be more sensitive to the form of the terminal value 
function than decisions further away. In period 42, for example, there is considerable 
curvature/variation in both the W4S2 and W2S2 release functions, while in period 12, 
there is comparatively little curvature/variation. This curvature reflects a transition 
from a 'low' release function when BOP-W is high to a 'high' release function when 
BOP-W is low. 
The SUMDP release functions differ considerably from the RN release function, 
though the difference decreases for periods further away from the end of the planning 
horizon. The variations over the entire range of BOP-Wand BOP-S are reflected in the 
figures above (adjacent to the optimal release surfaces). They show the difference 
between the RN release function and the SUMDP release functions for t=12, 26, and 
42. A positive difference indicates that the RN release is higher than the corresponding 
W 4S2 or W2S2 release. Consider the release functions with t=42 (Figure 6.18 and 
Figure 6.21): 
• When BOP-W is low, optimal release is higher, indicating that New Plymouth 
would be marginal were BOP-S in the range :::::500-1500GWh (approximately). For 
storage levels >1500 GWh (approximately), release is higher, less thermal 
generation would be required, and so Huntly would be the marginal station. 
• When BOP-W is high, optimal release is lower, indicating that in New Plymouth 
would be marginal for BOP-S in the range :::::2000-2500GWH; Stratford and 
Marsden-A would be marginal were,BOP-S in the range :::::500-2000GWH. 
Thus,. the SUMDP release functions indicate that for a reasonable range of BOP-S, one 
of four stations could be marginal, depending on the level of BOP-W. This result 
contrasts with the optimal RN release function described in Section 6.2, which implied 
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that New Plymouth was marginal for BOP-S in the range 279-2557GWh and that 
Huntly would only be marginal when storage levels were above 2500GWh. 
Previous results showed that mean EOH-W was lower for the W2S2 and W4S2 
cases compared to the RN case, with mean EOH-W decreasing as relative wealth 
aversion increased. In order for this lower EOH-W to be achieved, release must be 
lower. In the figures above, the optimal RN release is shown to be higher than the 
W2S2 and W 4S2 optimal release for a large range of BOP-Wand over the entire range 
of storage levels. This is indicated by a positive difference between the RN and 
SUMDP release functions. From these figures, and inspection of release functions with 
BOP-W fixed, the W4S2 release is generally less than the corresponding W2S2 release. 
This is reflected by the W4S2 release functions, for a particular level of BOP-W, placed 
to the right of the corresponding W2S2 release function. For relatively small ranges of 
BOP-Wand BOP-S, though, the optimal RN release is less than the W4S2 and W2S2 
optimal release. These ranges exist in the release surfaces of the three sample periods 
and increase, in terms of area and magnitude, as the time from the end of the horizon 
increases. Therefore the optimal release surface includes releases both greater and less 
than the RN optimal release, and this is reflected in the simulation results discussed 
later. 
For periods 26 and 12, the release functions have a similar form to those for t=42, 
but with less curvature and variation. As a result, the figures showing the difference 
from the optimal RN release show a smaller deviation in terms ofthe magnitude as well 
as the range of BOP-S and BOP-W for which there is variation. Associated with this 
behaviour is an increase in the range of BOP-Wand BOP-S for which there is a 
differential of zero, indicating an identical release to the RN release. This area is 
smallest for the period 42 results, and largest for the period 12 results. 
Figure 6.24 shows the RN, W2S2 and W4S2 mean weekly release (per hour), taken 
from the simulation. The release profiles are not symmetric, although demand is 
symmetric. All three mean release curves have similar profiles in that they start at 
approximately 800MWh in the first week, increase and peak at approximately 
2000MWh in the middle of the year, then decrease to about 1200MWH in the final 
week. Mean release is higher during the second half of the year. Presumably, this is 
because inflows are higher and increasing over that period and demand is decreasing. 
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Duri ng the first half of the year, inflows are lower and decreasing while demand is 
increasing. Demand peaks in the middle of the year, so higher reJeases are required in 
order to avoid the relatively large costs (and large decreases in wealth) incurred by 
operating more expensive thermal stations (recall that the starting storage level for the 
simulations was 14S0GWh). Although the mean EOH-W for both W2S2 and W4S2 
are lower than the RN EOH-W, mean release is not always lower than mean RN 
release. This is consistent with the release surfaces shown earlier. 
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Earlier results showed that increasing the relative wealth risk aversion reduced the 
mean and standard deviation of the EOH-W distribution, but that this variability was 
transfen"ed to the EOH-S distribution. Using the W4S2 and W2S2 utility functions 
resulted in a lower mean EOH-W than the RN EOH-W. The mean release and mean 
storage trajectories illustrate that, on average, this is achieved by releasing less (Figure 
6.24) and storing more (Figure 6.25). Further, when relative wealth risk aversion is 
increased, relative storage risk aversion implicitly decreases, and it was shown earlier 
that the result is an increased mean and increased variation. Therefore, more water is 
stored for W4S2 than W2S2, which is reflected by the W2S2 release trajectory being 
higher, and the W2S2 mean storage trajectory being lower, than the corresponding 
W 4S2 trajectories. 
As an example of the impact on generation from sources other than the reservoir, 
consider Figure 6.26 and Figure 6.27, which show the average generation from the Rl"J, 
and W2S2 and W4S2 simulations, respectively. 
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In all three cases, Manapouri and Clutha release at their maximum throughout the 
year. Huntly operates at its maximum through the middle of t e year, when demand is 
high r, though operates at lower levels at the beginning and end of the year. All other 
stat ions have lower mean generation levels in the latter part of the year in response to 
the increased reservoir release from higher inflows. New Plymouth has the most 
variable generation in all three cases, with the shape of its trajectory dictated by the 
simulations all starting fonn the same storage level, and the increased reservoir release 
in the later half of the year. In Figure 6.24, the W 4S2 and W2S2 mean release 
trajectories were lower then the RN trajectory during the April-July period, then 
slightly higher during the July-October period. The impact of this is to increase New 
Plymouth's mean generation in the first half of the year, enabli:lg water to be conserved 
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and used in the later half of the year and therefore minimise the extent to which New 
Plymouth and more expensive thermal stations would be required to generate over this 
period. In the RN case, Stratford, Marsden A, and even Otahuhu are dispatched in 
some simulations. These stations are used to a lesser extent for the W2S2 case (only 
Stratford used), and again for the W 4S2 case, with Stratford operating in the last period 
in one simulation. 
6.6 Conclusions 
Results have been presented for SUMDP applied to a classical reservoir management 
problem where hydro release is used to offset thermal generation in order to meet 
demand. Rather than minimising expected cost, though, the total utility of accumulated 
cost (U w) and storage (Us) at the end of the horizon was maximised. An additive 
utility function was used, and comparing the results from using a variety of 
combinations of U w and Us showed that the utility functions had a significant impact 
on the means and standard deviations of end-of-horizon wealth (Pw. and aUf ) and 
T "T 
storage (PST and a ST )' The nature of these interactions is summarised below: 
• Holding Uw constant and increasing the concavity (risk aversion in storage) in Us 
decreases Ps and decreases as . 
T T 
• Holding Us constant and increasing the concavity (risk aversion in wealth) in U w 
decreases Pw. and decreases am. 
T "T 
• An increase in Pw. (improvement) is accompanied by a decrease in Ps . 
T T 
• A decrease in a ST is accompanied by an increase in a W
T 
• 
In terms of system operation, the average storage and average release trajectories 
reflected the preferences implied by Uw and U.s' For example, if U w had a higher 
degree of concavity than Us' lower PW
T 
would be acceptable, and this would be 
achieved by releasing less, hence PST will be higher, though with a higher a ST • 
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Compared to the risk neutral case, risk aversion produced a more conservative 
release strategy in the first part of the year and a more aggressive strategy in the latter 
part of the year. As a result, generation from higher cost thermal plant was shifted to 
the first part of the year to meet demand, depending on the extent to which high cost 
outcomes are to be avoided, as implied by the utility function. 
Overall, the experimental results detailed here indicate that risk aversion, as 
reflected by a (non-linear) utility function can imply release strategies which have a 
significant impact on the distributions of expected end-of-horizon wealth and storage. 
In the next chapter, these effects are investigated for a reservoir operated in a 
'deregulated' electricity market. 

Chapter 7 
SUMDP and Reservoir Management in a 
Deregulated Electricity Market 
7.1 Introduction 
ill Chapter 5, the SUMDP model was applied to the operation of a single reservoir in a 
'regulated' environment where a single entity manages the reservoir and multiple 
thermal stations to meet demand. The decision variable in each period (week) was the 
release, or generation, from the reservoir, which implied the (deterministic) quantity of 
thermal generation required to meet demand. The cost of the thermal generation was 
the weekly return in the SDP algorithm. The accumulated weekly costs and the 
terminal storage were then used as the argument for the terminal value function, which 
was the utility associated with various combinations of the two attributes. 
ill the regulated case, then, the. reservoir and other generating plant were 
coordinated so as to meet demand. The accumulated cost of satisfying demand not met 
by reservoir release was the argument of the utility function. The reservoir was 
therefore used in a conventional manner i.e., as a means of alleviating the cost of 
running expensive thermal plant. ill a deregulated electricity system, the release 
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variable can represent the firm's interaction with an electricity market in a given period. 
The obvious candidate for the return from release is profit, and this is used here. 
In order to determine the profit from release in a given period, the behaviour of the 
other firms in the market must be represented in the model. A simple modification to 
the benefit function described in means that a 'dominant firm' scenario can be 
modelled, with the reservoir firm being dominant and the remaining firms acting as a 
fringe of price takers, even though they may set the price. In this model, each fringe 
firm offers their entire capacity to the market at marginal cost and will generate the 
quantity required to clear the market, so long as the spot price is greater than their 
marginal cost of generation. The reservoir manager has perfect knowledge of demand 
and the fringe capacities and costs when making the release decision in each period. 
Given some level of reservoir release, the fringe is just dispatched in a merit order of 
marginal cost so as to meet the residual demand. In a given period, the market price is 
set by the most expensive fringe station, which then determines the revenue received by 
the hydro firm from its release. The price associated with the release is used to create 
the benefit curve used as an input to the SUMDP optimisation. The objective is to 
maximise the firm's expected utility of end-of-horizon wealth (W) and the end-of-
horizon storage. 
Although the hydro firm controls the market price and hence possesses a high 
degree of market power; prices may not be pushed as high as in a Coumot model 
because the fringe offer their capacity at marginal cost. On the other hand, the reservoir 
firm has more control over its market share. This is a different representation of the 
nature of competition than the Coumot models of Scott (1997) and Bushnell (1998) 
which have been applied in a reservoir management context. (As a further extension, a 
Stackelberg leader/follower model is described in). Rather than the other firms 
behaving as perfect competitors, a Coumot model is used to represent competition 
between the fringe firms for the demand not satisfied by reservoir release). 
The firm is assumed to be contracted for a fixed quantity of electricity in each 
week. The contract quantity and strike price are input parameters of the model, and the 
other competitors are not contracted. Batstone and Scott (1998) examine the case 
where the spot market is a Coumot game and all the players can be contracted, though 
they assume the players are risk neutral towards wealth. 
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In this chapter, a variation of the previous model is introduced to address the case 
where a dominant and price-setting hydro firm operates a single reservoir in an 
electricity market. This case is referred to as the deregulated case. Section 7.2 
describes the formulation. The benefit function and a solution algorithm are discussed 
in Section 7.3, with conclusions in Section 7.4. Experimental results using this model 
are presented and discussed in and some alternative benefit functions are presented in . 
7.2 SUMDP and 'deregulated' reservoir management 
The formulation is essentially the same as described in , though the weekly return 
function now reflects the benefit to an individual firm rather than the system as a 
whole. We assume that the firm controls the weekly reservoir release (generation) 
made in each week. Reservoir storage and release are bounded and the inflows 
experienced in each week are uncertain. The relationship between qt and St+l is 
assumed to be· constant and negative and is not affected by factors such as the form of 
the market or storage levels (head effects). Demand must be met in each period and 
there are bounds on release and on storage. The inflows experienced in each week are 
uncertain. The formulation is the same as that presented in , but is repeated here for 
ease of reference. 
\It 
subject to: \It 
\It 
\It 
\It 
(7.1) 
where 
T is the number of periods (t) in the planning horizon. 
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ft(wt ,Sf) is the expected end-of-horizon utility for a given wealth and storage 
combination in period t. 
Sf 
at 
is the firm's accumulated profit at the beginning of t. 
is the reservoir storage level at the beginning of t (measured in 
units of electricity e.g. MWh). 
is the stochastic inflow (in MWh) into the reservoir during t. 
is the release (in MWh) during t. The optimal release in a given 
period, (Y(wt ,Sf), IS conditional on WI and Sf I.e., 
IY(Wt ,Sf)= argmax E[rf+!(wf+! ,Sf+l )]. 
~'5.ql5.ql 
is a function describing the benefit (or return) from release. The 
benefit function is different in each period because.it incorporates 
parameters such as demand, contracts, and the behaviour of other 
firms. 
l, st are the lower and upper bounds on storage in t. 
l, ct are the lower and upper bounds on release in t. We assume that qt 
is made before at is known, so a feasible release also satisfies 
q' ~ (s' -l). Equivalently, the minimum release bound can be 
represented by ('t being a non-decreasing function of the storage 
level and ql ~ ir(st). 
While the formulation and basic solution approach are the same as described for 
the regulated case 0, the benefit function Bt (qt ) is redefined so as to reflect the returns 
from reservoir release in an electricity market. Consequently, the definition and 
implications of the release variable are different. (Other variations could be modelled 
by varying and/or extending components of the" basic formulation while keeping the 
basic dynamics the same; a few ofthese are discussed further in ). 
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7.3 The benefit function 
The market is represented as the hydro firm and an additional I price-taking firms 
which are not expected to attempt to influence the price in the market. In each period 
they will generate as much as possible as long as the price is greater than in the 
marginal cost of generation (c i ), and are referred to as the 'fringe'. The time resolution 
of the model is a week. Weekly demand for electricity is assumed to be fixed at 
quantity g~, which does not vary as the price changes. Thus, the demand curve in tis 
(7.2) 
It is assumed that any level of ql (measured in MWh) feasible to the hydro firm can be 
sold to the market. Let gi be firm i's generation level, with total fringe generation 
I 
being g f = Igi' The fringe is assumed to satisfy the residual demand by dispatching 
i=1 
stations in order of marginal cost until g~ = dl(P)- ql. Equivalently, the residual 
demand curve faced by the hydro firm can be created by subtracting the fringe supply 
curve from the demand curve. 
The residual demand curve faced by the hydro firm can therefore be defined as 
d:(p) = dl (P)- S~(p) (7.3) 
where S~ (P) is the fringe supply curve. S~ (p) is a monotonically increasing function 
created by adding the quantities and marginal costs of the fringe firms in order of 
marginal cost. The spot price that will result from release ql can then be read off the 
inverse of d: (p). The benefit function, BI (ql ), is created by calculating the revenue 
from release given the residual demand curve and the firm's contract level, p. 
Revenue from release is then defined as the sum of contract revenue and spot revenue 
in the period: 
Bt (qt ) = p~ ft + p~ (qt _ fl ) (7.4) 
where p~ is the contract strike price and p~ is the spot price. The objective under 
consideration here is not revenue maximisation but utility maximisation, and utility is 
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based on total revenues earned throughout the planning horizon. The relevant 
characteristics of contracts for the context described here are when the contract is sold, 
when the electricity (or contract quantity) is delivered, and when the revenue is 
received. In this model, the contracts are assumed to have been sold prior to the 
planning horizon, so that quantities are fixed in each period of the planning horizon 
(though can vary over t). These levels could be derived from a higher level model. 
(Ideally, fl and p~ would be variables, though modelling contracts dynamically has 
its own complexities which are outside the scope of this work and certainly a topical 
research area (see Ranatunga (1995), Fleten et al (1999), or Batstone (2002) for 
research in this area)). A similar approach to that of Scott (1997) is used here where 
the contract level is varied assesses their impact on system performance. 
The contract revenue is received at the time of delivery, so the revenue in t is 
p~ fl , with p~ also fixed. If the firm were risk neutral, such that U(.) is linear, then 
this constant contract revenue could be ignored because 
With U(.) non-linear, contract revenue can not be separated out from the difference 
payments because the utility of the contract and spot revenues is not additive. Note, 
though, that by defining utility over end-of-horizon profit, the timing of the contract 
payments is assumed to be irrelevant. 
The impact on BI (qf) of assuming a fixed demand curve and stepped supply curve 
is that it is not continuous over the range of release values and has a saw-tooth shape 
(though for ease of illustration, these segments are sometimes connected). Increasing 
ql can change p~, and p~ is applied to the entire quantity of generation; the firm has 
monopoly power on the spot price. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates a weekly benefit curve when demand is fixed and the contract 
price is zero (p~ =0). 
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If station x is marginal in period t for some release q' , then increasing release to q' + /). 
will result in either x remaining marginal, and the spot price remaining at c
x
' or x being 
removed from the dispatch and replaced by station x-J, with marginal cost cx- 1 < c x • 
The lower marginal cost of station x-J is reflected by the flatter slope of the benefit 
function. From point 'A', then, as qf increases and while station x remains in the 
dispatch, P~ = c
x
' Total wealth, W f+1 , increases linearly at the rate of C
x 
up to the 
point at which x is generating at its minimum (point 'B '). As release is increased 
further, the next cheapest station becomes marginal and P~ = cx- 1 (point 'C'). The 
impact of this on the benefit calculation is that the revenue from release decreases 
because Ps applies to all q; and Cx- 1 < cx ' As release increases, the fringe continues to 
be displaced from the dispatch and the spot price decreases. 
If qf < if the firm has to 'buy back' the difference between its release and the 
contract quantity at the spot price, and the firm's spot revenue will be negative. If 
qf > if then p~ (qf - if) is positive and wealth will increase. As the contract quantity 
increases, the benefit curve 'skews' in a clockwise direction such that qf < if becomes 
increasingly less costly and qf > if becomes increasingly less profitable, so the firm 
has less ability, and incentive, to manipulate the spot price. The effect of a non-zero 
p~ is to shift Bf (qf) vertically by the quantity p~ p. The larger the contract revenue 
component in Bf(qf), the lower the impact of changes in spot revenue on marginal 
benefit. 
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7.3.1 State transition 
Consider now the process of determining the release that maximises the end-of-horizon 
expected utility. The transitions of (WI ,Sf) on to W t+1 X SI+l depend upon the release, 
demand, contract level, and inflows in the period. The wealth and storage state spaces 
are discretised at m=l ... M and n=l ... N points, respectively. The values of wl+1 and 
1+1 .... • 1 t t d t d t d b -1+1 d -t+l • 1 S ,.lor a partIcu ar wm ' Sn' an qk' are eno e Y Wm""k an sm,n,k' respectIve y. 
A state transition possibility curve for a (w:n , s~) pair is illustrated in Figure 7.2, 
with BI (ql ) mapped on to W t+1 X St+l. The first point on the state transition possibility 
curve is point 'A', corresponding to release l, which in this case equals OMWh. If p~ 
and ft are positive, demand is met wholly by fringe, with the marginal station (x) 
having marginal cost C
x
' With ft > 0, the firm must buy back the quantity 
(II -O)MW at price p~ (=c.J and incurs (negative) spot profit p~f'. The point at 
which a positive spot profit is made can be found by drawing a vertical line through the 
point at which (w~,s~) maps on to W I+1 xSt+l. 
Chapter 7: SUMDP and Reservoir Management in a Deregulated Electricity Market 
1- .. ---·-"-1 
I I 
I I 
l m ___ .. __ •• _ •• _.1 
···--···-···-···-T·········-···_·················· .. ··········· .. ··· .. ···· .. "1 [ ......... -.............. -... -iii I ... I I I 
I S~+l ,,(A}--=!!!I-r-----. 
S t + 1 "."""_ ... _ ......... - ........... "_" ... ,,,, ...... " ....... __ .......... " ... _ ... _ ......... __ ... "..... --_ ... - ......... --".-."-".-." .. ",, .. .. 
1 
~---I--+-----..L -1+1 W2,k 
1 
Figure 7.2: State transition possibility curve 
-1+1 
S2,k 
125 
There is no adjustment made here for the inflows. For reasons of computational 
efficiency, the value surface is adjusted for the inflow uncertainty prior to the 
calculation of (W 1+1,81+1) and the selection of the optimal release levels. As with the 
deregulated case, the inflow is an independent stochastic variable so ft+I(W'+1 ,Sl+l) 
can be adjusted for inflows, with the resulting inflow-adjusted expected utility function 
referred to as gt(Wt+I, SI+I). 
Recall that, in a given period, m and n are the indices for the discrete levels of 
wealth and storage and k is the index for the set of discrete release levels. The optimal 
release for a point in W f x Sf, ql (w:, s~), maximises gt (Wt+1 ,St+l ) i.e., 
q"t(w t st)= argmaxgl(w f+1 st+l) m' 1/ m,k' n,k 
q~ 
(7.6) 
where wl+1 and St+l are calculated as 
m,k n,k 
(7.7) 
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-f+1 st _ql 
S n,k n k (7.8) 
The expected utility at the beginning of t for a particular (w~" s~) pair is the value of 
gt{Wf+1 ,st+I) corresponding to ~r(w:n's~), or 
Vk (7.9) 
When w,!,:! and s,~~i do not fall on points in Wt x Sf, It (W~, s~) is calculated by 
interpolating between the values of gt{Wf+1 ,SI+I) corresponding to the discrete wealth 
and storage values that surround ( w:,:! ,s~~; ), as in . 
The computational effort required to determine It(w~,sJ over (wt E Wt,SI ESt) 
is dependent on the form of the water value function, the benefit function, and the end-
of-horizon utility function. In the regulated case 0 significant computational savings 
(approximately 99%) were achieved because the search for the optimal release could be 
'ratcheted'. This was possible because the benefit function was non-decreasing as 
storage decreased, independent of the level of storage and wealth, and the end-of-
horizon utility function was concave in both storage and wealth. The state transition 
possibility curve for the revenue maximiser is not necessarily non-decreasing for 
decreasing storage, so the schemes described in can not necessarily be implemented in 
the form they are described. This issue is discussed in the next section. 
7.3.2 Implementation issues 
A less efficient implementation of the ratchet scheme described in is still possible if 
demand is assumed to be fixed in the period. A solution algorithm is as follows: 
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Detennine fT+l (wT ST) 
tn' n 
Create gt(wt+1 ,St+l) 
rrn = 0 \In 
For t:::::: T ... 1 (period) 
For m = M ... 1 (wealth w:) 
For n :::::: 1 ... N (storage s~) 
ft (w:, s~) = -00 
"k = max(rr" , rrn_1) 
For p = I...P (segment of BI (q~ h 
For k = If(P) ... "k(p) given q~ < s~ (release q~) 
wt+1 = wt + Bt Iqt ) 
111 ~ k 
t+l _ st t 
S - 1/ qk' 
I't = gt (w t+! , st+l) 
Jm,n,k 
If l~,",k > P(W:II'S~) 
fl(W:,S~)= l~.n.k 
"I (I I) t q wm,sn = qk 
rr" = k 
else 
k::::::"k(p)+1 
end else 
end for k 
end forp 
end for n 
end for m 
end for t 
Figure 7.3: Solution algorithm with release ratchets for price setting reservoir 
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For the range of qt for which a particular thennal station is marginal, the slope of the 
benefit function is constant and hence is uni-modal. Therefore we can treat each 
segment of the state transition curve (where p~ :::::: 1£ x) as a separate benefit function and 
apply the same techniques used when the benefit function is uni-modal over 
qt :::; qt s 1t. The overheads of this scheme would justify its use for thennal stations 
with a relatively large generation capacity, but it may well be quicker to search the 
entire range of generation levels for small stations. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the application of SUMDP to a situation where a reservoir 
firm is a price setter in an electricity market. Whereas the benefit in each period for the 
deregulated case was the cost of satisfying demand, for this deregulated case it was 
defined as the profit from hydro release and took into account the impact of an assumed 
contract quantity and strike price. The next chapter details experiments performed for 
this case, with utility defined over the accumulated profit and storage at the end of the 
horizon. 
Chapter 8 
Experimelltal Results for Deregulated 
Reservoir Management 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, SUMDP is used to optimise release for a single hydro firm ("the firm") 
operating in a wholesale electricity market setting2. The market is assumed to consist 
of the hydro firm and five other firms (SOEl, SOE2, Contact, Transalta, & Other) and a 
notional 'Shortage' firm3. Excepting the hydro firm, each firm owns at least one 
generating station, with the capacities and marginal costs of each station used to create 
a supply curve in each period. 
2 This example is loosely based on historical data. While firm names and generic assumptions from the New 
Zealand system have been used here, they are not necessarily representative of the New Zealand system as it 
operates in reality. The reader should not draw any conclusions from results detailed in this chapter with respect to 
the performance of the corresponding firms in the New Zealand electricity market, under present conditions. 
3 For the experiments performed here, 'shortage' was never called upon, which is a somewhat pleasing outcome. 
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Firm Station Capacity Price 
(MW) ($/MWh) 
SOEl Waikato 1038 2.5 
TPD 335 1 
Huntly unit 1 230 2 
SOE2 Huntly unit 4 250 4.62 
Huntly units 2&3 500 26.69 
Te Awamutu 25 41.45 
Wairakei & Ohaaki 208 0.5 
Contact Clutha 639/244 1 OtaCC 336 3.38 
NPL 230 4.9 
Transalta S down 100 1.5 TCC 379 3.39 
Geo 114 0.5 
NIHyd 278 1 
Other SIHyd 62 1 
Cogen 150 1.5 
Kiwi 45 33.94 
Shortage 00 500 
Table 8.1: Station data 
Thennal and geothennal stations had the same price and capacity in all periods. Using 
historical inflow data, the weekly capacity for each run-of-river station was set to the 
average tributary flow in the week. The hydrological aspects of all hydro stations aside 
from the finn's were not explicitly modelled. The weekly capacity for SOE1 was 
defined as its average weekly generation. This data is detailed in Appendix 3. The 
original data set had several stations with undefined or zero marginal costs (e.g. all run-
of-river hydro). To ensure non-zero spot prices in situations where run-of-river units 
were marginal, it was necessary to set non-zero marginal costs for all stations. These 
marginal costs were also used in profit calculations for those finns. 
Demand is fixed in each week, corresponding to a single block approximation to 
the LDC in each week (annual demand is 34.9GWh). Figure 8.1 shows the annual 
demand profile. The large drop in demand in the middle of the profile corresponds to 
the Christmas period. 
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Figure 8.1: Demand profile 
plarming horizon began in .:uly. Maximum storage for the firm was 
2600GWh. Maximum release in an hour was 2344MWh (393.8GWh/week) and 
release set to the level of average tributary inflows. In addition to the market 
su and demand curves, the contract level (f'), and the strike price (p~) were 
parameters manually set in each period. Contracts were defined as a fixed percentage 
of fiml's release capacity. For example, a 50% contract level corresponded to a 
contract quantity of 1 172MWhlhour (J96.9GWh/week) which is approximately 8% of 
the storage capacity. More importantly, since average capacity utilisation is 
tlcantly less than 100%, a "50%" contract level corresponds to approximately 
114% of average armual generation. Contracts were not modelled for any of the other 
but are effectively assumed to be "reasonable" inasmuch as the behaviour of 
fimls is assumed to be represented by stable offers, as outlined above4 . 
starting storage level for each simulation was 2080GWh (=80% of capacity). 
8.2 shows the mean and standard deviation of weekly inflows. The raw inflow 
and tributary data is detailed in Appendix 3. 
4 those offers should not necessarily be interpreted as marginal costs, this stable behaviour at least implies 
that !hnse firms are not opportunistically explOiting market power. 
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Figure 8.2: Inflow data 
8.2 The risk neutral base case 
A standard SDP approach was used to solve this version of the reservoir management 
problem with the firm assumed to be risk neutral in wealth. A value of storage 
function, V(ST+l), was used to reflect the monetary value of water at the end of the 
horizon. An equilibrium V(ST+l) was determined by repeatedly solving the 
optimisation and using V(ST+l) from each iteration as V(ST+l) for the next. The 
equilibrium V(ST+l) was found when the mean squared deviation between the 
successive functions was less than 0.1. No more than 10 iterations were required, and 
this process was performed for each contract level. 
Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 show the CDFs of end-of-horizon wealth and end-of-
horizon storage from the RN simulations for each contract level (C). 
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The base case for these experiments is considered to be where the firm IS 72% 
contracted. A strike price of $48/MWh was used in all periods. This plice was 
detennined by averaging all the spot prices from the 20 simulated cases when the firm 
134 8: Reservoir 
was neutral of release or 165% 
output. 
8.3 Utility functions 
The end-of-horizon value surface is same as was In I.e., 
(HiTrl ) (WT+l )+ (V(STrl)) 1) 
where 
IS a refl finn's utility 
wealth at the end of the horizon. 
from the of 
is a function reflecting finn's utility derived from 
storage at end 
The reservoir wealth IS by a utility curve over a suitable 
range for FW values 
were perfonned the following combinations of contract level, 
utility Summary statistics all experiments are In 3. 
• The contract level: 72%, 
lit utility - WO, W ,W2, W4 - all utility 
curves are non-decreasing with non-increasing marginal utility. WO least 
curvature (linear) W 4 the most curvature. 
• utility storage function SO, S 1, S3,and where all curves 
are marginal utility. SO the least curvature 
and S4 most curvature. 
combinations of Us the most attention following 
simulation results, reason that they three extreme 
scenanos. The first is the neutral (RN) case, the finn is neutral 
An firm contracted for more than its expected output has incentives to the spot 
to avoid difference payments which can occur if relatively thermal stations are 
contracted scenario could reflect a situation, for where the hydro firm a is 
and retail businesses, with retail load 
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with respect to wealth and V(ST+I) reflects the value of water at the end of the horizon 
(this is the base case described earlier and does not use a utility function). The other 
two combinations, SOW4 and S2W4, are illustrated in Figure 8.5. 
Utility ~~~~~ ... - Utility 
SOW4 S2W4 
Figure 8.5: Combinations of Uw and Us 
8.4 Impact of risk aversion on firm/system performance 
These results all assume a contract level of 72% and use the same contract volumes and 
strike prices as defined for the RN base case in Section 8.2. It is important to note that 
this contract level results in the firm being over-contracted, so the firm has the incentive 
to k ep prices down. Recall also that the assumption made here is that the hydro firm 
has complete control over the spot price (assuming all release alternatives are feasible) 
because it knows the reaction of all other firms in the market. 
Before discussing the results, recall that utility is defined over both ending wealth 
and ending storage by an asymmetric function. We should therefore expect to see the 
ending storage and wealth outcomes reflect the relative utility as defined by the utility 
functions. Because the storage and wealth depend on each other, any gains in one 
dim ension will be expected to be obtained at the other's expense, as was shown and 
discussed in. Decreasing the variability of the ending wealth values results in an 
increase in the variability of ending storage values, and vice versa. The same logic 
applies for the mean. Because the utility functions are asymmetric (e.g. Figure 8.5), the 
nature of the impacts on the distributions of end-of-horizon wealth and storage should 
not be expected to be symmetric either. For example, in the case where the firm has 
more risk aversion towards end of horizon wealth values relative to end-of-hOlizon 
storage values (e.g., the SOW4 utility function), we would expect that ending wealth 
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values would be lower and have less variability compared to a case where the opposite 
is true (e.g., the S4WO utility function). 
Firstly, we consider the impacts of the utility functions on end of horizon values for 
the base case 72% contract level. Figure 8.6 plots average annual wealth against 
expected ending storage (LHS y-axis) and the standard deviation of the expected annual 
wealth (RRS y-axis) from the simulation results corresponding to each combination of 
wealth/storage utility function (WOSO, WOSI, ... W4S3, W4S4). 
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Figure 8.6: Wealth/storage trade-off (C=72%) 
The form of the trade-off between these end-of-horizon outcomes IS fairly 
straightforward and intuitive: 
• a higher expected end-of-horizon wealth IS highly variable and corresponds to a 
lower expected end-of-horizon storage. 
• a lower expected end-of-horizon wealth can be achieved with relative certainty, and 
corresponds to a higher expected end-of-horizon storage. 
These results have a pattern consistent with those illustrated and discussed in (see for 
example Figure 6.15). 
We consider now results obtained using the SOW4 and S2W4 utility functions as 
well as that of the RN base case. Figure 8.7 and Figure 8.8 show the CDFs for end of 
horizon wealth and storage. 
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The impact of risk aversion on the wealth CDFs is that they compress and become 
more upright, with minimum wealth increasing, maximum wealth decreasing, and mean 
wealth increasing by $4m using S2W4 and decreasing by $42m for SOW4. The 
stan.dard deviations of end-of-horizon wealth for the three cases are $45m (Rl"\J), $28m 
(S2W4), and $8m (SOW4). See Appendix 3 for more detailed results for those cases. It 
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is clear from the end-of-horizon wealth CDF that the lowest RN outcome ($310m) is 
far lower than those of the other cases, and hence is a primary cause for the large 
standard deviation of end-of-horizon wealth for the RN case6; the 5 th percentile figures 
for the SOW4 and RN cases are close in comparison (see Table 8.2, which follows). As 
in , and as reflected in Figure 8.6, these end-of-horizon wealth distributions must be 
considered in conjunction with the distributions of end-of-horizon storage, since, as has 
been discussed, the two are linked. 
Figure 8.9 and Figure 8.10 plot a risk averse CDF against the RJ'J CDF including 
the 5% (dashed), 25% (dotted), 50% (solid), 75% (dotted), and 95% quartiles. 
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Figure 8.9: RN and SOW4 end-of-horizon wealth CDFs (C=72%) 
6 See the circled points in Figure 8.6. 
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Figure 8.10: RN and S2W4 end-of-horizon wealth CDFs (C=72%) 
I~ . RN SO W4 
PW: Minimum $ 310,807 $ 379,811 
PW: 5% percentile $ 380,610 $ 379,866 
PW: 25% percentile $ 409,460 $ 380,429 
PW: Median $ 421,823 $ 384,993 
PW: 75% percentile $ 464,510 $ 396,768 
PW: 95% percentile $ 487,579 $ 399,896 
PW: Maximum $ 501,539 $ 401,375 
PW: Mean $ 430,072 $ 387,999 
PW: Standard deviation $ 44,600 $ 8,227 
Oiff from and % of RN 
$69004 22% 
$-744 0% 
$-29031 -7% 
$-36829 -8% 
$-67742 -14% 
$-87682 -17% 
$-100163 -19% 
$-42072 -9% 
$-36372 -81% 
Table 8.2: End-of-horizon wealth results (C=72%) 
The storage CDFs have similar shapes, and this is reflected by the mean storage 
traj ectories (Figure 8.11) and mean release trajectories (Figure 8.12) having similar 
profil es. The stm1ing storage level for each simulation is 20800Wh, and corresponds 
to the first week of July. The storage profiles are as we would expect, falling over 
winter/spring (demand higher), rising over spring/summer/autumn (demand lower), 
then falling again in autumn/winter (demand higher). 
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Figure 8.11: Mean storage trajectories 
It was shown earlier that compared to the simulation results for the RN case, those 
for the SOW 4 case had a lower mean and standard deviation of end-of-horizon wealth. 
It was also commented that since utility is defined over end-of-horizon wealth and 
storage, changes in the distribution of wealth (storage) is inversely related to changes in 
storage (wealth). This relationshjp is reflected by the average storage trajectories in 
Figure 8.11, wjth the end-of-horizon wealth outcomes appearing to be achieved by 
holding more water in storage, on average, to reduce the chance of low inflows which 
might subsequently result in hjgh difference payments due to relatively expensive 
thermal stations being required to satisfy demand. This policy produces in a higher 
ending EOH storage (1,795GWh) compared to the RN case (1 684GWh) and the S2W4 
case (164SGWh). For S2W4, mean end-of-horizon wealth actuaLLy increased compard 
to the RN case, but thjs is matched with a decrease in mean end-of-horizon storage. 
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Figure 8.12: Mean release trajectories 
The contract quantity in each week is 1688MWh, so the release schedules in Figure 
8.12 reflect the situation (discussed earlier) that the finn is over contracted and always 
buyi ng back generation from the market. Thus, it will have the incentive to push the 
spot plice as low as possible, and ensure that high spot price events occur rarely, since 
these will result in large difference payments and will therefore lower wealth. The 
mean spot price (Figure 8.13) is usually less than $50, indicating that the finn is 
releasing enough to ensure that Huntly units 2 and 3 ($266/MWh) remain out of the 
dispatch, on average, and hence that the most expensive thennal station is New 
Plymouth ($49IMWh). The large difference between these two marginal costs means 
that release will be highly linked to the demand profile. There is a step in the supply 
curve of approximately 500MW at a marginal cost of approximately $49, so it is the 
optimal release for a large proportion of 'moderate' storage/wealth combinations, as 
simulated here. 
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8.5 The impact of risk aversion on other firms 
When the firm is risk neutral, there is relatively little variability in competitor mean 
generation levels (Figure 8.15), most of the variability occurring in summer when 
inflows are high and demand is low (Figure 8.16). Thus the effect of SOW 4 utility 
function relative to the RN case is minimal. 
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Figure 8.15: Mean competitor generation (C=72%) 
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Figure 8.16: Starndard deviation of competitor gene,"ation (C=72%) 
Table 8.3 shows average annual generation and Table 8.4 shows average annual 
profi t for each firm. Generation is in units of GWh while profits are in units of ($ 000). 
The 'pot price is in units of $/MWh. 
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C-62% C-72% C::::~32% 
RN 50W4 RN 50W4 RN 50W4 
Mean SI dev 
, 
Mean 51 dey Mean 51 dey I Mean 51 dey Mean SI dey I Mean SI dey 
50El 4,125 2 4,123 10 4,122 15 4,119 21 4,123 9 4,119 19 ~ l50E2 5,015 254 I 5.191 133 5,001 260 I 5,145 146 5.002 263 I 5.125 155 I I I ~ ,Conlact 10,300 279 I 10,391 260 10,325 267 I 10.394 257 10,339 260 I 10.411 254 
1i,Transalta 4,141 112 I 4,136 126 4.147 100 I 4.138 123 4.149 99 I 3,974 113 
13 IOlhers 3,438 , 3,438 3,438 I 3.438 3,438 I 3,438 
u IShortage I I I 
SOE3 IGeneration 8,954 638, 8,694 484 8,940 602 I 8,738 505 8,921 586 I 8738 4991 
l310rage 1,696 192 I 1,739 203 1,700 193 1,736 201 1,703 194 1,739 2021 
Market IPrice $51.35 $3031 $58.29 $2.23 $45.99 $3.141 $51.52 $2.16 $46.94 $3.191 $50.04 $2.121 
Table 8.3: Average annual generation with firm utility and contract level varied 
C=62% C-72% C-82% 
RN 50W4 RN ~ SOW4 RN 50W4 
Mean Stdev Mean SI dev Mean St dey Mean SI dey Mean SI dey: Mean SI dey 
<II 50E1 $105.270 $12,564 $24.476 $62 $90,995 $12.944 : $24.451 $124 $90,837 $13,116 j $24.452 $115 
.g SOE2 $127,293 $14,300 $30,814 $792 $103,653 $14.562 $30,543 $869 $103,544 $14,686 $30.422 $922 
0:; Contact $304,803 $30.149 $61,681 $1.543 $261.434 $31,0281 $61,699 $1528 $261,099 $31.408 $61,798 $1,505 
a. Transalta $89638 $12,550 $24,549 $746 $71,494 $12,926 $24,563 $730 $71.368 $13.061 $24,587 $668 E 
0 Others $139.070 $11,039 $20,406 $0 $125,540 $11,394 $20,406 $0 $125,382 $11.560 $20,406 SO 
u Shortage $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 SO $0 
SOE3 Wealth $430,178 $38,960: $382,089 $2,965 $430,072 $44.600: $387,999 $8,227 $431,294 $50,779: $393,853 $11.861 
Table 8.4: Average annual profits with firm utility and contract level varied 
The results from using the SOW4 function result show a slight decrease in the 
finn's generation relative to the RN results, and this has the largest impact on the 
annual generation levels of SOE2 (increased mean and reduced standard deviation) and 
to a lesser extent Contact and Transalta (decreased mean and increased standard 
deviation). SOE2 is most affected by the change in contract and risk aversion, and this 
is because it owns Huntly unit 4 ($46.20/MWh) and Huntly units 2&3 ($266.90) which 
will be marginal stations in the dispatch. 
Another consequence of risk aversion is that with the finn generating less (so as to 
store water as an insurance against high cost events), more expensive stations must be 
caned on now and again to meet demand, resulting in higher spot prices. From Figure 
8.13, though, it is apparent that this effect resulted in a minimal change in spot prices. 
The reason is that the hydro finn is over-contracted so has an incentive to minimise the 
difference payments, and hence the extent to which prices rise above the strike price. 
8.6 The impact of contracts and risk aversion 
The impact of the three 62%, 72%, and 82% contract levels on RN and SOW 4 end-of-
horizon wealth is shown in Figure 8.17, with Figure 8.18 showing the corresponding 
effect on storage, At C=62%, the finn faces less exposure to the spot market (relative 
to the 72% and 82% cases), and hence to situations which will increases the variability 
of end-of-horizon wealth outcomes. Decreasing the contract level results in the CDFs 
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compressing and become more vertical. For SOW4, the wealth CDFs shift to the left 
slighlly, but this is compensated for by a shift to the right in the storage CDF. 
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Figure 8.18: RN and S2WO storage CDFs with contract Level varied 
The combined impact of risk aversion and contracting is best illustrated by comparing 
the two most extreme scenarios: SOW4&C=62% and RN&C=82%. The mean wealth 
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values are $382m and $431m, while the standard deviations are $3m and $50.8m, 
respectively. The mean spot prices are $58.29 compared to $46.94, while annual 
generation is largely unchanged (8,694GWh compared to 8,921GWh). As has been 
mentioned earlier, this reduction in end-of-horizon wealth (but with less variability) is 
compensated for by a shift in the mean end-of-horizon storage CDFs (increased mean) 
as well as an increase in its variability. 
Regardless of the contract level, simulation results produced using the SOW 4 risk 
aversion function produce results which significantly decrease the mean wealth and 
standard deviation compared to the risk neutral (RN) cases. The range of contract 
levels used here had a relatively minor impact on the distributions of ending wealth 
compared to the impact of the utility functions. 
8.7 Summary 
In this chapter, the impacts of risk aversion were investigated for a reservoir operated as 
a price setter in a wholesale electricity market. Concave utility functions had the 
expected impact on wealth, reducing the variation of end-of-horizon wealth outcomes, 
in some cases quite dramatically. This was at the expense of increasing the variability 
of end-of-horizon storage levels, though the increase was small compared to the impact 
on wealth. The change in mean wealth and storage was influenced by the nature of the 
trade-off between storage and wealth in the utility function. For a fixed contract level, 
increasing the concavity of U W' and holding Us constant (or, increasing the relative 
risk aversion towards end-of-horizon wealth) produces the following results: 
• JiwT and (j WT decrease. 
• JiST and (j ST increase. 
• The range of end-of-horizon wealth outcomes decreases. Both the maximum (best) 
and minimum (worst) EOH-W tend towards the mean, though the increase in the 
minimum EOH-WW value is larger than the decrease in the maximum EOH-W. 
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• Storage trajectories are higher on average and releases lower on average. Holding 
storage is a mechanism for hedging against the impacts of future inflow uncertainty 
on revenue given the contract level. 
• Spot prices tend to increase due to lower release levels. 
As contract levels decrease and tend toward the expected output: 
• Average release decreases marginally and average spot prices increase, reflecting 
the decrease in the incentives to keep spot prices low. 
• Jiw
r 
decreases marginally, presumably due to the over-contracting situation 
resulting in a balancing of contract revenues and difference payments (both positive 
and negative) for different over-contracted levels. 
• (j Wr decreases, presumably because the impacts of low inflows (and the subsequent 
low release and high difference payments) on wealth are reduced. 
• The impact of risk aversion on releases lessens because the weekly benefit function 
becomes more 'jagged' and plays a more dominant role in the trade-off between 
wealth and storage implied by the cost-to-go function. 
For the scenarios considered here, altering the risk aversion functions had more 
influence on the distributions of end-of-horizon wealth compared to altering the 
contract levels (and holding the risk aversion functions constant). As was shown and 
discussed, the variability of the end-of-horizon wealth did decrease slightly as the 
contract level was decreased, reflecting the ability of the hydro firm to reduce the 
frequency of situations which resulted in large difference payments, and hence reduce 
the variability of end-of-horizon wealth outcomes. 
Competitors were dispatched in order of marginal (offer) cost in order to meet 
demand, thus their generation and profit levels were directly related to the hydro firm's 
release levels. Firms owning stations with marginal costs around the average marginal 
cost were most affected because slight changes in the hydro firm's release levels 
resulted in them being removed, or included, in the dispatch. Firm SOE2 was most 
affected by changes in the hydro firm's risk aversion and contract levels due to its 
ownership of the Huntly4 unit, which was often marginal. 
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Overall, usmg a risk averse utility curve resulted in release schedules which 
substantially reduce the variability in end-of-horizon wealth outcomes while not greatly 
affecting the distributions of end-of-horizon storage. Although the firm possesses a 
strong influence on the spot price (due to all other firms being treated as a fringe), the 
results do provide a basis for comparison with models that use a more realistic form of 
market interaction, and suggest the merit of more research in this area, and in particular, 
for scenarios where the nature of competition, and the contract levels, are more 
realistic. 
Chapter 9 
Extellsions 
9.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have described and illustrated SUMDP for a reservoir firm 
operating in 'regulated' and 'deregulated' environments. ill the latter case, the 
reservoir firm was a dominant firm and the other firms were assumed to be price taking. 
ill reality, though, these firms may compete and have an influence over the market 
price. ill Section 9.2, a Stackelberg leader/follower model is developed where fringe 
firms compete for residual demand rather than being price takers. The previous cases 
have also assumed that the reservoir firm only produces hydro generation. Section 9.3 
discusses the case where the dominant firm owns thermal stations in addition to its 
hydro capacity. 
9.2 A Stackelberg leader/follower model 
Scott (1997) presents a Coumot analysis for the case where profit maximising (and 
implicitly risk neutral) contracted firms compete for market share by adjusting their 
quantities. A Nash equilibrium is found at the generation levels at which neither firm 
has any incentive to adjust their quantity offered given the offer of the other firms, 
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which have also determined their offers using the same process. Scott used this model 
to represent weekly operating behaviour and embedded it in a Dual Dynamic 
Programming model for reservoir management. One of the firms generates power from 
hydro generation and faces weekly inflow uncertainty. Instead of using a storage state 
variable in each period, Scott uses the marginal water value (MWV) associated with 
different storage levels. The MWV reflects the value of storing water and using it in a 
later period rather than releasing it now. Thus, when storage is high the MWV is low, 
and when storage is low the MWV is high. This is relevant because the MWV is 
treated as the hydro firm's marginal cost, so the market equilibrium and associated firm 
generation levels can therefore be determined using the Coumot equilibrium equations 
where the firms compete on the basis of quantity and not price. 
A variation from Scott's approach is to use a benefit function based upon a 
follower/leader game where the hydro firm is the leader and the other firms are 
followers. The leader offers some quantity to the market. This has the effect of 
reducing demand by the offer quantity, which is known by all firms. The followers 
then compete in a Coumot fashion for the remaining demand until a (Nash) equilibrium 
is found. An output from this equilibrium is the market price, which is used to derive 
the hydro firm's (weekly) profit function. This profit function can then be used to 
calculate end-of-period wealth, which is used to determine the optimal release. 
The main assumption of this approach is that any level of hydro release is accepted 
in the market dispatch, which is reasonable if the hydro manager adopts a strategy of 
offering generation at a price of zero, or has some other mechanism for making this 
possible. Although the follower firms determine the price via their competition for 
'follower' demand, the form of their competition is known by the hydro firm. 
Therefore, the hydro firm knows the market price, and the corresponding profit, that 
will result from any given level of hydro release. 
Scott also presented the Cournot equilibrium conditions for constant elasticity 
demand which assume a constant marginal cost and that each firms' generation is 
unbounded. In reality, a firm's generation is bou1;lded and its marginal costs may not be 
constant. Examples of non-constant marginal costs include linear marginal cost curves 
and stepped supply curves. 
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Scott presents the equilibrium equations for the case where a firm's marginal cost 
IS fixed (corresponding to a horizontal segment of its supply curve) and when its 
generation is fixed (corresponding to a vertical segment of its supply curve). Scott's 
technique for determining what he termed "admissible solutions" was to find solutions 
for different combinations of assumptions regarding each firm's supply curve, and then 
test whether solutions were consistent with the marginal costs used to derive them. See 
Chapter 3 of Scott (1997) for further discussion ofthis7. 
9.2.1 Linear demand 
Using the same notation as in previous chapters, the market levels (m subscript) of 
marginal cost, generation and contracts used in Scott's Cournot equilibrium equations 
are: 
(9.1) 
where Ci , gi' and /; correspond to firm i's marginal cost, generation level and 
contract level (respectively). This analysis is assumed to be for a particular period, so 
the t sUbscript is dropped unless otherwise necessary. 
Now consider the case where demand is assumed to be linear and represented by 
an inverse linear demand function of the form: 
(9.2) 
where (Po, go) is the reference point from which the price can be thought to deviate 
depending on the difference between g m and go. The Cournot equilibrium market 
price and generation level are: 
(9.3) 
(9.4) 
The individual firm generation levels are: 
7 In fact, the same problem can be represented as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) and solved quickly 
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(9.5) 
Given the linear demand curve described earlier, a 'follower' demand curve, 
pAgF,q~), can be created by subtracting q~, the 'leader' generation level, from the 
market demand curve i.e., 
(9.6) 
where gF is total follower generation and q~ is a discrete value of ql , with k E K and 
K being the set of feasible discretised hydro release levels. 
The 'follower' Coumot equilibrium price is determined as before with the go 
terms replaced by (go - q~ ). The 'follower' market consists of l' =/-1 firms and the 
'follower' market contract level, f~, excludes the hydro firm's contract level. Thus we 
have: 
(9.7) 
(9.8) 
and equilibrium generation levels for each firm: 
(9.9) 
Given the equilibrium follower generation, the market generation will be g* = g; + q~. 
The market price corresponding to g' is therefore: 
(9.10) 
The inverse market demand curve is just the follower inverse demand curve shifted to 
the right by q~, so the equilibrium price remains the same i.e, 
(9.11) 
using commercial non-linear solvers. 
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as shown in Figure 9.1. 
p(g) 
p(g) 
* * P =PF / 
g* g 
Figure 9.1: Equilibrium market and follower price and generation 
The fonn of the solution is similar to that discussed by Scott, who discusses it in 
the context of checking for an admissible solution if a finn is operating on a vertical 
section of its supply curve. In this case, though, it is the hydro finn which has its 
output fixed, and this output is feasible by definition. If the followers have stepped 
supply curves, it will be necessary to find an admissible follower solution for each q k • 
Scott (1997) discusses the uniqueness of these solutions for linear and constant 
elasticity demand. 
For the follower/leader game of interest here, the above analysis can be perfonned 
for the range of discrete q~. Assuming admissible follower solutions are found, there 
will be a price (p *) associated with each release. In effect, this analysis would result in 
a 'leader' demand curve, PL (qt), which reflects the market price for different hydro 
('leader') generation levels. 
If the competing finns each have a single marginal cost and unbounded generation, 
then P L (qt) can be derived analytically as follows. The slope of the leader demand 
curve, p( , is the change in market price resulting from a change in release 
(9.12) 
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which is constant and non-positive because p <0. Since the curve is downward 
sloping, the y-intercept, p;, will occur where qt =0, which is just the definition of 
equilibrium follower price when q~ =0. i.e., 
(9.13) 
The form of PL (qt) is therefore: 
L L I ;:::: Po + Poq 
+ + pql 
;:::: "'-"---"'--';";;;"';;"--":-;;"';;"+--
1'+1 1'+1 
(9.14) 
which is linear with slope -L. The curve is downward sloping because p <0. 
I' +1 
The profit from release can now be restated as: 
(9.15) 
which is concave over qt. Contract revenue may also be added, though this requires an 
assumption about the contract strike price. The form of Profit(qt) is of interest, 
particularly the marginal profit, which has two components. For a unit increase in 
release there will be a change in revenue generated from the additional unit of release 
as well as a change in revenue resulting from a different price being applied to the 
previous level of generation i.e., 
8Profit(qt) 
8qt (9.16) 
The first term is the price associated with qt and will be non-negative and non-
increasing for increasing qt , as per the earlier definition of P L (qt ). The second term is 
linear in qf with slope -L <0 and is positiv~ for ql < t,: and negative for qt > f: . 
1'+1 
For low ql, PL (qt »-L, while the reverse will occur for large ql. 
I' +1 
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Consider a simple example with the hydro firm and two additional firms with 
marginal costs of c[ =1.5 and c2 =2.5, and contract quantities 1; =800 and f2 =1200. 
The parameters for demand are Po =3, P =-0.001 and go =2000. The market 
parameters are l' =2, em = 2 and fm =2000. These are the same parameters used by 
Scott. The contract level for the hydro film is hi =500. 
The case where hydro release is zero (qk=O) is the same situation presented by 
Scott where there are only two firms. The equilibrium price is p~ =2.33 with total 
system generation of g~=gl:,=2666, which is comprised of g ~ = 1 633 and g;=1033. 
This solution is shown in Figure 9.2. 
3.5 
3.0 . 
2.5 
g. i<J . ~ O 
2.0 · 
1.5 t-------------~ 
1.0 - - - --- -
I 
I 
I 
---- ~ --- - -----. 1- ·-
I 
I 
I 
I 
0.5 - - ---- ---- -- --- - - - - - -- - --- - --- - -- - - ----- - -- -~-- - ----
I 
I 
oo~------~------~------~------~------~------~------~----~ 
o 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
p· lq, = 0 
Figure 9.2: Equilibrium price and generation when qk =0 
For fi rm 2, g; < f2' so quantity g; -f2 is purchased by firm 2 from the spot market to 
satisfy its contract obligations, so a lower p' will be desirable. Firm 1, on the other 
hand, has g~>.f." and is achieving a positive spot market profit, so a higher p' will be 
pre ferable. The hydro film's profit is calculated as Profit(ql)=f(0-500) = -1166, so 
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for this particular release, the hydro finn would satisfy its contract obligation by 
purchasing the entire quantity off the spot market and incur a loss. 
Now let qk =1000. The demand curve is shifted to the left by 1000. The 
equilibrium price is p~ =2, with g~ =2000 comprised of g~ =1300 and g; =700, as 
illustrated in Figure 9.3. Again, finn 1 has g: < ~, while g; > 12 for finn 2. The 
hydro finn is now making a positive spot profit of Profit(q( )=2(1000-500)=1000. 
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1 
1 
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I 
I 
0.0 -I----_--_--_--~-------___ ~ 
a 500 1000 1500 2500 3000 3.500 '000 
Figure 9.3: Equilibrium price and generation when qk =1000 
Evaluating Profit(q() for a range of q~ and for a fixed yields the profit curve shown in 
Figure 9.4. Contract revenue has been excluded from the profit calculations but would 
only result in the curves being shifted upwards by the contract revenue. 
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Figure 9.4: Firm profit levels (L demand, fixed marginal cost) 
Hydro profit is concave and decreasing at a non- increasing rate, as discussed earlier. 
As c/ increases, follower generation levels decrease linearly and, combined with the 
impact of q' on p;, yield convex profit curves. Under the assumptions stated, if the 
henefit in a given period defined to be Profit(q'), algorithmic improvements would be 
pos ible because it is concave. 
9.2.2 Constant elasticity demand 
We now consider the case where demand is modelled by a constant elasticity demand 
curve. From Scott, if the price elasticity of demand is defined as: 
og P 
£=---
op g 
(9.17) 
then the inverse market demand curve can be described as: 
1 
p(gJ ~ po[~J (9.18) 
[gnoring the hydro finn, the equilibrium price is found by solving: 
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which is polynomial in p* and can be solved numerically. 
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(9.19) 
If the follower/leader framework described earlier is adopted here, the follower 
demand curve needs to be created by adjusting the market demand curve for the leader 
generation. There are two ways which this can be done. Firstly, as for the linear 
demand case, the reference generation level can be adjusted by q~, giving: 
(9.20) 
Because the slope of the demand curve is dependent on the generation level, the 
follower and leader demand curves will only have the same slope at the reference 
points (Po,go) and (Po,go-q~). For gF :;i:(go-q~), BpF/BgF :;i:BpIB(gF+q~), so 
there will be an inconsistency between p F (g; ) and p(g 111 ), where g m = g; + q ~ . 
To ensure that pAg;)= p(gJ, pAg;) must be horizontally displaced from 
p(g m) by q~ Vp F' The form of the follower inverse market demand curve which will 
ensure that pAg;)= p(g,J is therefore: 
(9.21) 
which is equivalent to a demand curve of the form: 
(9.22) 
and the equilibrium price will be that which satisfies: 
1 
p gm _qt= .Pim 
[ 
:
-;; ,1" 
o go k sI'(p-c".)+p (9.23) 
Rearranging gives: 
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(9.24) 
so the equation to be solved for each q~ is: 
(9.25) 
Note that setting q~ =0 yields the following polynomial: 
/,
' & 
(1 + sJ')p·& - sJf- p.&-l - mPO = 0 F C m F ( t) 
, go -qk 
(9.26) 
which is exactly the same as Equation 3.38 in Scott (1997), as we would expect, 
because demand is unaffected by the hydro firm. Once p; has been determined, the 
equilibrium follower generation level is: 
(9.27) 
The individual firm generation levels are then calculated using Equation 3.41 in 
Scott (1997): 
* 
* PF -c; !. g . = + . I • I (9.28) 
PF 
* sgF 
Consider again the example described earlier where there is a hydro firm and two 
follower firms with marginal costs of C1 =1.5 and C 2 =2.5, and contract quantities 
1; =800 and 12 =1200. The contract level for the hydro firm is Ih =500. The 
parameters for demand are Po=3, go=2000, and &=-312. The market parameters are 
l' =2, em = 2 and 1m =2000. These are the same parameters used by Scott and in the 
linear demand example. 
The case where hydro release is zero (q k =0) is the same situation presented by 
Scott where there are only two firms. The equilibrium price is P; =2.26 with total 
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system generation of g~=g:=3057, which IS comprised of g,'=2343 and g;=714. 
This solution is shown in Figure 9.5. 
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Figure 9.5: Equilibrium price and generation when qk =0 (CE demand) 
As for the linear demand case, g;<1;, and g~> 1;. The hydro firm's profit IS 
calcu lated as Profit(q') = 2. (0 - 500) = -1166, so for th is particular release, the hydro 
3 
firm would satisfy its contract obligation by purchasing the entire quantity off the spot 
market and incur a loss. 
Now let q k =1 000. The demand curve is shifted to the left by 1000. The 
equilibrium price is p~=2, with g~=2000 comprised of g;=1300 and g;=700, as 
illustrated in Figure 9.6. Again firm 1 has g; < 1; while g; > 12. The hydro firm is 
now making a positive spot profit of Profit(q' )=2(1000-500)=1000. 
Chapter 9: Extensions 
5 
4.5 
4 
3.5 
3 
Q) 
-g 2.5 
"-
g'17=1000 
• 2 
---- --~ \ -", - - - - - -- - -
" 
- - - - - - - --q~ ;; 10<X) - - ~,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
-, 
- _-0- __ 0 o _ ___ o _ _ ____ o~o_o __ _ o_o_o __ _ o_o ___ ________ _ _ _____ _ 
' -, I 
" 
- - - - - - - - - 0 0 0 _ _ _ _ 0 _ ________ _ ~ _ _ ____ _______________ _ _ ______ _ 
.; . ~-=-=-= ~,,-,,-,,- ~ ~ . . .. ~~.~  .. ••. , 
1 
1.5 -1-_____________ --1.- 0 - 0 0 - - - 1 0 ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I 
--- ------ -- ------------ -- -- -- --------- -- - - ------
1 
0.5 - - . ------- ---- --- - ----1 
1 
o ~-----r_------r_------r_-------~----~~------~------~----~ 
161 
o 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 
f' , 'I. = 1000 
Generation 
Figure 9.6: Equilibrium price and generation when qk =500 (CE demand) 
Evaluating Projit(q() for a range of q~ and for fixed 'follower' marginal costs 
yieJds the profit curve shown in Figure 9.7. Also shown is the spot profit curve derived 
using linear demand. The profit curves are concave over the range of feasible release 
levels and are similarly scaled for both the linear and constant elasticity demand curves. 
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Figure 9.7: Hydro profit levels (CE demand, fixed marginal costs) 
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The market prices and generation levels associated with each hydro release are 
shown in Figure 9.S. When demand is assumed to be linear and the followers have 
fixed marginal costs, the price and generation curves are both linear, which was shown 
earlier. When a constant elasticity demand curve is used, the price curve has a flatter 
trajectory and is concave due to the demand curve and market generation curves being 
convex. 
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Figure 9.8: Spot price profiles (CE demand, fixed marginal cost) 
9.2.3 Stepped supply curves and linear demand 
Now consider the case where the follower firms have stepped supply curves. The 
previous analysis discussed the case where the marginal costs of each firm were fixed, 
which corresponds to generating on a particular step on the supply curve. Thus, a 
feasible generation level for a firm always corresponded to a single marginal cost. 
With each firm having a stepped supply curve consisting of vertical and hOlizontal 
segments, the equilibrium follower generation level will correspond to a single or 
mUltiple marginal costs, depending on whether the generation level corresponds to a 
vertical or horizontal segment of the supply curve. 
The equilibrium price, p;, associated with each discrete release level, q~, must 
now be determined. One way to do this is to search all possible intersections of the 
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follower firm supply curves until an equilibrium is found, and to do this for each q~; 
Scott (1997) proved that if demand is linear, there is a unique equilibrium price. Each 
follower firm's supply curve is separated into horizontal segments and vertical 
segments, with D; being the number of horizontal segments for firm i and E; being the 
number of vertical segments for firm i. The horizontal segments are defined for a fixed 
marginal cost (c) and over ranges of generation for each firm, and these bounds are 
denoted by the variables h and 11. The vertical segments are defined for a fixed 
generation level (g) and over a range of marginal costs, and these bounds are denoted 
by the variables v and ~ . Demand is linear and defined as p(gm) = Po + p(gm - go). 
Each of the two firms is contracted to supply /;, so the total level of 'follower' 
contracting is defined as IF = J; + 12' 
An algorithm to find p; is as follows: 
For each k (discrete hydro release q~) 
For dl = 1 ... D, (set of horizontal segments for firm 1) 
A 
C1 =cdl 
For d2 = 1 ... D2 (set of horizontal segments for firm 2) 
A 
C2 = C d2 
Cm =(CI+c2)/2 
-1: 3ci-Po-2cm-PIF+p(go-q~) f '-12 g . - . + or 1- , 
I I 3p 
if hdl > g 1 ?:. 11d' and hd2 > g 2 ?:. 11d2 (then solution is admissible) 
• _ Po + 2cm + plF - p(g 0 - q; ) 
Pk - 3 
endd2 
For e2 = 1 ... E2 (set of vertical segments for firm 2) 
A 
g2 = ge2 
g = I'+CI-Po-pJ;+p(go-q~-gJ 
1 )1 2p 
P = Po +C1 + PJ; - p(go -q; -g2) 
2' 
C2 = P - p(g 2 - 12) 
if hdl > gl ?:. 11d' and ve2 > C2 ?:. ~e2 (then solution is admissible) 
ende2 
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enddl 
For el = 1 ... EJ (set of vertical segments for firm 1) 
For d2 = 1 ... D2 (set of horizontal segments for firm 2) 
gl =gel 
g = f + c2 - Po - P.f2 + p(go - q; - g] ) 
2 2 2p 
P = Po +C2 + P/2 - p(go -q; -gl) 
2 
CI = P - P(gl - jJ 
if Vel> C1 ~ l:el and he2 > g 2 ~ l:!:.e2 (then solution is admissible) 
.end d2 
For e2 1. .. E2 (set of vertical segments for firm 2) 
gl =gel 
g2 = ge2 
P =Po-p(go-q;-gj-g2) 
if Vel > P ~ l:el and ve2 > P ~ (then solution is admissible) 
ende2 
endel 
end fork 
An alternative method is to find the Cournot equilibrium by solving a MCP 
formulation of the problem. The MCP solution can then replace the rather laborious 
process described above i.e., 
For each k (discrete hydro release q;) 
Find P; and g; by solving a MCP formulation 
end fork 
The MCP formulation contains the three equations used in the previous analysis. 
Firstly, total follower generation is defined as the sum of the generation of each station 
(j) owned by each firm (i): 
(9.29) 
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where the g ij variables have upper bounds corresponding to the station capacities. The 
price resulting from total follower generation and hydro release can then be defined, 
and represented in constraint form as: 
(9.30) 
Each firm operates at a level where the marginal cost of generation is equal to the 
marginal revenue: 
(9.31) 
This constraint and that which defines g F are expressed as 2:: constraints in the MCP 
formulation. 
Consider now an example described earlier where there is a hydro firm and two 
follower firms with contract quantities J; =800 and f2 =1200. Each firm has two 
stations. For firm one, the marginal cost and capacity vectors are (1.5,3.5) and 
(700,1000), and for firm two they are (2.5,5) and (1000,1000), respectively. The 
parameters for demand are Po=3, go=2500, and p=-O.OOl. This is essentially the 
same illustrative data discussed by Scott (1997, P 48); in his example, go=2500 and 
upper bounds on each firms most expensive station were not specified. The contract 
level for the leader is set at fl =500 and the maximum release as ct =1000. The spot 
price and leader profit curves for the range of ql are shown in Figure 9.9. 
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Figure 9.9: Spot price and leader profit (linear demand) 
When ql =0, the Coumot solution is gl =900 and g2 =1000 which results in a price 
p * =$3.60. The price curve is non-increasing and in this example consists of two linear 
segments. As ql increases from 0 to 400, gl decreases at the rate of 0.5 q' and g2 
remains fixed at 1000. This corresponds to the first (linear) segment in the spot price 
curve. Leader profit remains negative over this range of generation levels as ql < F . 
At ql =400, the follower solution is g[ =700 and g2 =1000. These follower generation 
levels remain the same for 400:::; ql :::; 1000. With follower generation levels essentially 
fixed, the price decreases at a higher rate for q';:::. 400 than when ql:::; 400, 
corresponding to the second linear segment in the spot price curve. The leader profit 
curve is piecewise quadratic due to the price curve being comprised of two linear 
segments and maximum profit is made where q' =ct. As a point of comparison, the 
Coumot solution was calculated where the leader used a marginal cost of 3 for the 
entire range of output. The leader generation was 650 (gl =700 and g2 =1000), which 
lies between F and r/, while p*=3.15. 
9.2.4 Stepped supply curves and constant elasticity demand 
MCP can again be used to handle constant elasticity demand. The fonnulation is the 
same as for the linear demand case aside from the different definition of the demand 
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curve. As discussed earlier, to ensure that leader generation has the desired impact on 
the follower demand curve, the price constraint is defined as 
(9.32) 
The same analysis performed usmg linear demand was performed usmg constant 
elasticity demand. The spot price and leader profit curves are illustrated in Figure 9.10. 
The curves are almost identical to the case with linear demand due to the fact that the 
linear and constant elasticity demand curves are very similar for generation/price values 
around the reference points. lncreasing leader generation shifts both curves back by the 
same amount, so the curves remain close for generation/prices around the adjusted 
reference points. 
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The Coumot solution when the leader is treated as a player (with marginal cost = 3) is 
p' =3.13 and the firm's generation is 646MW. This is almost identical to the linear 
demand case which had p' 3.15 and generation of 650MW. Note that when q' =500 
:he solution is identical to that presented in Scott (1997). 
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9.3 Managing hydro and thermal plant 
In the discussion thus far, the quantity of electricity supplied by the hydro firm was 
equal to the electricity generated from reservoir release. We now consider the case 
where the hydro firm is a price setter and owns an additional thermal plant, and show 
that it is possible to jointly optimise hydro and 'thermal' generation without much extra 
additional computation. 
The firm must now determine the total electricity it will offer to the market, and 
this will be comprised of hydro release ( q ) and thermal generation (G), where: 
(9.33) 
Reservoir release III a gIVen period is bounded, and thermal generation may be 
bounded. 
Recall that in , revenue from release was defined as the sum of contract revenue 
and spot revenue in the period: 
(9.34) 
where P F is the contract strike price and Psis the spot price, which is dependent on 
the demand curve, fringe firms, and level of release (the t subscripts have been 
dropped). The other players were assumed to be price takers, so the residual demand 
curve faced by the firm was derived by subtracting fringe supply from the demand 
curve, whether it be fixed, linear or of constant elasticity. The spot price for a 
particular release could then be read directly off the residual demand curve. 
The above definition of benefit does not include a cost of generation because 
reservoir release is assumed to have no direct variable cost. Now, though, the price is a 
function of the firm's total generation but the cost is only dependent on the firm's total 
thermal generation (G). Thus we have: 
B(q, G) = PFf + Ps(q+ G- f)- C(G) (9.35) 
where C(G) is a function describing the cost of thermal generation. If the firm's 
thermal generation is represented as a stepped supply curve, then C(G) will be convex 
if the units are dispatched in order of increasing marginal cost. 
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Ignoring storage issues, hydro release is the most desirable because it has no 
explicit cost, so for some spot price Ps' supplying a unit of electricity will yield a gross 
profit of (Ps -0), which will always be larger than the gross profit derived from 
supplying the electricity from the thermal source) at marginal cost cj (with gross profit 
P s - C j). While a unit of electricity generated using hydro will always yield a greater 
gross profit than that supplied from a thermal station, hydro release also reduces the 
storage level and hence affects the way in which the water can be used later in the 
planning horizon. Thus, a unit of hydro generation affects both wealth and storage, 
while a unit of thermal generation only affects wealth. Owning an additional 
'unconstrained' generation plant will increase the benefit associated with each hydro 
generation level. If the thermal plant is constrained in some way (e.g. lower bounds on 
generation), then the benefit from release may actually be worse compared to the case 
where the plant is not owned. This can occur because the operating cost of the 
'constrained on' plant can exceed the spot price. 
The form of the benefit function will differ now because the firm can choose 
between hydro and thermal generation sources. Assuming that thermal stations are 
dispatched in order of lowest to highest marginal costs, and ignoring intertemporal 
scheduling issues, the firm's optimal generation level for a particular wealth and 
storage level can be derived in a fairly straight forward manner. 
In terms of implementation, recall that reservoir release (generation) is discretised 
at K points, so qk is the k'th discrete release level (k E K). Thermal release is also 
discretised at I points, so G[ is the l'th discrete generation level (I E L). The simplest 
algorithm to find the optimal values of (qk' G[) for some (WI ,Sl) E WI X Sf is to 
evaluate all combinations of (qk' G[) so as to maximise expected utility I.e., 
Although BI (q, G) only needs to be computed once in each period, the inclusion of 
thermal generation has a similar effect' on computational effort to increasing the state 
space. However, if gl(WI+! ,sf+!) is non-decreasing in both storage and wealth, a 
significantly more efficient process can be used to optimise hydro and thermal release. 
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This process utilises the fact that a unit of hydro generation affects both wealth and 
storage, but a unit of thennal generation only affects wealth. 
In the purely hydro case, the optimal release for a particular (Wf ,Sf) pair was 
detennined by evaluating gf (Wf+1 ,SI+1) for each discrete release (q k)' For a particular 
qp B(q, G) can be calculated given qk (effectively fixed) and over the range of 
possible thennal generation levels. Let G*k denote the optimal thennal generation 
given that release is qk' If gl+l (wf ,Sf) is non-decreasing and G*k maximises 
B(q k' G*k ), then G*k will also maximise gf+1 (wf ,Sf). Observe that the maximisation of 
B(qk' G*k) can be perfonned independently of (Wf ,Sf), and the calculations only need 
to be perfonned once in each period if q and G are independent of the levels of storage 
and wealth. With these conditions satisfied, a single benefit function can be derived 
and used in exactly the same manner as for the hydro case to optimise q k for a given 
(Wf ,Sf) pair. 
In, Bf(q) had a discontinuous 'saw-tooth' shape. The slope of each kink (tooth) 
was equal to the marginal cost of the marginal fringe thennal station. When thennal 
generation is considered, the benefit function will have the same general shape, but the 
slope will also reflect the marginal cost of the finn's thennal generation. In the purely 
hydro case, the cost of production was zero, so kinks in the benefit curve corresponded 
to release levels which forced a change in the marginal station. With thennal 
production, the benefit function will also have kinks corresponding to changes in the 
cost of the finn's thennal generation. The kinks corresponding to a change in the 
finn's marginal cost are not nearly as large as those caused by a change in marginal 
fringe station because the latter affects the profit generated by the finn's total 
generation whereas the fonner only affects the cost of a single unit of generation. 
Let B(qk,G) refer to the function which describes the benefit from generating G 
given a fixed value of qk' Let G*(qk) be the finn's profit maximising thennal 
generation given hydro generation q k' Let B{q, G* (q)) refer to the function describing 
the total benefit to the finn given hydro generation q and the associated optimal 
thennal generation G* (q) . In order to find G* (q J that maximises B(q k' G*k) for a 
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particular q k' a search over the entire range of G is not required. All that is required is 
a comparison of the values of G which correspond to the 'point' of a 'tooth' in the 
benefit function. If the firm owns J thermal stations and the fringe consists of J F 
stations, then there will be a maximum of J F breakpoints in the residual demand curve, 
and hence a maximum of J +JF breakpoints in B(qk,G). As demand increases, the 
number of breakpoints in the residual demand curve will increase, and as qk increases, 
the number of breakpoints in B(qk,G) will decrease. Regardless, with a price taking 
competition, the number of breakpoints to evaluate for each is q k is still a relatively 
small number, so the computational effort required to derive B(q k' G) would not overly 
exceed that required to derive benefit function for the regulated and deregulated cases 
described in earlier chapters. 
9.4 Conclusion 
Chapters 4-8 described and illustrated SUMDP for a reservoir operating in 'regulated' 
and 'deregulated' environments. Alternative benefit functions can be envisaged, and a 
few of those were discussed in this chapter, namely making a different assumption 
about the response of other players to the release decision from the hydro firm, and 
where the offer from the hydro firm incorporates a thermal generation owned by the 
same firm. These benefit functions are a function of release and can be derived 
independently from SUMDP. Once derived though, they could be incorporated in 
SUMDP with the value function used to derive the optimal release levels in the same 
way as illustrated for the earlier cases. 
In the next chapter, SUMDP is discussed for stochastic route choice problems, 
which have similar characteristics to the reservoir management problem, and for which 
there are few approaches discussed in the literature which produce dynamic solutions, 
consider uncertainty, and consider risk. 

Chapter 10 
SUMDP and Stochastic Route Choice 
10.1 Introduction 
For the medium-tenn reservoir management problem, SUMDP corresponded to finding 
an optimal dynamic (or non-stationary) route (or path) through a discrete directed 
acyclic stochastic network. Planning problems in the domains of energy, finance, 
transportation, telecommunications, and project management often have a similar 
structure. In essence, the problem is this: given an origin node, a destination node, and 
a number of intennediary nodes all linked by arcs with uncertain lengths, what is the 
'shortest' route from the origin to the destination. These problems are often referred to 
as stochastic route choice (SRC) problems. The aspect of interest is that, in the 
literature, SRC fonnulations typically have separable objectives where an expected 
value is maximised/minimised at each node/stage. The optimal routes are therefore 
'risk neutral', which may not always be appropriate. 
As discussed, SUMDP maximises a non-linear function of the outcomes associated 
with each decision made during the planning horizon. For a SRC problem, this is 
equivalent to the objective being a function of all the arcs in routes, and the optimal 
route being dynamic (or non-stationary). For some specific fonns of arc uncertainty 
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and utility, SRC problems can reduce to a deterministic problem (Loui, 1983). 
Deterministic dynamic programming can be applied because the optimal decision at 
each node is independent of how the node was arrived at (Bellman's principle of 
optimality). For less restrictive assumptions about utility and uncertainty, though, the 
objective remains a non-separable function of the arcs that comprise a route. Therefore, 
Bellman's principle of optimality does not hold, and complete enumeration is the only 
technique that will guarantee a globally optimal solution (Loui 1983, Bard & Bennett 
1991). 
There are a relatively small number of studies which address SRC problems where 
the DM has a non-linear preference towards terminal outcomes, and the solutions are 
static rather than dynamic. Static solutions are determined prior to any realisation of 
uncertainty, while dynamic solutions allow the DM to adjust the route once some 
uncertainty has been realised, while still maximising the same objective8. While static 
solutions are appropriate in contexts where a 'one-shot' route is required (e.g., route 
choice for hazardous materials), there are many situations where a dynamic solution 
appears to be more appropriate. For example, Bard & Miller (1989) describe a project 
selection problem with a budget constraint and an objective of maximising a non-linear 
utility function. The budget can be allocated to projects in order to improve the 
distribution of project completion times. The solution from their algorithm is static, in 
that not only are the proj ects selected prior to the outcomes of the proj ect times, but so 
are the budget allocations. A more appropriate solution to that problem would have the 
project selection and budget allocation decisions dependent on the time taken to 
complete earlier projects. Moreover, multiple projects might be optimal at a decision 
node, depending on the time taken to complete the previous projects and remaining 
budget. A problem of this type is illustrated in a later section. To the author's 
knowledge there are no methods which describe an optimal, dynamic, utility 
maximising solution to the SRC problem, a problem which has been described as 
"notoriously intractable" in Murthy & Sarkar (1997, p. 227). 
ill Section 10.2, the SRC problem is introduced. A simple SRC problem is solved 
using SDP to illustrate how a non-optimal (static) solution can be produced when the 
objective is non-linear. The literature is also reviewed. ill Section 10.3, a SUMDP 
8 An alternative rationale is to assume that the DM's preferences change as the route is followed. 
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approach to the SRC problem is presented and illustrated with two example problems. 
Some extensions/variations to the SUMDP approach are presented in Section 10.4 in 
the context of specific problems, and a summary is given in Section 10.5. 
10.2 Motivation 
In this section, the route choice problem is introduced for a directed acyclic stochastic 
network. Let I be a finite set of nodes and K(i, j) be a finite set of directed arcs each 
linking a pair of nodes (i, j) where (i, j) E I and J>I. The set of successor nodes (j) to 
node I are defined in the set j E J(i). The length of each are, t k' is assumed to be an 
independent random variable with some known distribution and there may be multiple 
arcs connecting a pair of nodes. The optimal route through the network (from 1 to 1) is 
that which minimises the length of the route, and when uncertainty is present, with no 
risk aversion, minimises the expected route length. 
Stochastic dynamic programming is one technique which can be used to find the 
optimal route through this network if the objective is to minimise the expected route 
length, as described in any standard operations research text (e.g., Daellenbach et. al. 
(1983)) or dynamic programming text (e.g., Denardo (1982)). Let f(i) be the 
minimum expected route length from node i to node I; this is the cost-to-go function. It 
is easy to envisage problems with multiple successor nodes and arcs that skip nodes 
(illustrated in a later section). As long as the network is acyclic, these scenarios can be 
handled by SDP, and the SUMDP approach described earlier. The optimal decision at 
each node can be found by evaluating the following dynamic programming recursion: 
SRCl f(i) = min E rt + f(j)] j,kljEJ(i),kEK(i,j) ~ k Vi"* I (10:1) 
where f{I) = O. Starting from the penultimate node, the recursion is solved for each 
successive node i.e., from i=I-1 to i=l. The decision made at each node is the arc to 
'travel' on, and hence what the successor node (j) will be. 
Consider the network in Figure 10.1 which describes a network (project) consisting 
of 4 arcs (tasks). The nodes represent points at which tasks are completed and the next 
task is selected. The time taken to complete a task is uncertain, though it is assumed 
here that the nature of the uncertainty is known. A DM must determine the sequence of 
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tasks which satisfies her objective; either task 1 or 2 is selected, then either task 3 or 4 
is selected. 
Figure 10.1: Network with stochastic travel times 
In keeping with the simplicity of the network, the arc lengths are assumed to have 
discrete and finite probability distributions with two outcomes, vk and Wk' The 
probabilities of these outcomes occurring are a k and fik , respectively, where 
o ~ a k ~ 1 and fik = 1 ak. The expected length of arc k can therefore be calculated as 
1k =akvk + fik Wk' Table 10.1 contains the task length data (in units of weeks, say) and 
the associated probabilities for this example. 
FromAtoB FromB to C 
VI a l =.4 V =7 3 a 3=.1 
! WI =4 fil=·6 W3 fi3=·9 
v2 a 2=.3 v4=8 a 4=·6 
w2 f32 =.7 w4=4 fi4=.4 
Table 10.1: Travel times and probabilities 
For the arc data described here, the expected arc lengths are ~ =0.4(1)+0.6(4) 
2.8, 12 =2.7, 13 =6.1, and 14=6.4. When the DM 'arrives' at node B (implying that 
either task 1 or 2 has been completed), either task 3 or 4 must be selected. Using the 
objective of minimising the expected project length, arc 3 is preferred to arc 4, and 
hence is the optimal arc to select from B. At node A, the DM can select from tasks 1 
and 2, with the latter having the lower expected length. Thus, the solution to problem 
SRCl is route (2,3) which has an expected completion time of8.8 (weeks). 
Consider now a scenario where there is a time limit on the project length and this is 
reflected by a 'decreasing deadline' utility function of the form: 
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(10.2) 
where ao ' a 1 and d are all positive (see Figure 10.2 where ao =100, a 1 =5, and d=8). If 
Tc is greater than d hours, the project is deemed to have no value, reflected by zero 
utility. Equivalently, the negative slope of U(Tc) can reflect the increasing reward for 
completing the project earlier than d. Note that the utility function could be in units of 
pro fit.. The key issue is that the tasks do not contribute to the profit in themselves, it is 
the total time to complete 'the project', or all the tasks, which determines the profit. It 
is worth noting here that the utility functions discussed in the context of SRC problems 
(e.g. Bard and Bennett, 1991; Murthy and Sarkar, 1997) tend to have an economic 
interpretation, and are devoid of probabilistic interpretations. 
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Figure 10.2: Decreasing deadline utiJity function 
If SRCI is applied to this problem then the optimal arc at each node is that with the 
maxi mum expected utility. For node A, E[U(t2)] > E[U(tJ)] and for node B 
E[U(tJ] > E[U(t 4 )], so the route that maximises the sum of the expected utilities is 
(2,3), the same as that which minimised the sum of the expected task lengths (and the 
expected project length). However, the DM wishes to select a route from A to C which 
maximises the expected utility associated with the total travel time, which depends on 
all the arc lengths in the optimal route. As shown in the introductory chapters, when 
the objective is defined this way, the optimal solution (in this case a route through a 
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network) must be determined by considering the expected utility of this total time. The 
objective is therefore no longer additive, and the problem can not be solved using the 
dynamic programming formulation of SRCI. 
One way to determine a utility maximising solution is to use a process of complete 
enumeration. This involves calculating the expected utility associated with every route 
in the network. Let p be a route from A to C and P be the set of all p, so P={(1,3), 
(1,4), (2,3), (2,4)}. For some p, the time taken to reach node C, Tc, is 
(10.3) 
where Tc is a random variable due to t k being random. The optimal route is that 
which maximises the expected utility of the total travel time i.e., 
SRC2 max E[U(Tc)] 
PEP 
(lOA) 
For the example network, evaluating E[U(Tc)] for all p yields expected utilities of 25.8 
(route 1-3),2604 (route 1-4), 16.2 (route 1-3), and 26.6 (route 2-4), so the optimal route 
for problem SRC2 is (2,4). Routes (2,4), (1,3), and (1,4) are all preferred to (2,3), 
which was the optimal solution to problem SRCI. The solutions to both SRCI and 
SRC2 are static in the sense that the task selected at B can not be adjusted depending 
on the length of task 2, which is the arc selected at A. SRCI is a DP, and the solution 
to SRCI is dynamic in the sense that the optimal arc is a function of the node, even 
though it wasn't apparent in the example. The drawback with complete enumeration, 
though, is that in addition to the optimal routes being static, the number of routes 
increases exponentially in the number of nodes. If dynamic routes were also included 
in P, the number of routes would quickly become intractable for even a small number 
of nodes. (Techniques have been developed for reducing the number of arcs in the 
network, although in the context of finding static solutions. These are discussed in the 
next section). 
Considerable attention has been given to solution methods for deterministic and 
stochastic networks, with the latter problem being more complex and difficult to solve. 
Solution approaches are varied e.g. Markov decision processes, stochastic 
programming, and stochastic dynamic programming (Dror, 1993). When stochasticity 
is considered, the objective of most approaches is to minimise or maximise an expected 
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value, which implies that the DM is risk neutral. The techniques that consider the 
DM's attitude to risk, usually reflected by some form of utility function, rely on Monte 
Carlo simulation or some similar form of scenario generation/evaluation to evaluate the 
DM's utility. Approaches such as these are required because utility is a function of all 
the decisions, so the objective is no longer additive, and Bellman's principle of 
optimality does not hold. 
There are a relatively small number of studies which focus on the SRC problem 
where the DM has some preference or attitude towards the distribution of terminal 
outcomes. For some specific forms of arc uncertainty and utility, SRC problems can 
reduce to a deterministic problem (Loui, 1983) and can be solved using dynamic 
programming where the optimal decision from a node is independent of how the node 
was arrived at (Bellman's principle of optimality). For more general forms of utility 
and uncertainty, though, the objective remains a non-separable function of the arcs that 
comprise a route, so Bellman's principle of optimality does not hold, and complete 
enumeration is the only technique that will guarantee a globally optimal solution (Loui 
(1983), Bard & Bennett (1991)). 
The concept of risk/utility rarely appears in the general SRC literature, even when 
uncertainty is a central issue (though implied risk attitudes are usu,ally mentioned in the 
few papers that consider non-linear utility functions). Loui (1983), Bard & Bennett 
(1991), and Murthy & Sarkar (1997) all state that to determine an optimal static utility 
maximising solution (SRC2) requires complete enumeration of all possible routes. As 
an alternative, algorithms have been developed which reduce the size of the network by 
removing arcs. Eiger et. al. (1985) present an O( n2 ) algorithm which produces a static 
solution when the DM's utility function is linear or exponential. Mirchandani & 
Soroush (1985) extend this work to handle a quadratic utility function. Bard & Bennett 
(1991) use Monte Carlo simulation and stochastic dominance rules to arrive at a set of 
"attractive" solutions. Murthy & Sarkar (1996, 1997, and 1998) developed rules for 
removing arcs when it can be proved that any route from a given node to the destination 
node will not be optimal. These rules are derived from the form of the uncertainty of 
the arc lengths and the form of the utility function (a decreasing deadline in Murthy & 
Sarkar (1997) and piecewise-linear in Murthy & Sarkar (1998)). 
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While the perfonnance of some of these approaches is impressive, the major 
drawback is that the solutions are static in an environment where the uncertainty is 
dynamic. Static solutions to SRC problems are detennined prior to any realisation of 
uncertainty, whereas dynamic solutions allow the DM to adjust the route once some 
uncertainty has been realised. While static solutions are certainly appropriate in many 
situations (e.g. route choice for hazardous materials), there are many contexts where 
dynamic updating is more consistent with a DM's behaviour and/or the decision making 
environment (e.g., reservoir planning, capacity planning, and many delivery/pickup 
problems) yet few published approaches for finding solutions (Murthy & Sarkar, 1997). 
The few techniques that address the dynamic stochastic shortest route problem require 
some restrictive assumptions about the fonn of the problem, as discussed below. 
Dynamic (or time adaptive) solutions to SRC problems refer to the case where the 
DM can adjust the route having experienced some uncertainty during the trip. Hall 
(1983) introduced the concept of adaptive route choice, which he defines as the 
"process of adjusting route choice to infonnation learned on the day of travel" (p. 203). 
He discusses adaptive route choice from a practical perspective, reporting on a number 
of experiments (using students) which investigated the way in which different types of 
infonnation affected the traveller's expectations of travel times. Following from this 
work, Hall (1986) describes a dynamic programming fonnulation for the SRC which 
produces a dynamic solution when travel times are dependent on the time of arrival at a 
node. The network is divided into K stages, and a maximum of K decisions can be 
taken during the trip. The minimum expected final arrival time, having arrived at node 
n at time f.1n and made k arc selections is defined as 1',; (n, f.1n)' The state transition is 
defined as 
'Vi :t- I (10.5) 
where N(i)is the set of successor nodes (including multiple arcs) and !ij(t! f.1J is the 
probability density function for the arrival time at node j given that the traveller arrives 
at node i at time f.1i' He illustrates this technique when arc travel times have 
exponential probability distributions and produces an analytical solution for a small 
example problem. 
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A different approach is taken by Psaraftis & Tsitsiklis (1993), who consider a 
shortest route problem when the DM faces uncertain arc times, modelled by a Markov 
process, upon arrival at a node. The objective is to minimise the expected cost of 
traversing the network, and the decision process involves deciding whether to remain at 
a node to wait for a more promising future state or to travel along one of the arcs, and if 
so, determining which arc (node) to travel on (to). They discuss their approach in the 
context of ship routing. More recently, Pretolani (2000) described how hypergraph 
methods can be used to find dynamic solutions to stochastic acyclic networks with 
time-dependent arc lengths, which requires that the arc length distributions be discrete 
and the arc lengths positive. Although the accumulated time at a node is considered 
when determining the optimal hyperarcs, the objective must be additive for the 
hyperarc "weights" to be added. 
Vehicle Routing Problems consist of determining a route for one or more vehicles 
which, starting from one or more origin nodes, ensures that the vehicle(s) visit(s) some 
set of nodes such that the route( s) satisfies some set of side constraints (e.g., demand) 
and maximises some objective(s). There has been considerable research on this 
problem and its variations, though there are relatively few approaches which handle 
issues relevant to this work, namely stochastic and/or time dependent arc times. 
Malandraki & Daskin (1992) consider the VRP when travel times are deterministic but 
dependent on the arrival time at a node. The travel time dependency is modelled using 
a step function, with the width of a step indicating the range of departure times over 
which a given travel time applies. They formulate the problem as a MILP. Laporte et. 
al. (1992) consider the VRP with stochastic travel and service times, and use chance 
constrained programming and stochastic programming with recourse to determine 
optimal static routes for m vehicles. 
Risk has been incorporated into the transportation planning of hazardous materials 
(HM). Route choice problems for HM is a problem faced by many industrial countries 
especially with recent regulatory developments. Ashtakal & Eno (1996) describe a HM 
route choice model with an objectiv~ of minimising the impact of a spill on the 
population and environment. In this context, they define risk as the probability of an 
accident, multiplied by the consequence of an accident, so an arc with extreme 
consequences may remain desirable if the probability of an accident is low. Because 
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the impacts on the population and nature have different units, a single arc 'cost' is 
derived by weighting the standardised arc 'costs'. Using a deterministic SP algorithm, 
(static) routes are determined for the range of weightings, implying different 
prioritisation, with the optimal route being that which minimises the sum of the 
'normalised' impedances. HM routing problems are probably not a relevant application 
of SUMDP because the uncertainty is expressed in terms of the probability of an 
incident on a route. The revealing of uncertainty during a trip is in terms ofthere being, 
or not being, an incident while travelling along an arc. If there is an incident, the trip 
ends, but if there is not an incident, the optimal route, whether it is static or dynamic, 
remains optimal. 
A major difference in HM problems is the technique used to quantify 'risk', and 
hence how the objective is defined (Erkut & Verter, 1998). The standard model 
assumes deterministic incident probabilities and consequences, and the objective 
minimises some combination of these as a single objective. Multi-attribute models 
have also been investigated e.g., an objective of minimising the total incident 
probability and population exposure. Erkut & Verter (1998) observed that the risk 
(defined as probability x consequence) for a particular route through a network is 
dependent on the risk associated with each link, and that this complication is simplified 
by assuming that the probabilities are so small that a suitable approximation is to 
minimise the sum of the risks on each arc, which can be achieved by finding the 
shortest route. 
There is a body of literature which addresses the behaviour of travellers, and 
interaction between them e.g., Iida et. al. (1992), Abdel-aty et. al. (1997). Jansson & 
Ridderstolpe (1992) consider the impact on ridership distributions when travellers 
select amongst various routes to reach the same destination under various combinations 
of behavioural and operational assumptions. Chen & Hseuh (1998) consider the 
dynamic user-optimal departure time/route choice problem, though it is discussed in the 
context of a group of individuals selecting a route which minimises their individual 
travel times and adapting it. While SUMDP is not envisaged as a tool to address these 
issues, one could imagine it being embedded in these methods so that the behaviour of 
individuals with different preferences could be analysed. 
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While these approaches handle the dynamic aspect of the problem, they are unable 
to handle non-linear terminal value functions, which are a natural consideration when a 
DM faces uncertainty. Interestingly, in their conclusions, Psaraftis & Tsitsiklis (1993) 
note that extending their model to handle a time window with penalties for early and/or 
late arrival (i.e., a non-linear value function) would require the inclusion of the time 
dimension into the state space, though they do not elaborate. The extension they refer 
to is the essential feature of the SUMDP approach described in this thesis. 
10.3 SUMDP for SRC problems 
In this section, the application of SUMDP to the SRC problem is presented and 
illustrated using the example discussed in the previous section. Consider an acyclic 
network where each node (i) is connected only to its successor node (i+ 1), and multiple 
arcs connect each pair of nodes. (This restrictive assumption is relaxed later in the 
section). If t; is the time taken from i to i+ 1, the total time taken to reach I is: 
(10.6) 
As shown earlier, with a non-linear utility function and stochastic arc times, the 
objective can be stated as: 
(10.7) 
This objective is non-separable i.e., for a 3 node network and route (a,b): 
(10.8) 
The expected utility depends on the travel time taken over all stages, and cannot be 
calculated by adding the expected utility of each individual travel time, as noted in 
several articles when considering non-linear utility functions (Bard & Bennett 1991, 
Loui 1983, Murthy & Sarkar 1997). Therefore, the objective is non-separable, 
invalidating the use of a recursive rehition which is independent of the outcomes of 
decisions taken at other nodes of the network. This invalidates the principle of 
optimality underlying SRCl, and presumably motivated the search for alternative 
solution approaches such as the complete enumeration formulation (SRC2). 
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In order to overcome the problem of non-separability, another state variable is 
defined. In the reservoir management problem, the variable was the accumulated profit 
up to the beginning of the period. In the SRC problem, the variable, 1';, is the 
accumulated time to reach i. Because the network is directed and acyclic, the node 
precedence relationships are known, so the time taken to reach node i is simply the sum 
of the arc lengths from the origin to i. This is equivalent to the wealth at the beginning 
of a particular period being the sum of the profits earned in all previous periods; the 
nodes in the SRC problem are just stages in a SDP. 
The accumulated time taken to reach node i from the origin is therefore: 
H 
T,="t 
I L..J r 
r=1 
The accumulated time to reach node i+ 1 is: 
Thus, the total travel time to reach 1 is: 
I-I 
TI =1';-1 +t; = Lt; 
;=1 
(10.9) 
(10.10) 
(10.11) 
which is the argument of the utility function described earlier. However, TI is not 
dependent on all the decisions made prior to arriving at node 1, but only on the value of 
TI - 1 and the arc(s) selected at 1-1 (which in tum affect the value of t I ). Similarly, TI - 1 
is dependent on the accumulated time and arc selection(s) made at node 1-2, and so on. 
Thus, and more generally, if M(i) is the set of nodes preceding node i, then 1'; only 
depends on the value of Tm mE M(i) and the length of the arcs connecting m to i. As 
with the wealth in SUMDP model described for the reservoir planning problem, the 
initial travel time at the origin node ( first stage) is assumed to be zero (1; = 0 ). 
The problem can now be reformulated as a standard stochastic dynamic program 
with a 2-dimensional state space: the accumulated 'travel' time, 1';, and the node (or 
stage), i. The terminal value function, f(I,TJ, is determined by evaluating the utility 
over a range of relevant travel times to the node 1. It is possible to have multiple origin 
and destination nodes; they are equivalent to states of the first and last stages, 
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respectively. Assuming there is a single destination and origin, the terminal value 
function is defined as /(1, ~ ) = U(~) and the stochastic dynamic programming 
recursIOn IS: 
SRC3 /(i,r:) = min (Elr(J·,T.),1\ 
I j,kijeJ(i),keK(i,j) } 1J 
subject to 
(10.12) 
where tk and K(i,j) are defined as in the previous section. The decision to be made at 
each node is which arc to travel on, and this implies what the successor node will be, as 
an arc can only be associated with a single (iJ) pair. SRC3 is solved using discrete 
dynamic programming. While the nodes and arcs are naturally discrete, the 
accumulated time is not, so for each node, I; is discretised across the range of possible 
arrival times at i. The bounds on I; can be calculated by passing through the network 
and calculating the minimum and maximum times each node can be arrived at given the 
bounds on I; for predecessor nodes and relevant arc length distributions. There is 
clearly potential to refine this aspect of the solution technique, both in terms of 
intelligent discretisation of the I; variables and the application of arc reduction 
techniques. 
Starting from stage 1-1 and working backwards according to the node precedence 
relationships, f(i, I;) is evaluated for each node and the optimal decision from each 
stage stored. With non-negative arc lengths, the range of I; will increase for i further 
away from the origin, and TJ will have the longest range of arrival times. Negative arc 
lengths can be handled by the technique and require no special attention; they are 
equivalent to negative profits in the reservoir management problem described earlier. 
The formulation in SRC3 does not require that the utility function take a particular 
form. The form of utility function is dependent on the type of problem and decision 
making environment. For example, a 'decreasing deadline' utility function may be 
relevant for R&D proj ect evaluation (Bard and Bennett, 1991), whereas a concave or 
other non-linear function may be relevant for a route choice problem where a DM 
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specifies an attitude towards travel time and/or distance and/or cost. The formulation 
does not require a specific form of arc length uncertainty, either, though it will impact 
on the ease with which TJ is discretised. For example, if the distributions have an 
upper bound of + 00 then a heuristically set upper bound will be necessary. Depending 
on the form of the uncertainty and utility functions, algorithmic modifications should be 
able to be developed to reduce the time required to determine optimal arcs, particularly 
when there are multiple arcs linking two nodes. 
10.3.1 Example 1 
Consider again the example network, arc data, and decreasing deadline utility function 
introduced earlier. Let r;rnin and T;max be the lower and upper bounds on the 
accumulated completion time at node i. The range of completion times for tasks 1 and 
2 is 1-4 weeks, so the bounds on the arrival time at node Bare TB
min 
=1 and TB
max
=4 
(because TArnin = TAmax = 0). The maximum and minimum travel times of arcs 3 and 4, 
the two alternatives from node B, are 4 and 8 weeks, respectively. Thus 
Tmin = Trnin + 4 =5 hours and Tmax = Tmax + 5 =5 hours c B 'C B • 
Using the decreasing deadline utility function illustrated III Figure 10.2, the 
terminal value function is defined over the range of Tc as f(C,Tc) = U(Tc). Now 
consider the task to select upon 'arrival' at node B. The expected values of f(C,TJ 
for the range of possible values of TB and the two possible tasks, are plotted in Figure 
10.3. The optimal task(s) could be either arc, depending on the length oftime taken to 
arrive at B. For TB =1 and TB =2, arc 3 maximises expected utility with values of 75 
and 66.8, respectively. For TB =3 and TB =4, arc 4 maximises expected utility with 
values of 56.2 and 42.6, respectively. 
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Figure 10.3: E[r(C,Tc )] values for arcs 3 and 4 
From A, the optimal task is that which maximises E[r(B,Ta)]. Task 1 has a 
durat ion of either 1 or 3 hours, so E[r(B,TJ]=.4(56.2)+.6(75)=67.5. The 
corresponding value for arc 2 is E[,r(B,TJ]=57.1, so the optimal task from A is task 1. 
Task J only has two possible outcomes, though, so the optimal route can be stated as 
foll ows: select task 1 and if its duration is 1 week, then select task 3, otherwise select 
task 4 (see Figure 10.4). 
Arc 2 Arc 31 Ta = {3,4} 
--------
-.... _---------
-----
Arc 31 Ta = {1,2} 
Figure 10.4: Solution to SRC3 
This dynamic solution allows the DM to select the task at B given the realisation of 
uncertainty associated with the decision made at A. Moreover, the solution to even this 
simple problem involves the potential use of both tasks 3 and 4 at B, which would be 
impossible in a static solution. 
The example problem has been solved using three formulations (SRCl, SRC2, and 
SRC3), each with a different way of handling DM preferences. The optimal routes for 
SRC2 and SRC3 would be expected to be more sensitive to the variability of Tc , and 
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particularly when Tc >d, at which point the benefit from completing the project is zero. 
This is certainly the case. The optimal route for SRC1 has a lower expected 
completion time of8.8 weeks compared to 9.1 (SRC2) and 9.08 (SRC3) weeks, and a 
lower range of completion times of 2 weeks compared to 5 for SRC2 and SRC3. The 
difference between the utility maximising static (SRC2) and dynamic (SRC3) solutions 
is highlighted by an increase in the probability of meeting the deadline; Pre Tc :::; d ) 
equals 0.27 for the optimal route to SRCI compared to 0.40 (SRC2) and 0.64 (SRC3). 
These are what would be expected for a risk averse DM a distribution of completion 
times with a lower range and higher mean is preferred to a distribution with a lower 
mean and higher range (more variability). 
10.3.2 Example 2 
Consider a (small) SRC problem which involves finding a utility maximising route 
through the network illustrated Figure 10.5a. In this network, the DM has the ability to 
'skip' nodes. The arc lengths are normally distributed as follows: arcs 1, 4, and 6 are 
N ~ (11,2); arcs 2 and 5 are N ~ (21,1); arc 3 is N ~ (30,10), and arc 7 is N ~ (12,1). 
k=3 
(a) Network 
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~ 1200000 
§ 
800000 
400000 
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(b) Utility functions 
Figure 10.5: SRC example 
80 10 
Three utility functions were defined over the range of completion times (Figure 1 0.5b). 
The base case is when the DM is risk neutral (RN), which corresponds to the negatively 
sloped dashed line. The other two utility functions reflect the case where there is a 
limit on the completion time, and this is reflected by a 'decreasing deadline' utility 
function described earlier. The curves differ in the modelling of preferences towards 
TN when TN <d, where d=36. The 'RNDD' utility curve is linear for TN <d, while the 
'RADD' utility curve is concave. 
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Discrete dynamic programming is again used to find a utility maximising route 
through the network. The solutions are summarised in Table 10.2. The RN solution 
(arc 3) takes no account of the variability of the arc times, so the (combination of) arcs 
with the lowest mean travel time is preferred. The RNDD solution involves using arc 2 
to reach node 3, then either arc 6 or 7, depending on the time of arrival at node 3 i.e., 
the length of arc 2. The RADD solution takes a more conservative decision at node 1, 
moving to node 2 via arc 1. If the realisation of tt is less than 15.4, arc 5 is selected to 
move to the destination node. Arc 1 is N ~ (11,2), so the route 1-4 is most likely to 
occur. However, if tl >15.4, arc 4 is selected to reach node 3, at which time another set 
of conditional arc selections is described. The clear difference between the RADD and 
RNDD policies is that risk aversion results in a more flexible strategy which is more 
sensitive to the distributions ofthe arc lengths. 
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
RN Arc 3 - -
RNDD Arc 2 - Arc 6: .7; <19 
21 <.7; < 22.4 
.7; > 22.8 
Arc 7: 19<.7; <21 
22.4 <.7; < 22.8 
RADD Arc 1 ArcS: T2 <15.4 Arc 6: .7; <18.9 
Arc 4: T2 > 15.4 21.2 <.7; < 22.4 
.7; >22.8 
Arc 7: 18.9 <.7; < 21.2 
22.4 <.7; < 22.8 
Table 10.2: SRC solution 
Consider the decision process at node 3 for the RNDD and RADD cases. For low 
(good) .7; where there is essentially no chance of T4 >d, the means and variances of 
arcs 6 and 7 are such that arc 6 has a higher expected utility than arc 7. Let 11k denote 
the mean length of arc k. Because the means and variances of arcs 6 and 7 are similar, 
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for 1; near d- 11k' there are ranges of 1; for which each arc is preferred. However, arc 
6 has a lower mean and higher variance, so for large values of 1; there will be a higher 
probability that I:t <d, and hence an expected utility greater than that for arc 7. Arc 6 is 
therefore preferred for both RADD and RNDD when 1; is large. 
10.4 Extensions to the formulation 
This section briefly discusses some extensions to, and other application if, SUMDP to 
stochastic route choice problems. 
10.4.1 Generic extensions 
Three formulations have been presented for SRC problems with uncertain arc travel 
times. The fundamental difference between the three formulations is that in SRC1 the 
objective is to minimise the expected travel time and in SRC2/SRC3 the objective is to 
maximise the utility of the expected travel time. A natural variation of SRC3 is to 
consider travel cost instead of travel time. The formulation would remain essentially 
the same, but instead of accumulating time, cost would be accumulated, with Cj being 
the cost incurred to reach node i and ck being cost distribution if arc k is used to travel 
between two nodes. The uncertainty could be a function of a number of factors, such as 
the travel time, distance of the route, uncertainty in the traffic density, and road 
conditions. The terminal value function would be defined over the range of costs, so 
An interesting, yet more computationally intensive formulation would involve the 
utility function being based on both time and cost i.e., 
SRC4 
subject to c. =c.+ck } I 
T. - 0 1-
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(10.13) 
This is a SDP with a 3-dimensional state-space and could be used to model a SRC 
problem where there are alternatives with different fixed and variable costs, as well as 
different time distributions.9 
Consider now an extension to the SRC where travel times (arc lengths) are 
uncertain and dependent on the time of arrival at a node. The 'accumulated time' state 
provides the information to handle time-dependent travel times. In, the previous 
formulation, 1'; refers to the accumulated travel time upon reaching node i and is 
implicitly independent of real time i.e., 1'; is the 'time since departure' and the 
departure time is either assumed (and fixed), or irrelevant. Examples of time-
dependent travel times are the peak and off-peak traffic flows on urban road networks. 
A simple stepped travel-time function could be used to reflect these time dependencies. 
Travel time distributions would be associated with each congestion segment. If time-
dependent travel times are being considered, then the network must be anchored to real 
time in some way. One way to achieve this is to explicitly define a departure time from 
node 1, lj, which is used as a reference point to calculate the 'real' arrival times at a 
particular node. If Ri is defined as the 'real' arrival time at node i, then Ri = t(r;,lj) 
and the state transition becomes Tj = r; + t k (Ri)' A formulation for this problem is 
SRC5 f(i,r.)= min (Elf(J·,T. )1\ 
I j,kljeJ(i),keK(i,j) } JJ 
subject to 
7; =0 (10.14) 
The utility function is still defined over the range of possible ~ values, which will 
correspond to a range of real-time values (R[). If the function t(r;,lj) is additive then 
U(T[) and U(R[) will be linear transformations of each other. Note that using U(T[) 
9 For example, consider travelling between two cities by car andjor plane and/or train. 
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or U(RJ ) implies that the DM has no preferences regarding the real-time departure 
time, 1\. When arc travel times are independent of node arrival time, this assumption is 
reasonable, though not necessarily realistic. Note, though, that the sensitivity of the 
optimal route to different departure times could be examined by adjusting 1\. 
An alternative to time-dependent travel times is to have correlated travel times 
which reflects the fact that observing a high traffic density along one route is likely to 
mean that the next route has a high density too. It could also be a way of representing 
the effect of getting a "run" on the lights or striking a bad "run" where red lights (and 
hence slow travel times) are repeatedly experienced. This relationship could be 
modelled by a Markov process where the discrete states are the different traffic 
densities. A 2-state transition process with high same-state transition probabilities 
could be used to model this case. A formulation for this problem would be as follows. 
The terminal value function is defined as 
f(I,~,MI) = U(~) (10.15) 
The state space for this problem comprises the nodes (i), the accumulated travel time 
(1';), and the state of the traffic (Mi). This problem can be formulated as a SDP as 
follows: 
SRC6 
subject to 
~ =0 (10.16) 
where Mi is the Markov state of the uncertainty process (affecting travel time) at node 
i where there are some number of discrete states (N m). The transition probabilities 
would exacerbate the differences between different types of routes and transport 
mediums. For example, in a network comprised of shorter/congested urban roads and 
longer/less congested ringroads, there would be' a high probability of the urban road 
remaining congested, while on the ringroad, there would be a high probability that the 
congestion remained low. 
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In SRC5 the travel times are dependent on the time of arrival, but independent 
between arcs. In SRC6, the travel times are dependent on the type of 'congestion' 
observed along the previous arc, but are independent of the actual time of day. 
Combining the two approaches is a natural extension to both models. 
SRC7 Vi-:f:.! 
subject to 
~ =0 (10.17) 
Previous formulations assume the utility function only applies to the destination 
node. It is easy to construct scenarios where the DM has multiple preference functions, 
and/or multiple trips. It would be useful to extend SUMDP to handle the case where 
the DM has a preference towards some other trip component other than the arrival time 
at the destination node e.g., the arrival time at an intermediary node. Consider the 
situation depicted in Figure 10.6. The DM must travel from 01-Dl where some 
activity is performed. Upon completion of the activity, the DM takes another trip (02-
D2), possibly to return to the original origin. The DM may have preferences towards 
the time taken for trip 1 (arrival time at the destination), the time available for the 
activity, and the time taken for trip 2. The activity completion time may be 
deterministic or stochastic, and may be able to be influenced if the DM takes some 
action, presumably at some cost. What are the optimal routes for trip 1 and 2, and 
optimal 'activity action(s)', given these preferences? 
Figure 10.6: A trip-activity-trip scenario 
Another variation relates to the time the DM departs from the origin node. In the 
above formulations, the departure time is assumed to be fixed and known in advance. 
This is a reasonable assumption for those applications for which the departure time has 
little direct impact on the DM's utility or on the nature of the uncertainty modelled in 
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the network (e.g. project scheduling). When the departure time does affect the form of 
the problem (e.g., time-dependent travel times) then an obvious extension to these 
models is to relax the assumption that the departure time is fixed. If r1 is to be 
considered as a variable, then the DM's preferences towards r1 become important. If 
the DM is indifferent between values of lj, then, depending on the form of U(~), it 
may be optimal to leave at an unreasonably early time in order to arrive at some 
destination prior to some deadline. Were U(~) to be monotonically decreasing in ~ 
there is no incentive to leave 'late' so the early departure will likely result in an early 
arrival and therefore maximise utility. If U(~) had positive and negative sloping 
regions then early arrival is less undesirable and an 'unreasonable' lj will not be utility 
maximising. These behavioural aspects of traveller behaviour are an area worthy of 
future development. 
10.4.2 Project selection problems 
The planning of projects/tasks can be represented by a network where the nodes 
represent projects and the arcs represent project completion times and precedence 
relationships. The standard analysis is to determine the distribution of the 
longest/shortest route, so there is no optimisation as such. When the DM can select 
projects/tasks (as in R&D project selection), then the problem can be modelled as a DP. 
The SUMDP approach can be applied to the stochastic project selection problem (also 
referred to as probabilistic PERT and PNET) by simply replacing the definition of the 
nodes and arcs. The literature and some extensions to the stochastic project scheduling 
problem are discussed below. 
Dawood (1998) considers the project scheduling/selection problem where the 
duration of a particular activity (arc) is affected by a number of 'risk factors' which can 
have different probability distributions. He discusses the problem in the context of 
managing a construction project, so the risk factors include weather, soil types, and 
design changes. The variability of the project's duration is determined by performing 
Monte Carlo simulations where the random numbers, in conjunction with subjective 
weightings, are used to determine activity duration times. Using a correlation analysis, 
the risk factors which have the most impact on project duration (which were not 
dissimilar to those derived using a standard PERT approach) are identified. The only 
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decision making process involves an adjustment of the weights for risk factors to reflect 
a management decision (e.g., reduce the impact of weather if the project is starting over 
summer). The simulations are re-run, and, not surprisingly, the variability in project 
duration time is reduced. While simplistic, the approach is interesting in that the 
impact of risk factors is explicitly considered. 
Bard & Miller (1989) present a heuristic approach to the project selection problem 
when the DM also has a fixed budget which can be 'invested' in the projects to improve 
the distribution of expected completion time. A "near optimal" solution is found by a 
heuristic procedure which takes as inputs the results from a Monte Carlo simulation, 
where each simulation involves determining a static, utility maximising, optimal 
sequence of projects and investments given a particular realisation of route lengths. 
The objective of each realisation is to maximise expected utility, though this is only 
based upon time; they assume that there is no value in having any of the budget 
remaining upon reaching the destination node. They test their approach on some small 
sized problems, noting that their method is computationally intensive and that arc 
reduction methods would be a useful development. The solution is static, yet a 
dynamic solution would be a useful extension because one could imagine that having 
been selected, the duration of a given project would affect which project is selected 
once it is completed. This extension does not appear to have been addressed in the 
literature. Later, a formulation is presented, along with some further extensions. 
The approach of Bard and Miller (1989) is similar to the reservoir management 
problem in that a 'stock' (the remaining budget/water) is carried through from one stage 
to another. By augmenting the problem discussed by Bard and Miller with an 
'accumulated arc length' (or accumulated time) state, DM preferences towards terminal 
budget funds and total project time on project selection can be explicitly modelled. The 
optimal solution describes the project to be selected and the budget allocation that 
maximises the DM's expected terminal value upon completing the last project. ill Bard 
& Miller (1989), the utility function is a function of the total time taken to complete the 
project, and the entire budget must be allocated. Here, though, the DM's utility can be 
a function of the remaining budget i.e., 
(10.18) 
where 
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I final node in network. 
total time taken to reach node 1. 
dollars available left upon reaching node 1. 
This IS more realistic than Bard and Miller (1989) and requires no additional 
information because the budget level is a state variable. The objective to be maximised 
at each node is 
SRC8 
subject to: 
where 
i 
J(i) 
b _Billi! 1-
(10.19) 
expected terminal utility if at node i with an accumulated arc length 
of 1; and having B; units remaining to be allocated. 
node number i= 1, ... J. 
the set of feasible nodes (denoted by j) to travel to at node i. 
dollars available to allocate at node i. 
time spent to reach node i. 
initial budget allocation. 
dollars allocated at node i. 
the project completion time distribution given an investment of Yi 
and that the decision is to complete the project represented by the 
arc connecting i and j. 
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Upon arriving at node i, the expected utility of arriving at node) (via the project 
implied by the arc connecting i and)) is determined. If y;=O then the budget remains 
unchanged (b j =b;) and the range and mean of the possible project times is at its 
largest. Allocating y; >0 reduces the range and probability of a long project time 
eventuating, though the remaining budget is also reduced. This problem can be solved 
by discretising the 'remaining budget' and 'accumulated project time' states. 
A small problem was coded and solved and is briefly discussed here. It is similar 
to the problem described by Bard & Miller (1989) and involves finding the utility 
maximising path through the network illustrated in Figure 1 O. 7, where the nodes 
correspond to projects with uncertain completion times. As described in the above 
formulation, a budget can be allocated to each project and this affects the distribution of 
the time taken to complete a project. The decision to be made at each node is how 
much to invest in the current project, given the time taken to complete the previous 
projects, and which project (node) will be completed following the completion of the 
current project. Note that this somewhat unintuitive state transition is due to the way in 
which the network has been described. It is equivalent to a network with 4 'decision' 
nodes with arcs between nodes corresponding to projects. The decision at each node 
would be which proj ect to select, and how much to spend on it; decisions about future 
projects would not be considered until the 'current' project had been completed. 
I--~~@ 
Figure 10.7: Network for project scheduling example 
The length of each project was approximated using a Normal distribution. The 
project length data is detailed in Table 10.3. Also included in the table are Al and L\2' 
which are parameters used to improve the project length distributions when capital is 
allocated to them. If J1 and (J' denote the mean and standard deviation of a project 
length and y is allocated to a project, then the distribution of the project length was 
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drawn from N(;./, CY') where j.1' = j.1- Y~I and CY' = CY - Y~2' A total budget of 10 
monetary units is available at the start of the planning process. 
Project Mean Standard ~I ~2 
deviation 
1 18 4 0.05 0.1 
2 22 4 0.1 0.05 
3 22 6 0.05 0.05 
4 25 3 0.05 0.05 
5 20 2 0.05 0.05 
Table 10.3: Project length data 
The utility function used was that shown in Figure 10.8. The solution is also shown in 
Figure 10.8, and involves the following sequence of projects: 2-3-5. Although the 
initial budget available was fixed at 10, the optimal project changes from 2 to 1 when 
the initial budget is less than or equal to 6. With a lower budget, the ability to reduce 
the variation in project time is reduced, so a more conservative strategy is taken for the 
first project so that the remaining budget can be better allocated to reduce the 
distributions of task 4 and/or 5. 
While the project selections turned out to be static, the budget allocations are not 
(Figure 10.9). They have an intuitively pleasing form, being convex in both 
accumulated time and remaining budget. Thus, the amount spent on the project 
increases as the time spent on previous projects increases, and as the remaining budget 
Increases. 
Figure 10.8: Utility function and solution 
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Figure 10.9: Dynamic budget allocations 
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For large networks, the SDP algoritID11 could be quite computationally intensive 
because at each node the optimal arc (project) for a relevant range of budget levels and 
accumulated project times would need to be detennined. It may be possible to reduce 
the search by being able to show that a given project is optimal for some range of 
budget and/or accumulated project lengths, though this will depend on the fonn of the 
util ity function and the nature of the state transition. The fonnulation stated above has 
the arc length distributions dependent on the budget level, so the dominance of one 
project over another for a given budget level may not be applicable for another budget 
level. Dominance relationships for a given budget level would presumably provide 
use ful starting points for the search algori thm, though, and it may be that all that is 
required is that any additional feasible budget allocations are evaluated, rather than 
having to evaluate /(i, 'F;, B,) for all budget allocations. This is an area for 
investigation and experimentation should a model be developed and tested. 
A variation is to consider the case where there is some initial budget which has 
random contributions made at the completion (or prior to selection) of each project. 
The state transition for the budget state would then become: 
B = B -yo +c (10.20) J / / I 
where c, is a random contribution towards the budget. If the distribution of c, is 
independent of the level of B, and 'F;, then an intennediate expected utili ty surface can 
be created, as in the reservoir management problem, which is the convolution of the 
contribution distribution and the expected utility surface at node). 
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Contributions could be a perfonnance or reward measure, perhaps reflecting the 
desirability of completing a particular project andlor being based upon the time taken to 
complete the project. This could be modelled as 
(10.21) 
so the budget remalmng upon reaching node j is the budget at node i, less the 
'investment' in the project plus a contribution or return which is a function of the 
project and the expected time to complete the project. The concept of time-dependent 
travel times could be translated to wealth-dependent incomes. For example, consider a 
scenario where the decision to be made at each period is to invest some amount in a 
'product' which has an uncertain return. Holding money also has a return, but this is 
dependent on the quantity of money held because a higher holding allows the DM 
access to a better rate. 
10.4.3 A capacity expansion problem 
SRC problems are often discussed in the telecommunications literature in the context of 
capacity expansion, though there are few approaches which consider stochasticity 
Laguna (1998). The decision to be made in each period is how much additional 
capacity to install given that the demand for capacity is uncertain. Consider the 
situation faced by a (telecommunications or transmission) finn that needs to detennine 
the way in which it should manage its capacity for a single location over time given that 
demand for capacity is uncertain. This situation is represented in Figure 10.10, where 
the horizon is four periods and the capacity of the network is represented by the x 
variables. 
x=2 
x=l 
x=O 
t=l t=2 t=3 t = 4 
Figure 10.10: Illustrative capacity expansion network 
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During each period, some level of demand, dt , is experienced, which is independent of 
the previous demand level. The distribution of demand is estimated with some known 
probability distribution P(dt ). In a given period, the cost of not meeting demand, 
y(dt -Xt - yJ, incurs a real (or perceived) cost. The variable Yt denotes the capacity 
installed at the beginning of period t, prior to the demand being experienced. Note that 
if xt + Yt ~ dt , no cost is incurred. 
Increasing capacity also incurs a cost ct (Yt ), where Yt is the number of units 
installed in period t. The cost function would usually involve a fixed cost and then 
linear or convex variable costs. The objective is to minimise the installation costs and 
'unmet demand' costs, i.e. 
T 
Z = I(ct(Yt)+UDCt) (10.22) 
t=1 
where 
Ci) 
UDCt = fP(dt)Y(dt -Xt - yJ7t (10.23) 
X, 
Alternative forms of Z could include a maintenance cost term, and an end-of horizon 
value of capacity term. 
The decision to be made in each period is the number of units of capacity to install 
and the feasible (discrete) alternatives are represented by the arcs linked nodes. If the 
utility function were based on the cost at the end of the horizon, utility would be 
defmed as U(z) ~ u( t (c, (y, )+ UDC, )). As with the simple SUMDP model, the 
utility function is handled by defining another state variable, Zt' which is the 
accumulated installation and unmet demand cost at period t where the state transition 
equation is Zt+l = Zt + ct (Yt ) + UDCt and ZI = O. The state space of this problem 
therefore consists of the time period, (t), the quantity of installed capacity at the 
beginning of period t (xt ), and the accumulated cost at the beginning of period t (Zt ). 
The terminal value function can be defined as f(t,XT,ZT) = U(ZT)' An alternative is to 
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define /(t,xr,Zr) = U(XpZr) to incorporate the finn's attitude to the capacity installed 
in T. The recursive relation can now be defined as 
SRC9 
subject to 
(10.24) 
Solving this problem would require that the state and decision variables be 
discretised, as indicated by the fonn of the network. Feasible extensions to this 
problem include the installation cost being dependent on the current level of installed 
capacity, and demand uncertainty being modelled as a Markov process (requiring the 
definition of another state variable). 
This fonnulation assumes a simple representation of a complex problem, though 
there appears to be a lot of potential in developing a dynamic solution to this problem. 
For example, in the above model the decision variable is the quantity of capacity to 
install for a single component. The handling of multiple components is an obvious 
extension and this could be achieved by solving a more complex sub-problem (in 
Laguna 1998 the sub-problems are stochastic knapsack problems, which is itself yet 
another potential application of SUMDP). 
10.5 Conclusions 
There are many problems which have solutions corresponding to 'shortest' routes 
through an acyclic network. Stochasticity makes these problems more difficult to 
solve, and this is compounded if a DM's preferences toward tenninal outcomes is 
considered. To the author's knowledge, there" are no approaches presented in the 
literature for finding a dynamic utility maximising path through a stochastic network. 
Although the technique was illustrated using an extremely simple example, there 
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appear to be a number of extensions to other stochastic planning problems that can be 
represented as acyclic networks where uncertainty is revealed over time. 

Chapter 11 
Conclusions 
This chapter summanses the central ideas and results from applying SUMDP (an 
approach for maximising utility in a stochastic dynamic programming framework) to 
medium-tenn reservoir management in deregulated and regulated electricity markets. 
SUMDP was also explored as a solution approach for stochastic route choice problems. 
11.1SUMDP 
Stochastic dynamic programming is a popular technique for modelling finite horizon 
stochastic sequential decision problems; one such problem is reservoir management. A 
frequently used objective for SDP models is to maximise the expected value of the 
outcomes of decisions. This implies a risk neutral attitude to outcomes which is not 
always appropriate, and often just a convenient simplification due to the difficulty of 
handling risk aversion. 
A utility function can be used to reflect risk aversion, but maximising utility is an 
invalid objective for a standard SDP fonnulation, and computationally intractable if 
solved via a decision tree. In SUMDP was introduced as a method for evaluating a 
decision tree which is more efficient that complete enumeration due to the stage-wise 
decomposition. This was achieved by defining an auxiliary variable as the 
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'accumulated returns' and assuming that the DM's preferences are defined over the 
sum of the returns (,accumulated returns') at the end of the planning horizon. As a 
result, a SUMDP formulation allows the maximisation of the utility finally realised in T 
without requiring that all decisions up to Tbe considered simultaneously. 
The practical and theoretical applications of such a technique are broad due to the 
relative simplicity of the conditions required to extend a SDP formulation to handle the 
'utility maximising' formulation. A drawback, though, is that the auxiliary variable 
increases the number of states evaluated at each stage. Methods for reducing the 
impact of this are dependent on the characteristics of the problem, and should be 
investigated for any application. 
11.2 SUMDP and medium-term reservoir management 
Medium-term reservoir management is a classic planning problem to which SDP has 
been applied, particularly in New Zealand where there is a high dependence on hydro 
generation. Risk has been identified as being of prime importance for reservoir 
management problems, and reservoir management in New Zealand is no exception. 
The environment in which risk is considered has also changed with the reservoirs 
managed in deregulated electricity markets rather than by regulated andlor 
Government-owned entities. In these two contexts, there are few published approaches 
that incorporate the DM's attitudes to outcomes at the end of the planning horizon, and 
few approaches that consider reservoir management in a deregulated electricity market 
where there are few firms with market power. 
Chapters 4-8 discussed the application of SUMDP in the context of reservoir 
management in New Zealand, assuming regulated and deregulated electricity markets. 
The form of the utility functions used here implied a trade-off between storage and 
'wealth', as opposed to only being risk averse towards wealth, so the impact of these 
functions of both components is important. In the regulated case, the benefit from 
release was the cost of meeting demand not met from reservoir release. Both these 
return functions use simplified representations of the New Zealand electricity system, 
and do not take into account transmission effects, or issues such as contract trading, the 
effect of spot market operation on contract prices/revenue, and the threat of new entry 
on market behaviour. 
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Experimental results for both cases clearly showed that as the risk aversion towards 
end-of-horizon wealth increased: 
• the mean and variability of end-of-horizon wealth decreased. 
• the mean and variability of end-of-horizon storage increased. 
• Storage trajectories were higher on average and releases lower on average, storage 
being a mechanism for hedging against the impacts of future inflow uncertainty. 
• Spot prices tended to increase due to lower release levels. 
For the case of a dominant hydro firm which was contracted (and in this case contracted 
for more than its average output), the experimental results showed that as the contract 
level was decreased towards expected output: 
• Mean end-of-horizon wealth decreased slightly, though the variance of end-of-
horizon wealth decreased substantially. 
• The spot price increased, reflecting the decreased incentive for the firm to push spot 
prices lower. 
• Mean and standard deviation of end-of-horizon storage remained relatively 
constant. 
The magnitude of the effects of risk aversion on the end-oh-horizon wealth and 
storage distributions was greater than those resulting from altering the contract level. 
However, decreasing the contract level resulted in end-of-horizon wealth distributions 
with extremely low variability, reflecting the ability of the hydro firm to reduce the 
frequency of situations which result in relatively extreme difference payments and spot 
revenues, and hence increase the variability of end-of-horizon wealth outcomes. 
Throughout these analyses, a single reservoir model has been used. A two-
reservoir model would likely produce more accurate results for the New Zealand 
system given the geographical layout of the hydro generation capacity and nature of the 
main transmission constraints. However, the resulting SDP formulation would have 3 
state variables and would hence be computationally demanding. 
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11.3 SUMDP and stochastic route choice 
It was observed that SUMDP can be extended to a range of problems where the 
accumulated return is a function of a subset of decisions in previous stages, as long as a 
stage is not returned to. Problems with a temporal aspect naturally have this property, 
though it can also be found in other problems which can be represented as a (stochastic) 
directed acyclic network. 
The application of SUMDP to stochastic route choice problems was illustrated 
using several examples. They illustrated how a utility function defined over an 
attribute (e.g., time, cost) at the terminal node can result in a non-static solution at each 
node. This non-static property was clearly evident in the project selection and budget 
allocation example taken from the literature. While the project selection decisions for 
the example were independent of the total project length, the budget allocation 
decisions were non-static and a function of the total project length. This attribute of the 
optimal decision space was an enhancement to that provided in the published example. 
11.4 Future research 
The applications of SUMDP discussed here for reservoir management in New Zealand 
have defined wealth as the weekly return from release. In this context, a more realistic 
weekly model of the New Zealand electricity market would be desirable, especially 
now that information on bidding behaviour and contracts is becoming available. 
Incorporating transmission, ancillary services, and demand-side participation would 
also lead to a more accurate model. Another obvious extension is to consider correlated 
inflows, especially given that inflow uncertainty is the key driver of variability in 
outcomes. While this would increase the state-space, it would be possible to limit the 
increase in the computational requirements to a linear rather than exponential increase. 
The ability to model aversion towards outcomes can be utilised in ways other than 
modelling risk aversion towards profit outcomes. For example: utility could be defined 
on the return which would be received by a potential new entrant. Briefly, if the firm 
knew the cost structure of a potential entrant, it would be possible to model the 
entrant's accumulated profit, and define a utility curve over that range so as to ensure 
entry to the market did not appear to be viable given the risks and returns available. A 
variant of this would be to model the performance of a price-taking competitor that 
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owns hydro and/or thermal plant and faces uncertain prices and/or inflows. Another 
example would be to model a fuel stockpile used by a thermal plant that could be 
managed given uncertainties about alternative fuel prices/availability and generation 
requirements. 
While it is possible to devise numerous potential applications, a key issue to be 
considered is how to integrate an approach such as SUJVIDP with the strategic planning 
process of organisations involved in managing hydro reservoirs and other assets for 
which a SDP and utility maximisation has value. 
SUJVIDP has been used to investigate the impacts of risk aversion on storage in the 
medium-term. However, a longer-term approach addressing this aspect along with the 
interactions with spot prices, contracts, and demand is warranted. The forthcoming 
Ph.D. thesis of Bats tone (2002) addresses some of these issues. 
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Appendix 1 
Multi-attribute utility functions 
One approach for handling multiple attributes is to define an additive utility function 
(see for example, Keeney, 1970; Richard, 1975). For the reservoir management 
problem described earlier, this would have the form 
(Al.l) 
Scalars kw and ks can be used to weight the utility functions. A function with this 
form implies that W T+1 and ST+l are mutually utility independent; the utility associated 
with each consequence is independent of the value of the other consequence. For 
example, W T+1 would be utility independent of ST+l if the (conditional) utility function 
for W T+1 E WT+l given ST+l ST+l E ST+l does not depend on the values of ST+l and ST+l 
I '2 1 2' 
As an aside, an additive utility function implies that W T+1 and ST+l are utility 
independent, but not vice versa (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). For some given arbitrary 
ST+l and W T+1 W T+1 E W T+1 and ST+l E ST+J additive independence implies that 1 1 , ',' 
pU{WT+1 ,ST+l)+ (1- P )u(W;+l ,S;+I)= pU{WT+1 ,S;+I)+ (1- P )u(W;+l ,ST+l). In terms of 
actually assessing the DM's utility function, additive independence reduces the 
difficulty involved in assessing U{WT+1 ,ST+l) because only two conditional utility 
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functions need to be derived in order to define utility over WT+1 X ST+l (Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976). 
Additively independent utility functions can be difficult to justify, though, 
because ofthe assumption that the DM's utility is not affected by the value ofthe other 
attribute. A more general case is a multi-linear utility function, which has the form 
u(wT+l ST+l)= k u (WT+1)+ k u (ST+I)+ k k k U (ST+l \- (ST+l) 
, w w 3 S WS W S S ~ ;u.s (A1.2) 
with kw,ks >0, and WT+1 and ST+l utility independent. The latter term is a scaling 
mechanism on the conditional utility functions, so the interaction between the utilities 
for WT+I and ST+I are accounted for. If the scaling factor in the last term is non-zero, 
this function can be expressed in multiplicative form 
(A1.3) 
using the conditional utility functions for WT+1 and ST+l. 
To assume that WT+1 is utility independent implies that the DM's utility for an 
increase in accumulated return is independent of the system state. If this implication is 
less plausible, a utility function can be defined to reflect ST+l being utility independent 
of WT+l, but not vice versa. Keeney and Raiffa (1976) state that, for W[+l E WT+1 , the 
utility function which handles this situation is 
(AlA) 
for some arbitrary wi+1 E WT+1 , C2 (WT+1) > O. They go on to state how c1 (WT+1 ) and 
C2 (W
T
+
1) can be derived from conditional utility functions (which have one of the 
attributes fixed) and/or isopreference curves (where the value of utility is constant). If 
neither ST+I or WT+1 are utility independent, this definition of U(WT+1 ,ST+I) may 
provide an adequate approximation to the DM's utility function (Keeney and Raiffa; 
1976). 
Richard (1975) gives conditions for comparing the risk aversion of two multi-
attribute utility functions U(w,s) and V(w,s). Consider a DM's preferences for the 
following equally probable outcomes: A=((wo,so),(wo,so)) and B=((wpso),(wo,sJ), 
where WI > Wo and SI > so' Strict risk aversion and risk seeking attitudes are implied 
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for the above risk aversion and seeking attitudes if A ~ B never occurs. Assuming that 
U(w,s) is twice continuously differentiable in s and w and the first derivatives are 
positive, Richard (1975) states that 
• iff au(w,s)/ awas ~ 0 then the DM is risk averse; 
• iff au(w,s)/ awas = 0 then the DM is risk neutral; and 
• iff au(w,s)/ awas ~ 0 then the DM is risk seeking. 
Risk aversion receives the most attention in the literature because trading off 
returns and the risks inherent in attaining those returns is a characteristic of many 
decision problems, particularly in the financial area. Consequently, following the 
initial theories of utility functions and risk aversion, measures of risk aversion were 
developed. For example, the Pratt-Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion at a 
particular value ofw is the ratio of au(w)/ a2 w to au(w)/ a2 w. Recently, research has 
addressed the concept of representing (and measuring and assessing) attitudes to risk 
and return separately (e.g., Dyer and Sarin, 1982; Bell, 1995; Weber and Milliman, 
1997). 
Clearly, if U(w,s) is multi-attribute risk seeking, then V(w,s) has greater multi-
attribute risk aversion if it is risk neutral or risk averse. The more interesting case is 
when both functions are multi -attribute risk averse. In that case, V( w, s) has greater 
multi-attribute risk aversion than U(w,s) if the multi-attribute risk premium (MRP) for 
V(w,s) is greater or equal to that for U(w,s) for the same uncertain consequences. 
Here, the MRP is a pair of values (w',s') which results in the same expected utility as 
the utility ofthe expected values. For the single attribute case, the risk premium (RP) is 
calculated as the difference between E(w) and W, which is known as certainty 
equivalent. For uncertain W, the certainty equivalent is the amount which results in 
U( w) = E[u( w)]. The RP is the difference between w and W, with risk aversion 
requiring that the risk premium is non-negative. For the multi-attribute case, the risk 
premium is defined in a similar way, but clearly must account for the risk premiums for 
both attributes. For U(w,s) , the MRP is defined as: 
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for 0 < p < 1. V(w,s) has greater multi-attribute risk aversion than U(w,s) iff 
for all wo' wI' so, and SI and (w',s') which satisfy the MRP definition for U(w,s). 
The intuitive reasoning is that the risk premium that satisfies the DM with utility 
function U(w,s) is not enough to satisfy the DM if their utility function is V(w,s), so 
V(w,s) must be more risk averse than U(w,s). 
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A2.1 Benefit curves with linear demand 
In this section, the calculation of Bf (qf ) = _Cf (qf ,p(gf ~ gf ,e) is discussed for linear 
and demand curves. Linear demand is modelled using the following general function 
CA2·7) 
where Po >0 and PI <0. Here, p(g) reflects the price that consumers are prepared to 
pay for some quantity g. The inverse of this function, g(p), is also referred to, and 
describes the quantity demanded as a function of the price. 
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Po 
Figure A2.1: Linear demand curve 
The equilibrium price (or cost) and generation, p. and g*, are found by equating 
supply with demand. The supply curve is discontinuous, consisting of vertical and 
horizontal segments, so it is necessary to test each segment for the existence of the 
equilibrium. Consider Figure A2.2, which shows the intersection of demand with two 
supply curves. The demand curve has the form p 300 - 20g. Curve 'A' results from 
zero release (q~ 0), while curve 'B' results from a release of q~ = 7.5. 
A 
r-t---
• i PA =c2 ............................................... ! 
* ~ PB .. · .. · .... · ...... · .... · .......... · .................................... l· .. .. 
c1 i 
q~ 
• • gA gB 
,----
Figure A2.2: Equilibrium (linear demand) 
B 
g~ 
If demand intersects the supply curve on a horizontal segment of the supply curve CA') 
then the equilibrium price is C j , the marginal cost corresponding to that segment. In 
the above example, p. = P ~ C2 • Substituting ci for the price and rearranging gives 
(A2.8) 
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The point (P:, g:) will remain the equilibrium as long as station i remains marginal, or 
until demand intersects supply on a vertical segment. 
If demand intersects supply on a vertical segment ofthe supply curve ('B ') then g * 
remains static at the generation level corresponding to a breakpoint in the supply curve, 
and in this example at g;. The equilibrium price is therefore 
(A2.9) 
When the equilibrium is on a vertical segment, a.change in qt of I1q will change g* by 
-l1q / PI units until demand intersects supply on a horizontal section. For a positive 
I1q' -l1q / PI ~ 0, so demand will be non-decreasing as release increases. 
It has been shown that when demand is linear, increasing release will not always 
correspond to offsetting the most expensive thermal station. This is because demand 
will increase as cheaper stations become marginal, and hydro release is assumed to 
have a marginal cost of $0, or to be less than any other energy source. When demand is 
constant, the consumer surplus or welfare is assumed to be constant and hence is 
discarded form the analysis. When demand changes, though, it may be useful to 
incorporate consumer welfare in to the release decision, because there must be some 
benefit from being able to consume more energy. 
g' 
CSt(qt ,pt(gt 19t ,e)= f(p(g)- p' ~g~ (A2.1O) 
o 
~--------~----------~----.g~ ~----~------~------~----~, 
g~ s 
Figure A2.3: Consumer surplus (linear demand) 
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The DCR is created as for the fixed demand case, by subtracting supply from 
demand. Because demand is linear though, the DCR is comprised of horizontal and 
downward sloping sections. Figure A2.4 shows the DCR where demand is described 
by the function p = 300 - 20g . The slopes of the non-horizontal segments are 
therefore -20. 
C j 
C3 
DCR 
/ C2 
C} 
ql 
-I q 
Figure A2A: Demand curve for release (linear demand) 
When demand is fixed, C(.) is calculated by integrating the DCR over the range 
(qt ,d l ) because demand must be satisfied. When demand is not fixed, it adjusts to the 
quantity offered, and the price, so the maximum cost that can be offset by hydro release 
occurs when ql 1t. The total cost is therefore the integral of the DCR over the range 
. ijl 
Ct(qt,p(gt}gt,ct )= JD1(ql}Jqt (A2.11) 
q' 
Figure A2.S illustrates Dt(qt) and C(.) for the range of feasible qt with 
d t = 12MW. As qt increases the marginal cost is non-increasing, so C (.) is convex 
as for the fixed demand case. The cost curve is comprised of linear and quadratic 
segments. The quadratic segments exist over the ranges of qt corresponding to the 
downward sloping segments of D'(qt). 
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Figure A2.5: Cost of meeting demand (linear demand) 
Continuing to assume that consumer welfare is constant, the benefit function can 
again be defined as B'(q')=-C'(q',p(g'),g',C' ), so the benefit function has the same 
general fonn as for the case with fixed demand. 
A2.2 Approximating /1+1 (W I +I ,SI+1) 
Let lid 1 d h I f -I ( 1+1 1+1) d' gx+l.y' g\,),+I' an gHI,),+1 enote 1 eva ues 0 g W ,s correspon mg to 
the pair-wise combinations of {W~+I , W~:II }, and {S;,+I ,s::\ }. A triangular interpolation 
scheme was used to calculate gl+l (W I +I ,Sl+[) using the three wealth/storage points that 
form the triangle enclosing (WI +I, SI+I). Other schemes are certainly possible. For 
example, gl (WI +I ,SI+I) could be approximated using all four comer points. 
For any point, though, there will be two triangles that enclose a point. Consider 
Figure A2.6 where (WI +I ,SI+I) could be approximated using triangle ABC or ABD. The 
'best' approximation scheme could be detennined by comparing the approximation to 
gl (WI +I, SI+I) at the midpoint of ABCD. With the interpolations being linear, this 
amounts to comparing differences between the values of g' (W I +I, SI+I) at the comer 
points. Thus, if (g~,Y+1 - g~+I,),) ~ (g~,)' - g~+I.Y+I) interpolate using ABC, otherwise, 
interpolate across ABD. For a non-decreasi ng utility function, 
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Figure A2.6: Approximation scheme 
implies that 
is preferred over 
, 
gX+l,J' 
order to to use the or upper (ACD) IS 
to 
triangle is 
> s then the 
-'( 1+1 g w , 
on diagonal 
in Figure A2.6) 
+ 
+ 
is used and 
by the 
(A2.13) 
J 
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A2.3 Summary graphs and results tables 
, I t I' 
75% percentile 
95% percentile 
Maximum 
Mean 
5% W percentile: Diff from RN 
25% W percentile: Diff from RN 
Median W: Diff. from RN 
75% W percentile: Diff from RN 
5% W percentile: Diff from RN 
Maximum W: Diff, from RN 
Mean W: Diff, from RN 
standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
5% W percentile: % Diff from RN 
W percentile: % Diff from RN 
Maximum W: % diff, from RN 
standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 
(209,575) 
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$ (202,233) 
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$ (193,848) 
$ (190,362) 
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$ 
$ 
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-66.5% 
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$(21 1,987) 
$ (21 1,986) 
$ (21 1,986) 
$(21 1,985) 
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$ 
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2,529 
1 005 
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(33,885) 
(13,960) 
(11,204) 
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7.7% 
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15.6% 
20.0% 
7.1% 
-81.6% 
-93.5% 
Figure A2.7: Summary statistics for EOH-W 
$ (215,036) 
$ (212,025) 
$ (203,672) 
$ (194,334) 
$ (193,930) 
$ (186,926) 
$ (181,561) 
$ (198,355) 
$ 
$ 
8,781 
1 173 
14.658 
2,765 
3,009 
2,421 
(4,519) 
(9,724) 
(12,249) 
(1.302) 
(4,952) 
-1,5% 
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-34.1% 
23/ 
2,6% 
4.7% 
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-61.6% 
-66.0% 
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Maximum S: Diff. from RN 
Median S: Diff. from RN 
Mean S: Diff. from RN 
S standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
Mean S: % diff. from RN 
S standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
S semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 
20.8% 
30.9% 51.2% 
11.1% 29.5% 
66.4% 68.7% 
110.7% 123.0% 
Figure A2.8: Summary statistics for EOH-S 
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Figure A2.9: Mean EOH-W 
40.7% 
23.4% 
47.6% 
89.5% 
Appendix 2: Material to accompany chaplers on regulated reservoir management 
en 
:i:. 
o 
W 
0: 
'" .. 
2500 · 
E 1 
0 , 
20000 
18000 
16000 
~ 6 1 
w 
'0 12000 
4000 
W1 
S4 WO 
Figure A2.10: Mean EOH-S 
S1 
SO W4 
Figure A2.11: Standard deviation of EOH-W 
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Figure A2.12: Standard deviation of EOH-S 
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A3.1 Benefit curves with linear demand 
Current experiments have assumed a fixed demand in each period, in the sense that 
demand is perfectly inelastic, so no matter what the price is, the same amount of energy 
wi ll be demanded. It may be more realistic to assume a non-fixed demand, for example 
a linear or non-linear (with some level of elasticity) demand curve. In Figure A3.1 the 
suppl y curve used thus far has been plotted. A fixed demand curve (vertical line) and a 
"linear" (and sloped) demand curve are also shown. These both pass through the same 
price/quantity equilibrium at ($50,3000MW). 
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Figure A3.1: Supply and demand curves 
Now, the impact of increasing hydro release, q', on the spot pnce (Ps) and 
consequently on benefit from release can be examined. Recall that it is assumed that 
the finn can offer any quantity on to the market and it will be accepted. Therefore, the 
impact of increasing q H is to shift the supply curve to the right, and possibly a different 
equilibrium price. Because the supply curve is stepped, the equilibrium price may 
remain the same for different hydro releases. If the supply curve was positive sloped, 
then the price would be different for each possible hydro release level. Assuming that 
the other players in the market are price takers and that demand is certain, a residual 
demand curve (RDC), which is the demand for finn generation, can be fonned by 
subtracting supply from demand. The RDC allows the finn to calculate the market 
price given some level of generation offered on to the manglers market. Figure A3.2 
shows the RDC's corresponding to the two demand curves and the supply curve shown 
in west wing Figure A3.1. 
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For the fixed demand, the ROC is essentially a reflection of the supply curve at the 
quantity of 3000MW. More importantly, each unit of hydro release displaces a unit of 
"other" generation, because the additional supply on to the market has no impact on 
demand, even if the price is lower (because it is fixed). When demand is linear, 
increasing hydro release has less of an impact on the price, because demand actually 
increases as more is offered on to the market. The fact that the sloped RDC dominates 
the fi xed RDC for all quantities is not a general result; and is only due to the relative 
placement of the two demand curves. For example, if the level of fixed demand is set 
at 3500MW, then the RDCs are as shown in Figure A3.3. 
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Figure A3.3: Residual demand curves witb bigber fixed demand 
For example, if qH =1000MW, as illustrated in Figure A3.4, Ps =$2.50 compared to 
Ps =$15 when the demand is linear. 
$60.00 -r------------ ---
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Figure A3.4: Supply and demand curves wbere q/-l =}OOOMW 
6000 
The benefit function still has a saw-tooth shape, but the segments which join the 
points of the teeth can be curved. Recall that for some generation level, the revenue is 
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calculated as Ps x q. From the linear-RDC (e.g., Figure A3.I), it is apparent that for 
some ranges of q, the price decreases linearly (corresponding to the demand curve 
intersecting a vertical segment of the supply curve). 
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Figure A3.5: Benefit function (C=OMW) 
State transition 
2500 3000 
The benefit function, B' (.), is created by calculating Ps (q~ - c') for each discrete q~ 
value, where Ps is the marginal cost corresponding to q~ on the residual demand 
curve. The following three figures show B' (.) for 0 ~ q' ~ 2455, d' (Ps )=3,500MW, 
and c' =OMW, 500MW, 1 OOOMW, respectively, 
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As c, increases, the profits from q, > c, decrease and the losses from q( < c, 
IOcrease. Consider the case where c, =lOOOMW and d(=3,500MWh, as shown in 
Figure A3.8. Profits can only be achieved for q( > c, and the Slze of these profits 
decreases as c, IOcreases because the spot market pnce decreases due to cheaper 
stations being marginal, and the volume of release the spot market price applies to 
decreases also. An illustrative state transition possibility curve, where the initial 
(W" S,) state is ( w, =$30million and 5, =600GWh), is shown in Figure A3,9 and release 
is discretised into units of IMW, so the curve is essentially continuous along a given 
segment. 
244 Appendix 3: Material to accompany chapters on deregulated reservoir management 
700 ----------------------------------
600 -- ----_,---- ---- - • 
500 -- - - ----
400 - - -----------
300 • 
200 -- --
100 - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--- - -- - ----- ---~ .~ ------- ~ I 
S- $10000,000 S2oooo.ooo SJ.C.:J'Oo ooo $40.000.000 $50,000000 ~JSO. OOO .OOO "570.000 000 • O.OOO.OOC 
Reservoir wealth (I· 1) 
Figure A3.9: State transition possibility curve with IMWh release dicretisation 
An illustration of the state transition when the release discretisation is 500 points, 
as used the in the optimisation runs described later, is shown in Figure A3.l O. 
700 ~-----------------------------
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Figure A3.10: State transition possibility curve with 5MWh release dicretisation 
This coarser approximation does not appear to have a significant impact on the 
form of the curve. If the release level corresponding to a spike is optimal, then the 
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revenue from the nearest 'coarse' release level will have a lower benefit because the 
release level will most likely not be a mUltiple of2455/(1000-1) = 2.45. 
Table A3.1 shows the bounds on wealth used for each optimisation: 
C=30% C=35% C=40% C=45% C=50% 
WH -$150m -$200m -$250m -$300m -$400m 
-T 
WH $150m $100m $50m $25m $25m T 
WH -$ 10m -$ 10m -$10m -$10m -$10m 
-1 
w,H $ 10m $ 10m $ 10m $10m $10m 
1 
Table A3.1: Parameters for bounds on wealth state variable 
The grid spacing in the storage dimension was constant throughout the optimisation. 
A3.3 System data and results for dataset 1 
A3.3.1 Demand data 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 4484 4495 4481 4453 4427 4412 4398 4378 4342 4289 
10 4231 4182 4149 4130 4112 4084 4044 3937 3969 3961 
20 3976 3998 4004 3979 3923 3513 3434 3660 3770 3836 
30 3885 3922 3939 3946 3949 3958 3972 3985 3994 3919 
40 3946 4035 4081 4141 4204 4257 4296 4330 4365 4351 
50 4475 4533 
Table A3.2: Demand data 
A3.3.2 Hydrological data 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 55 58 50 64 62 72 72 65 58 65 
10 78 68 78 93 104 112 110 122 135 131 
20 150 139 174 205 208 214 170 213 194 209 
30 184 159 154 141 141 ' 151 173 114 142 124 
40 114 105 100 97 99 95 84 75 81 80 
50 64 66 
Table A3.3: Hydro firm - mean inflow (GWh) 
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Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 13 27 11 37 22 35 42 25 20 36 
10 42 29 47 49 59 61 68 60 90 52 
20 73 58 89 161 119 130 41 149 65 98 
30 74 46 56 33 48 83 98 46 100 54 
40 53 62 44 39 72 74 38 39 42 49 
50 25 27 
Table A3.4: Hydro firm - standard deviation of inflow (GWh) 
Week 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 157 148 130 173 174 210 208 176 173 186 
10 239 206 234 302 306 363 328 359 387 355 
20 409 372 426 483 484 492 376 460 407 411 
30 359 315 282 273 257 294 372 273 305 279 
40 276 244 240 247 263 262 259 227 239 243 
50 187 184 
Table A3.5: Hydro firm - mean tributary inflows (MWh) 
A3.3.3 Results tables 
The tables in this appendix contain summary results for end-of-horizon storage and 
wealth. PW refers to 'player wealth', which is the hydro firm's wealth or profit, and 8 
refers to storage. The summary statistics are taken over the tange of end of horizon 
results e.g., average storage (8: Mean) is the average of the storage levels at the end of 
year (week 52) over the number of simulations (20). The mean spot price is taken over 
all 52x20 observations. In some instances, the semi-standard variation (or semi-
deviation) is larger than the standard deviation. This occurred because the denominator 
for the semi-deviation calculations was m-l, where m is the number of observations 
which are less than the mean. Because only 20 simulations are performed, m is often 
small, so subtracting 1 from it can have a large impact on the calculation. 
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'f T . 
PW: Minimum 
PW: 5% percentile 
PW: 25% percentile 
PW: Median 
PW: 75% percentile 
PW : 95% percentile 
PW: Maximum 
PW: Mean 
PW: Standard deviation 
PW: Semi-deviation 
5% PW percentile: Ditt from RN 
PW percentile: Ditt from RN 
Median PW: Ditt. from RN 
Median S: Ditt. from RN 
Mean S: Diff. from RN 
S standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
S semi-deviation : Diff. from RN 
331,351 
$ 385,525 
$ 410,506 
$ 421,098 
$ 461,284 
$ 480,403 
$ 494,562 
$ 430,178 
$ 38,960 
$ 38,609 
,841 
$ 379,875 
$ 380,335 
$ 381,328 
$ 383,095 
$ 387,335 
$ 390,828 
$ 382,089 
$ 2,965 
$ 1,770 
48,490 
(5,650) 
(30,171) 
(39,770) 
(78,190) 
$ (93,068) 
$ (103,734) 
$ 
$ 
$ 
(48,089) 
(35,995) 
155 
154 
33 
65 
Table A3.6: Wealth and storage results (c=62%) 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
379,738 
380,479 
386,527 
397,552 
408,205 
422,378 
423,204 
397,822 
14,659 
13,507 
129 
112 
(2) 
29 
247 
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320,357 379,788 384,025 
PW: 5% percentile 382,682 $ 379,839 $ 387,133 
PW: 25% percentile 409,379 $ 380,155 $ 395,899 
PW: Median 420,565 $ 380,461 $ 405,367 
PW: 75% percentile 461,251 $ 383,876 $ 418,244 
PW: 95% percentile 481,864 $ 394,863 $ 435,597 
PW: Maximum 496,601 $ 396,840 $ 448,007 
PW: Mean 429,015 $ 382,817 $ 407,686 
PW: Standard deviation 41,635 $ 4,853 $ 17,692 
PW: Semi-deviation 41,730 $ 2,615 $ 15,417 
59,432 
5% PW percentile: Ditt from RN (2,843) 
PW percentile: Ditt from RN (29,224 ) 
Median PW: Ditt. from RN (40,104) 
75% PW percentile: Ditt from RN (77,375) 
95% PW percentile: Ditt from RN (87,001 ) 
Maximum PW: Diff. from RN (99,762) 
Mean PW: Diff. from RN (46,197) 
PW standard deviation: Ditt. from RN (36,783) 
,11 
2,177 
1,789 
S: Mean 1,683 
S: Standard deviation 347 
S: Semi-deviation 422 452 
Maximum S: Diff. from RN 76 12 
Median S: Diff. from RN 126 92 
Mean S: Diff. from RN 133 67 
S standard deviation: Diff. from RN 27 6 
S semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 56 30 
Table A3.7: Wealth and storage results (c=67%) 
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urn 
PW: 5% percenti Ie 
PW: 25% percentile 
PW: Median 
PW: 75% percentile 
PW: 95% percentile 
PW: Maximum 
PW: Mean 
PW: Standard deviation 
PW: Semi-deviation 
75% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
PW percentile: Diff from RN 
Maximum PW: Diff. from RN 
urn 
: Maximum 
: Median 
: Mean 
Minimum 
Maximum S: Diff. from RN 
Median S: Diff. from RN 
Mean S: Diff. from RN 
standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
, semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
380,610 
409,460 
421 ,823 
464,510 
487,579 
501,539 
430,072 
44,600 
45,275 
,811 $ 
$ 379,866 $ 
$ 380,429 $ 
$ 384,993 $ 
$ 396,768 $ 
$ 399,896 $ 
$ 401,375 $ 
$ 387,999 $ 
$ 8,227 $ 
$ 6,903 $ 
$ (744) $ 
$ (29,032) $ 
$ (36,830) $ 
$ (67,743) $ 
$ (87,682) $ 
$ (100 ,164) $ 
$ (42 ,073) $ 
$ (36,373) $ 
$ $ 
138 
111 
28 
58 
Table A3.8: Wealth and storage results (c=72%) 
249 
384,993 
398,159 
420,908 
431,912 
458,683 
477,729 
486,403 
434,227 
29,181 
27,550 
12 
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. Minimum 
PW: 5% percentile 
PW: 25% percentile 
PW: Median 
PW: 75% percentile 
PW: 95% percentile 
PW: Maximum 
PW: Mean 
PW: Standard deviation 
PW: Semi-deviation 
5% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
25% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
Median PW: Diff. from RN 
75% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
95% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
Maximum PW: Diff. from RN 
Mean PW: Diff. from RN 
PW standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
Maximum S: Diff. from RN 
Median S: Diff. from RN 
Mean S: Diff. from RN 
S standard deviation: Diff. from RN 
S semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 
301,258 $ 379,829 
$ 377,061 $ 379,875 
$ 409,832 $ 380,419 
$ 422,847 $ 386,550 
$ 466,956 $ 395,441 
$ 491,092 $ 399,824 
$ 505,763 $ 403,798 
$ 430,528 $ 388,552 
$ 47,499 $ 8,213 
$ 48,571 $ 7,487 
138 
99 
25 
55 
Table A3.9: Wealth and storage results (c=77%) 
384,025 
$ 387,133 
$ 395,899 
$ 405,367 
$ 418,244 
$ 435,597 
$ 448,007 
$ 407,686 
$ 17,692 
$ 15,417 
92 
62 
6 
30 
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T 1 . 
PW: Minimum 
PW: 5% percentile 
PW: 25% percentile 
PW : Median 
PW : 75% percentile 
PW: 95% percentile 
PW: Maximum 
PW: Mean 
PW : Standard deviation 
PW : Semi-deviation 
Minimum PW: 
5% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
5% PW percentile: Ditt from RN 
Median PW: Diff. from RN 
75% PW percentile: Diff from RN 
95% PW percentile: Ditt from RN 
Maximum PW: Diff. from RN 
Mean PW: Diff. from RN 
PW standard deviation: Ditt. from RN 
Maximum S: Ditt. from RN 
Median S: Ditt. from RN 
Mean S: Ditt. from RN 
standard deviation: Ditt. from RN 
semi-deviation: Diff. from RN 
291,708 
$ 373,513 $ 379,876 
$ 408,572 $ 383,615 
$ 423,831 $ 392,449 
$ 470,189 $ 402,149 
$ 495,738 $ 4"13,563 
$ 511,020 $ 413,836 
$ 431,294 $ 393,853 
$ 50,779 $ 11,861 
$ 52,229 $ 10,646 
92 
87 
25 
53 
Table A3.IO: Wealth and storage results (c=82%) 
251 
$ 379,876 
$ 383,615 
$ 392,449 
$ 402,149 
$ 413,563 
$ 413,836 
$ 393,853 
$ 11,861 
$ 10,646 
92 
87 
25 
53 
